MOPAN ASSESSMENT REPORT

African Development Bank (AfDB)

PART II

Technical and Statistical Annex

MOPAN

Published February 2023

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MOPAN ASSESSMENT REPORT
2021-22

African Development Bank (AfDB)

PART II
Technical and Statistical Annex

MOPAN
Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network

EXPLANATORY NOTE

MOPAN is the only collective action mechanism that meets member countries' information needs regarding the performance of multilateral organisations (MOs). Through its institutional assessment reports, MOPAN provides comprehensive, independent, and credible performance information to inform members' engagement and accountability mechanisms.

MOPAN's assessment reports tell the story of the multilateral organisation (MO) and its performance. Through detailing the major findings and conclusions of the assessment, alongside the MO's performance journey, strengths, and areas for improvement, the reports support members' decision-making regarding MOs and the wider multilateral system.

MOPAN assessment reports are composed of two parts: the Analysis Summary and the Technical and Statistical Annex. This is Part II: Technical and Statistical Annex of AfDB (2021). It contains the detailed underlying analysis of each score, the list of supporting evidence documents, as well as the summarised results of the external partner survey that fed into this assessment.

For the Analysis Summary of the MOPAN Assessment of AfDB including organisational context, key findings and the assessment methodology and process, refer to Part I.

Please cite this publication as:
Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), (2023), *MOPAN Assessment Report: African Development Bank (AfDB),* 2021 Assessment, Paris.

PART II – TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations and Acronyms 2

PART II – Technical and Statistical Annex 3

Annex A: PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 4
Methodology scoring and rating 4
The AfDB's scoring overview 5
The AfDB's performance rating summary 6

Performance analysis table 8
Strategic management 8
KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results 8

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels, in line with the principles of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda 22

Operational management 36
KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility 36

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability 47

Relationship management 73
KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships 73

KPI 6: Working in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and catalysing the use of resources 89

Performance management 110
KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function 110

KPI 8: The MO applies evidence-based planning and programming 123

Results 135
KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals 135

KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, as the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate 150

KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently 152

KPI 12: Results are sustainable 157

Annex B: EVIDENCE LIST 160

Annex C: RESULTS OF THE MOPAN EXTERNAL PARTNER SURVEY 165
Respondent's membership of associated institutions or bodies 166
Respondent's geographical coverage 166

Survey questions 167

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
ADER	Annual Development Effectiveness Review
ADF	African Development Fund
ADOA	Assessments of additionality and development outcomes
AfDB	African Development Bank Group
AIF	African Investment Forum
ASR	Africa Specialty Risks
CGD	Centre for Global Development
CPPR	Country Portfolio Performance Review
CRC	Country risk classification
CRF	Crisis Response Facility
CRFA	Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAI	Disclosure and Access to information
DBDM	Development and Business Delivery Model
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DO	Development Outcome
ECGF	Governance and Economic Reforms Department
E&S	Environmental and Social
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
FI	Financial intermediary
GAP	Governance Action Plan
GCI-VII	7th General Capital Increase
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HR	Human Resources
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IDA	International Development Association
IDEV	Independent Development Evaluation
IFI	International Finance Institution
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPR	Implementation Progress and Results Report
IRM	Independent Recourse Mechanism
ISS	Integrated Safeguard System
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LoC	Line of Credit
MARS	Management Record Action System
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MI	Micro-indicator
MO	Multilateral Organisation
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MTR	Mid-term review
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NPL	Non-Performing Loan
NSO	Non-Sovereign Operation
NTF	Nigeria Trust Fund
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PBA	Performance-based formula
PBO	Programme-based operation
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCREN	Project Completion Report Evaluation Note
PETH	Ethics Department
PPP	Public-private partnership
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSE	Private Sector Environment
PSEAH	Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
PSR	Productivity-Sustainability-Resilience
QuODA	Quality of Development Aid
RBM	Result-based management
RDTS	Transition Support Department
REC	Regional Economic Community
RISP	Regional Integration Strategy Paper
RLF	Results Based Logical Framework
RMC	Regional Member Country
RMF	Results Measurement Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SEAH	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment
SESP	Self-Evaluation Systems and Processes
SH	Sexual Harassment
SME	Small and medium enterprise
SO	Sovereign operation
TA	Private Sector Development
ToC	Theory of Change
TSF	Transition Support Facility
TYS	Ten-Year Strategy
UA	Units of Aid
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	US Dollar
WARR	Weighted Average Risk Rating
XSR	Expanded Supervision Report

PART II

Technical and Statistical Annex

Part II: Technical and Statistical Annex provides the background to the key findings and scores presented in the first part of the report. It starts by outlining the underlying analysis of each score by key performance indicators (KPI), micro-indicators (MI) and elements. It then lists the documents used as evidence for analyses and scores. Lastly, it provides information about the survey methodology, response rates and summarises the results of the external partner survey that fed into the assessment.

MOPAN

ANNEX A – PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

METHODOLOGY FOR SCORING AND RATING

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.1 is described in the *2020 Methodology Manual*, which can be found MOPAN's website.

Each of the 12 KPIs contains several MIs, which vary in number. The KPI rating is calculated by taking the average of the ratings of its constituent MIs (Figure 1).

Scoring of KPIs 1-8

The scoring of KPIs 1-8 is based on an aggregated scoring of the MIs. Each MI contains several elements, which vary in number. Taking the average of the constituent scores per element, a score is then calculated per MI. The same logic is pursued at aggregation to the KPI level, to ensure a consistent approach. Taking the average of the constituent scores per MI, an aggregated score is then calculated per KPI.

Scoring of KPIs 9-12

The scoring of KPIs 9-12 is based upon a meta-analysis of evaluations and performance information, rated at the MI level and aggregated to the KPI level.

For KPI 9, results against the mandate and contribution to cross-cutting results are given equal weight. KPIs 9-12 assess results achieved as assessed in evaluations and annual performance reporting from the organisations.

Non-sovereign operations (NSOS) are covered under 9.1 for all evaluation dimensions, while SOs are treated in KPI 9 (effectiveness), 10 (relevance), 11 (efficiency), and 12 (sustainability).

Rating scales

Whenever scores are aggregated, rating scales translate them into ratings summarising the assessment across KPIs and MIs. Figure 2 shows the rating scale used under MOPAN 3.1.

FIGURE 2. **MOPAN 3.1 PERFORMANCE SCORING AND RATING SCALE, METHODOLOGY 3.1**

- Highly satisfactory (3.51-4.00)
- Satisfactory (2.51-3.50)
- Unsatisfactory (1.51-2.50)
- Highly unsatisfactory (0.00-1.50)
- No evidence / Not applicable

A score of "N/E" means "no evidence" and indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not any evidence was to be found. The team assumes that "no evidence" does not necessarily mean that the element is not present (which would result in a zero score). Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation. A note indicating "N/A" means that an element is considered to be "not applicable". This usually owes to the organisation's specific nature.

THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK'S SCORING OVERVIEW

The graphic on page 6 provides a snapshot of the African Development Bank's scoring against the MOPAN framework of key performance indicators (KPIs), micro-indicators (MIs), and elements by the five performance areas (Strategic Management, Operational Management, Relationship Management, Performance Management, and Results).

The Performance rating summary indicates that the African Development Bank performs well in the areas of Strategic Management and Performance Management with "satisfactory" or "highly satisfactory" scores across most of MIs and at the element level. The Bank also performs well in the areas of Operational Management, Relationship Management and Results, although there is room for improvement in addressing efficiency. Areas for development include work to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (MI 4.7 and MI 4.8), improve sustainability (MI 5.6), planned disbursements (MI 4.2) and timeliness of project completion (MI 11.2).

FIGURE 1. **THE AfDB'S PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY**



How to read these charts



- **Highly satisfactory** (3.51-4.00)
- **Satisfactory** (2.51-3.50)
- **Unsatisfactory** (1.51-2.50)
- **Highly unsatisfactory** (0-1.50)
- **No evidence / Not applicable**

Strategic management

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework

- 1.1 Long-term vision
- 1.2 Organisational architecture
- 1.3 Supports normative frameworks
- 1.4 Financial framework

KPI 2: Cross-cutting issues

- 2.1 Gender equality
- 2.2 Environment
- 2.3 Fragility
- 2.4 Governance

Operational management

KPI 3: Resources support, relevance and agility

- 3.1 Resources aligned to functions
- 3.2 Resource mobilisation
- 3.3 Decentralised decision making
- 3.4 Performance-based human resources

KPI 4: Cost and value consciousness, financial transparency

- 4.1 Translarent decision making
- 4.2 Disbursement as planned
- 4.3 Results-based budgeting
- 4.4 Audit
- 4.5 Control mechanisms
- 4.6 Anti-fraud procedures
- 4.7 SEA prevention / response
- 4.8 SH prevention / response

Relationship management

KPI 5: Planning / intervention design support, relevance and agility

- 5.1 Alignment to country
- 5.2 Context analysis
- 5.3 Capacity analysis
- 5.4 Risk management
- 5.5 Cross-cutting issues in intervention design
- 5.6 Sustainability
- 5.7 Implementation speed

KPI 6: Work in coherent partnerships

- 6.1 Agility
- 6.2 Comparative advantage
- 6.3 Use country systems
- 6.4 Synergies
- 6.5 Co-ordination
- 6.6 Information sharing
- 6.7 Accountability to beneficiaries
- 6.8 Joint assessments
- 6.9 Knowledge

Performance management

KPI 7: Transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function

- 7.1 RBM applied
- 7.2 RBM in strategies
- 7.3 Evidence-based targets
- 7.4 Effective monitoring systems
- 7.5 Performance data applied

KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied

- 8.1 Independent evaluation function
- 8.2 Evaluation coverage
- 8.3 Evaluation quality
- 8.4 Evidence-based design
- 8.5 Poor performance tracked
- 8.6 Follow-up systems
- 8.7 Uptake of lessons

Results

KPI 9: Achievement of results

- 9.1 Results obtained
- 9.2 Gender equality
- 9.3 Environment / climate change
- 9.4 Fragility
- 9.5 Governance

KPI 10: Relevance to partners

- 10.1 Responsive to needs

KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

- 11.1 Cost efficiency
- 11.2 Timeliness

KPI 12: Results are sustainable

- 12.1 Sustainable benefits

High confidence
Medium confidence
Little to no confidence

Highly satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Highly unsatisfactory
No evidence/Not applicable



PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TABLE

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities

KPI 1. Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results	KPI score
Satisfactory	3.42

The TYS 2013-22 provided the initial foundation for AfDB's work on inclusive and green growth (GG) as equally important objectives, with five operational priorities (High 5s) and 3 areas of special emphasis: gender, fragile states, and agriculture and food security. Its implementation was complemented by the High 5s Agenda that the board adopted in May 2016, and which updated the Bank's main priority areas and provided a strategic foundation geared to key results. The RMF was restructured in 2017 to make the High 5s central to reporting requirements in order to i) push towards the highest goals through indicators that set quantitative targets in key areas, and ii) provide a metric for measuring progress towards the SDGs given a nearly 86% congruence with the High 5s, according to the 2017 UNDP Africa Policy Brief on Strengthening Strategic Alignment for Africa. The Theory of Change underpinning the RMF was considered more comprehensive than those of comparator institutions according to a Bank benchmarking study. The transition to a new strategy in 2023 will take place in the context of a profoundly changed operating environment. The COVID-19 crisis brutally imposed a different way of doing business with client countries and within the Bank. The coexistence of the TYS 2013-22 and the High 5s (2016-25) has also created some challenges because the two strategies cover different time periods and the initial TYS priorities have been largely superseded by the High 5s. This raises questions about the primacy of the TYS, its convergence with the High 5s and how they are treated in the Bank's RMF.

While the vision is largely in line with the Bank's operational priorities, a clear analysis of its comparative advantages is still needed. This process began as part of preparing the new TYS. In 2021, the Bank board approved a proposal to enhance selectivity (as part of the GCI discussions), based on mapping comparative advantages against the High 5s agenda, and taking account of its track record, operational capacity, strategic partnerships, and RMCs' evolving demands. This can help the Bank better address calls from its RMCs to respond to their new challenges ("build back better", post-COVID prevention, energy transition) and from its Board to be more selective.

The Bank has traditionally focused on infrastructure development, which is distributed over all High 5s (especially power, industrialisation and integration), for reporting requirements. About 80% of its portfolio is focused in five sectors – transport, power, finance, agriculture, and water/sanitation. Over time, a solid basis of expertise, strategies, capacity, skills, and resources have been developed on these sectors of portfolio concentration, implying a de-facto comparative advantage. But there is no obvious correspondence between the areas of portfolio concentration and the High 5s. Projects are categorised by sector (portfolio composition) but reported on by High 5 in the RMF/ADER. The higher degree of dispersion in interventions related to the Quality of Life High 5 – public sector management, health, education, social protection, water and sanitation, urban development, skills development, and most of the policy-based financing and crisis-related budget support – further speaks to the need for intentional strategic thinking about the Bank's positioning. The highest share of project approvals (in terms of value) for the last 4 years has been in areas covered by this High 5. A further spike in 2020-21 reflected the COVID-19 response which was largely categorised there. Quality of Life approvals rose to 77% and 37% of total approvals in 2020 and 2021 respectively.

At the same time, at below 4%, the social sectors have traditionally been present in the Bank portfolio to a lesser extent. In line with the call for greater selectivity and the need to focus on core strengths, the Bank is revisiting its approach to the social sectors and streamlining the High 5 Quality of Life, but the categorisation of program-based operations (PBOs) and the work on governance may be challenging. It may take some time to show a portfolio composition with a better High 5s balance.

The Bank has taken the lead on the African continent for its work on regional integration. The scope of its policy work includes country level through the CSP and the RISP for North, West, Central, East, and Southern Africa. Having decentralised, the Bank can make full use of its proximity to and affinity with RMCs to strengthen its alignment, promote deeper policy and sector dialogue with its stakeholders, develop new business opportunities, and improve donor coordination. This was particularly relevant for fragile situations where country presence and a strong relationship with country stakeholders have evolved over time in a Bank's comparative advantage. This echoes the survey results showing mostly positive responses.

The COVID-19 crisis tested the Bank's capacity and agility to address emergency situations. The pandemic caused the Bank to rethink its priorities and financial projections swiftly. As early as April 2020, the Bank presented the COVID-19 CRF, articulated around improving RMC capacity to absorb the budgetary impact of the economic slowdown and ensure that governments could maintain their essential public expenditures. Moreover, ADF invested in the COVID-19 multi-country programmes of emergency assistance in alignment with the CRF, the TYS, and the High 5s.

The project pipeline was repurposed to establish the CRF, which was endowed with $10 billion, mostly as budget support, to meet pressing priority needs in RMCs. The COVID-19 crisis led to a deterioration in member countries' debt sustainability and impacted the Bank prudential ratios, putting a brake on its lending capacity. Also, RMCs had limited borrowing capacity during COVID-19 and there was a drop in demand for budget support in 2021, leading to cancellations or postponement. Overall, only 33% of its initial ambition was approved in the form of budget support or investment operations, and most key lending targets went unmet. Private sector operations were suspended in 2020 to prioritise sovereign loans. Lending is expected to grow again in the sovereign and non-sovereign portfolio in 2022 as payments from the GCI-VII continue to flow in. The Bank did maintain a strong financial position despite the COVID-19 crisis and preserved its AAA rating thanks to donor willingness to extend special temporary callable capital.

The Bank's ability to adapt its programming and financing to respond to COVID-19 in an agile and responsive way is reflected in the positive perceptions of external partners. However, the need for speed superseded existing strategies and programmes and inevitably caused delays in implementing the regular programme. An evaluation of the Bank response du COVID-19 was released in December 2022.

Alongside its strategic framework, the Bank has been implementing a comprehensive programme of reforms to operationalise its commitments to performance and results, among which:

The 2016-17 Development and Business Delivery Model (DBDM) and its drive to move closer to clients to enhance delivery and strengthen the performance culture has been a game changer for the Bank in improving its relevance and contribution to policy dialogue. Country offices manage a greater proportion of projects – from 60% in 2015 to 76% in 2021. The share of decentralised staff rose to 52% in 2021 from the 2015 baseline of 40% but remains below the RMF's 67% target for 2021. In its evaluation of the implementation of the DBDM (2019), IDEV noted that the Bank's small scale relative to other MDBs makes it more difficult to reach a critical mass that can justify the costs of opening new offices. Some issues still need to be – and are being – addressed, especially regarding a matrix management-related division of responsibility and accountability between sector and regional staff, and the number, skill mix, and location of private sector staff.

The One-Bank model reflects the institution's ambition and pathway towards a new set of standards for enhanced coordination, alignment and coherence across the whole Bank Group and its different entities. This is particularly relevant for Non-Sovereign Operations (NSOs) since private sector support is embedded within the organsational structure and not a separate entity. The link and coordination between SOs and NSOs still requires improvement. In 2020, the One Bank delivery model was supported by additions to KPIs intended to boost results, performance, and accountability. As part of the ADF-16 negotiations (virtual meeting July 2022) the Bank produced a document that proposes to accelerate its investment in PSD and NSOs in ADF countries, with special attention to fragile contexts. It will do this by using upstream sovereign investments to improve the enabling environment and overcome barriers to effective NSO investment.

The Bank adopted an ambitious set of commitments related to GCI-VII and ADF-15 in 2019. About two-thirds of the GCI-VII commitments were implemented as of December 2021, covering 34 actions to support seven strategic objectives. For ADF-15, 58 of 62 commitments were achieved at the time of ADF mid-term review in 2021.

Overall, the Bank has pursued a path of a significant transformation since the last MOPAN assessment in 2015-16. The TYS mid-term review and the DBDM evaluation in 2019 both note that many of the challenges facing the Bank are familiar, and that the tools to tackle them are available. However, some reforms (DBDM, One-Bank) have been implemented more slowly than anticipated and will take longer to show results. There is also a perception that the broad scope and diversity of reforms combined with several strategies and results framework (TYS, High 5s, DBDM, GCI commitments and ADF negotiations) have created goal congestion and made the strategic management of the Bank complex.

- The Bank's financial framework has ensured growing financing and predictability through core fund mobilisation mechanisms over a three-year replenishment cycle for ADF and periodic GCIs for ADB (the last two in 2019 and 2010).
- Bank shareholders adopted a significant capital increase in 2019 that doubled the capital base which rose from $93 billion to $208 billion. At the end of 2020, there was $144 billion of subscribed capital, ($10 billion of paid-up portions and $134 billion of callable portions). At the same time, the Bank carried out a balance sheet optimisation initiative to reduce concentration risk on its NSO portfolio and to increase lending headroom. In 2020, a new long-term financial sustainability framework was adopted.
- ADF-15 in 2019 saw an increase in pledged funding of 32% from the previous cycle to $7.6 billion, and ADF-16 concluded in 2022 with a further increase of 17% to $8.9 billion.
- Several initiatives were launched to address weaknesses in the use of shareholder capital. These included i) improving the range of loan and guarantee instruments that the Bank can deploy while strengthening net income and conserving risk capital; ii) stepping up engagement with banks, insurance companies and institutional investors to draw cost-effective private capital into productive investments with as little application of the Bank's capital as possible, and iii) revising prudential ratios and financial indicators to align them with the regulatory environment and rating agency standards. These measures protect the Bank's triple-A credit rating and reinforce its excellent position as an issuer in global debt capital markets.

Like other IFIs, the Bank devotes its own resources almost entirely to finance country and regional programs through sovereign loans. Trust funds, which are kept separate from ADF funds, can play a key role in financing special initiatives through grants, especially at the continental level, for which the Bank regular program is not well adapted. The main challenge is to ensure that the additional grant funding is mobilised in such a way that it fits into the strategic plans to complement the existing resources allocation system without competing with replenishment resources. This is an area where the Bank ought to mobilise larger volumes of funds and address the relative fragmentation of the trust fund portfolio. The survey results on whether the Bank manages trust funds efficiently through pooled and umbrella funds and for emergency/conflict situations show positive responses from borrowing countries but more critical views from some 25% (n=5/18 respondents) of board members (20 in total). To further pursue trust fund impact maximisation, a new trust fund policy was adopted in 2021 (Figure 9).

MI 1.1 Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage in the context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: A publicly available strategic plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision	3
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	3
Element 3: The strategic plan operationalises the vision and defines intended results	3
Element 4: The strategic plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance and attention to risks	3
MI 1.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Ten-Year Strategy (TYS) 2013-22 provided the initial foundation for AFDB's work on inclusive and GG as equally important objectives with 5 operational priorities and 3 areas of special emphasis. The implementation of the TYS was complemented by the adoption by the board of the High 5s Agenda (2016-25) in May 2016, which came to update the Bank's main operational priorities, provide additional elements to the Bank strategic foundations, and a metric for measuring progress in the pursuit of the SDGs. The first objective of the TYS is to achieve growth that is more inclusive, leading not just to equality of treatment and opportunity but to deep reductions in poverty and a correspondingly large increase in jobs. The second is to ensure that inclusive growth is sustainable, by helping Africa gradually transition to GG that will protect livelihoods, improve water, energy and food security, promote the sustainable use of natural resources and spur innovation, job creation and	1, 4 – 5, 13, 15 – 16, 20, 46, 60, 79, 100, 102 – 103, 111, 122

economic development. In the strategy, the importance of the private sector has increasingly been taking front-stage and the Bank is currently the main provider of infrastructure finance with private sector participation with $4.5 billion over 2007-22.

In 2015, AfDB president Akinwumi Adesina launched the High 5s which came to cast the TYS in the context of 5 strategic priority areas intended to accelerate support to African countries pursuing the SDGs: 1) Light up and Power Africa, 2) Feed Africa, 3) Industrialize Africa, 4) Integrate Africa, and 5) Improve the quality of life for the People of Africa. A High 5 can rely on a unique strategy developed concomitantly with the High 5s framework (Light up and Power Africa, Feed Africa, Industrialize Africa), on a previous strategy (Integrate Africa), or on various sector strategies (Improve the quality of life for the People of Africa). The Bank also committed to mainstreaming four cross-cutting themes: gender, climate, fragility and governance into policy work and operations. According to a 2017 UNDP study, the AfDB is 86% aligned with the implementation of the SDG Agenda 2030.

The High 5s have become central to the Bank's vision and the RMF reporting requirements were restructured accordingly in 2017. In the process, however, the TYS five operational priorities and 3 areas of special emphasis only partially coincide with the High 5s as some indicators receive less or no attention in the results framework that was restructured in 2017, especially private sector development, skills & technology, and, to some extent, the GG-related climate agenda. The coexistence of the TYS (2013-22) and the High 5 (2016-25) has created some challenges to the extent that these two undertakings cover different periods and the initial TYS priorities have been largely superseded by the High 5s agenda, raising questions about the primacy of the TYS, its convergence with the High 5s, and how they are treated in the RMF.

Element 2: While the vision is largely in line with its operational priorities, a clear analysis of the Bank's comparative advantages is still needed, and the process has started as part of preparing the new TYS. The Bank's main comparative advantage have not been analysed in a rigorous manner until recently, as part of the renewal of the TYS, which can help the Bank better respond to calls both by its RMCs to respond to new challenges ("build back better", post-COVID prevention, energy transition) and by its board to be more selective. A proposal to enhance selectivity was approved by the board in 2021 (as part of the GCI discussions), after the Bank went through a process of mapping its comparative advantages against the High 5 agenda, to identify priority areas, and taking account of the Bank's track record, its operational capacity, its strategic partnerships, and RMCs' evolving demands. In practice, the Bank has traditionally focused on infrastructure development and 80% of the Bank portfolio is focused in five sectors – transport, power, finance, agriculture, and water/sanitation. Over time, these sectors of portfolio concentration have built a solid basis of expertise, strategies, capacity, skills, and resources, implying a "de-facto" comparative advantage that still needs to be confirmed by further strategic analysis as the correspondence between the sectors of portfolio concentration and the High 5s is not obvious since projects are categorised by sector (portfolio composition) but reported on by High 5s in the RMF/ADER. The higher level of dispersion in interventions related to the "Quality of life" High 5, covering public sector management, health, education, social protection, water and sanitation, urban development, and skills development, as well as also most of the policy-based financing and crisis related budget support, further speaks to the need for an intentional strategic thinking about the Bank's positioning.

1, 4 – 5, 13, 15 – 16, 20, 46, 60, 79, 100, 102 – 103, 111, 122

This High 5 experienced a blip in 2020-21 because of the COVID-19 response which was mostly categorised there and brought the "Quality of Life" approvals to 77% and 37% of total approvals in 2020 and 2021 respectively. At the same time, the social sectors have traditionally been to a lesser extent present in the Bank portfolio at below 4%. The Bank is revisiting its approach to the social sectors and is streamlining the High- 5 "Quality of Life" around the concept of sustainable infrastructure for the social sectors. It may take some time, however, to show a more High 5s-balanced portfolio composition. This echoes the

Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) review of the UK's review of support for the AfDB, which emphasised the need to better balance the ambition to offer a comprehensive menu of development interventions and the need to focus on its core strengths, based on its comparative advantage. Also, it is to be noted that the Bank works on a demand-driven way and is to a large extent subject to what Governments want to borrow for, and their own assessment of what the Bank comparative advantages are compared to other IFIs. Still, with respect to comparative advantage, the Bank has taken the lead in the African continent for its work on regional integration, considering that the scope of its policy work covers country level through Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and the Regional Integrated Strategy Programs (RISPs) for North, West, Central, East, and Southern Africa. At the same time decentralisation permitted the Bank to make full use of its proximity and affinity to RMCs to strengthen its alignment with national priorities, promote deeper policy and sector dialogue with its stakeholders, develop new business opportunities, improve donor coordination, and enhance impact in the countries in which the Bank intervenes. This proved relevant for fragile situations where the Bank has markedly increased its presence and is recognised for having developed a strong relationship with country's stakeholders. Also, the Bank has developed a specific financing instrument, the Transition States Facility (TSF), which, according to IDEV's 2022 evaluation, embodies flexibility and has enabled the Bank to respond effectively to the multidimensional needs of transition states. This may evolve over time into a Bank comparative advantage, despite some implementation issues (to be discussed later in the report. In the same vein, it is important that the Bank pursues a dynamic and strategic discussion as part of its new TYS on the evolving nature of the demand side from its RMCs and how to remain relevant in a logic of comparative advantages while institutionalising greater selectivity.	
Element 3: The combination of the TYS, the High 5s and the Results Measurement Framework (RMF) has operationalised the vision by defining a set of underlying strategies and action plans, and including ambitious targets consistent with the SDGs and the African Union's Agenda 2063. The TYS mid-term review (2019) notes that the Bank's country strategies approved since 2013 are aligned with the TYS and with the High 5s priorities and consistently addressing the crosscutting areas of governance, fragility, gender and climate change. To report on results, the Bank has elaborated the RMF 2016-25, focusing on the Bank's High 5s and using four levels to track performance: 1) development progress across Africa; 2) the Bank's contributions towards development in all its operations; 3) the quality of the Bank's operations, and 4) monitors the Bank's efficiency as an organisation. Altogether the RMF identifies 14 objectives which summarise the theory of change that guides the Bank's actions. A benchmark study carried out by Management in 2021 notes that the Theory of Change that underpins the RMF is more comprehensive than those of comparator institutions. While the RMF/ADER methodology explains the articulation between the two TYS objectives and the High 5s, in the process of integration some more specific TYS indicators were not incorporated in the RMF or were not treated consistently in the case of cross-cutting issues. For instance, the GG-CC agenda (one of the TYS objectives) includes very few specific indicators in the RMF but it is rather addressed through existing proxy indicators related to inclusion, resilience, etc. Yet the new strategic framework on climate change (adopted by the board in October 2021 and launched at COP 26), including a five-year action plan, commits the Bank to fully align all new operations to the Paris Agreement by 2023 and all country strategies and internal interventions to the agreement by 2025. Also, it commits to invest 40% of its funds in climate finance and to maintain parity between adaptation and mitigation finance. This shows renewed commitment of the Bank towards the GG-CC agenda, but it is challenging to measure it through the RMF. On cross-cutting themes, four governance-related indicators were included but not for fragility nor climate. An evaluation of the TYS is currently under way and should provide a more detailed assessment of the continued relevance of the TYS after the launch of the High 5s initiative and their level of convergence.	1, 4 – 5, 13, 15 – 16, 20, 46, 60, 79, 100, 102 – 103, 111, 122

Element 4: A new TYS is now under development, anchored in the revised High 5s priorities and learning from numerous evaluations as well as from the lessons of the recent COVID-19 crisis management. The next TYS will guide the Bank to the last stretch of the SDG period in 2030. It will also be a period during which the Bank is likely to see the benefits from the reform efforts that it went through in the last couple of years. The revision of the strategic plan is complemented by a number of broad-ranging commitments made to the shareholders in the context of the ADF negotiations and general capital increase (GCI) of 2019, which allow the Bank to remain relevant and adapt to evolving circumstances while remaining within the purview of the TYS. The Bank has made an important job in pursuing the implementation of these commitments and report back to the board on a regular basis. In the case of GCI VII, about two-thirds of these commitments were implemented as of December 2021, covering 34 actions to support seven strategic objectives. For ADF-15, 58 of 62 commitments were achieved at the time of ADF Mid-Term Review in 2021.Similarly, the mid-term review of the ADF-15 (December 2021) highlighted how the ADF demonstrated performance, responsiveness and impact in countries facing threats of climate change, COVID-19 and the heavy debt burdens, meeting 94% of ADF-15 policy commitments due by the MTR. The implementation of the strategic framework is reviewed on a regular basis through the ADER, which follows the RMF framework. As described above, while the TYS indicators/targets in the RMF were initially set for 2022, the indicators were reset in 2017 with the advent of the High 5s and new targets established for 2025, some of which at unrealistic levels. However, the ADER stopped reporting on the 2025 targets since 2020 and only uses the targets for the on-going year. As a new TYS comes into place in 2023, new indicators and targets are likely to be introduced with a 2033 horizon, which may leave the High 5s 2025 targets unattended. In the specific case of addressing the impact of COVID-19, the Bank demonstrated agility in adapting to new circumstances and remain relevant without having to elaborate new strategies or amend existing ones. The impact of COVID-19 on the results frameworks (RFs) of the various strategies is yet to be assessed.	1, 4 – 5, 13, 15 – 16, 20, 46, 60, 79, 100, 102 – 103, 111, 122
MI 1.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.20**
Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan	3
Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan	3
Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4
Element 4: The operating model allows for strong co-operation across the organisation	3
Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results	3
MI 1.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: By and large the organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan. Within the current organisation, the president is assisted by the senior vice president (SVP) and eight vice presidents (VPs). One VP is in charge of regional offices and business delivery, three are in charge of sectors (agriculture, human and social development; energy; infrastructure & industrialisation); and the rest are service VPs dedicated to HR, technology & corporate services, finance, and economic governance & knowledge management. The private sector is also incorporated in the infrastructure VP. The four cross-cutting themes are all present in the organigram with their own divisions embedded	2 – 3, 4 – 5, 6 – 13, 14 – 15, 60 – 61, 80 – 99, 100 – 101

in one of the sectoral VPs (gender with agriculture/social, and climate with energy), in the Chief Economist's complex (governance) or in the Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery complex (RDVP) (fragility). The effectiveness of the mainstreaming of cross-cutting themes into Bank operations while being associated to a given VP has not been subject to an institutional review. Five regional offices support and coordinate the work of more than 40 country offices across the continent. The establishment of the revised DBDM in 2016-17 provided further impetus aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of the strategic plan. The Bank organised itself to implement the High 5s priorities by focusing on five institutional pillars: (i) move closer to the client to enhance delivery; (ii) reconfigure headquarters to support the regions to deliver better outcomes; (iii) strengthen the performance culture to attract and maintain talent; (iv) streamline business processes; and (v) improve financial performance and increase development impact. Overall, the reforms are seen by an IDEV evaluation of the DBDM (2019) to have contributed to a stronger focus and alignment with the High 5s, and improvements in the Bank's contribution to policy dialogue. A significant number of staff moved to the regional offices and a new organisation and management structure are now in place. In parallel, the Bank has taken steps to further devolve work and authority to the staff in the field. There are 52% of operations staff based in the regional and country offices, and 76% of projects are managed from country offices in 2021 (ADER). Both indicators are above the baseline of 40% and 60% respectively in 2015, showing implementation progress, but below targets of 63% and 80% respectively for 2021. Implementation has been slower than expected, leaving some room for further improvement. **Element 2:** The operating model is largely in place and supports implementation of the High 5s. The TYS mid-term review (2019) finds that Management should focus on implementation and delivery of enhanced results. Similarly, the DBDM evaluation by IDEV (2019) notes that the Bank has better resourced and empowered field offices and the organisational structure is better aligned to the High 5s. The reconfiguration of headquarters, although still work in progress, is positively perceived by RMC. IDEV evaluation of DBDM notes that all pillars are assessed as relevant to the aims of the DBDM and by and large staff came around the typical complexity of matrix management structures. However, it also notes that while reforms did take place, the level of organisational transformation was neither at the speed, nor the depth, originally intended. Implementation has been slower than anticipated, and the ambition of the proposed transformation was over optimistic given the context and capacity. The evaluation dates of 2019 and since then many of the recommendations made by IDEV, and the commitments implemented in the context of ADF-15 and GCI-VII, have been taken on board by Management (see KPI 7). Results will be examined in KPIs 9-12, but in some cases, they will take longer to materialise. The third progress report on the implementation of the CGI-VII (April 2022) indicate that several commitments refer to the improvement of the organisational model and that the programme is being implemented satisfactorily. Similarly, recommendations made in the context of the ADF-15 are well on their way to being implemented, which include strengthening the Bank's strategic focus, enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness while ensuring financial sustainability, improving its capacity to deliver results and at scale, and positioning it to achieve impact as a trusted development partner on the continent. **Element 3. The past couple of years have seen an important effort to review and update systems, processes and procedures governing the operating model.** The ADER is the main tool for reviewing on an annual basis progress on the delivery of the main indicators. It is structured around the High 5s at levels 1 and 2 and the cross-cutting areas; there is also a chapter on effective operational management and efficient management, levels 3 and 4 of the RMF 2016-25. Commitments made at the GCI-VII are	2 – 3, 4 – 5, 6 – 13, 14 – 15, 60 – 61, 80 – 99, 100 – 101

also reviewed every six months and progress reported to the board. One of the reforms that had the greatest impact on the Bank's operational model is the DBDM which was updated in 2016 and reviewed on a regular basis (including through the ADER). However, the decentralisation process is still subject to finetuning to maximise its effectiveness. In 2020, the COVID-19 crisis shifted the priorities of the Bank and its regional members countries, and was a major cause of review and adjustments, albeit temporarily, especially with respect to travel restrictions and working from home. More than 75 operations were postponed to prioritise COVID-19 relief, and the pipeline of projects was repurposed. Beyond the merits of the COVID-related operations, which is still being evaluated, the Bank's operational model demonstrated the capacity to respond swiftly to an emergency situation and to lead relief efforts in many countries. **Element 4: Decentralisation in a matrix-management structure should continue to be an area of attention with respect to pursuing strong relationship between the regions and the sectors while encouraging cross-complex collaboration.** Further clarifying decision-making authority and accountability issues between complexes and between HQ and the field, including field staff reporting arrangements has been the subject of attention in the Bank in implementing the DBDM. IDEV evaluation of DBDM (2019) notes that while being closer to the client is positively perceived by RMCs, the restructuring and subsequent reconfigurations of headquarter is still work in progress. As part of the operationalisation of the One Bank approach for joint planning and coordinating work programme interventions between regions and sectors, Management approved in July 2021 an operational instruction entitled "Rules of the Game" institutionalising greater interaction between regions, sectors and ecosystems around readiness and realism of lending projections and adequate resource allocation. Also, the establishment of an implementation manager position at the regional level is meant to improve portfolio management issues and the interface with sector staff. Similarly, the fact that staff working on NSOs have been concentrated in HQ calls for further adjustments, which is now being addressed through the recruitment of six regional NSO Leads for each of the five regions and the Nigeria Country Office. The One-Bank model raises the bar in terms of the institution's ambition towards a new set of standards for enhanced coordination, alignment and coherence across the whole Bank Group and its different entities. The One Bank model is particularly important for the way public and private interventions can harmonise processes and leverage each other to maximise their contribution to the SDGs. The IDEV evaluation of the Bank's Private Sector Development Strategy (2013-19) in 2020 noted some good examples of linkages between SOs and NSOs but also observed their scarcity. Also, the absence of clearly designated institutional responsibilities for ensuring linkages within the Bank is observed, while in principle they should happen more naturally since the private sector window is integrated within Bank's operations in one of the Vice-Presidencies and not a separate entity like in other IFIs. IDEV's 2019 evaluation of the Bank's utilisation of PPP mechanisms, notes that the Bank has no formal coordination mechanisms directed toward PPPs, facilitating concerted efforts across its departments. Subsequently, Management developed a Bank-wide PPP Framework to provide the needed strategic direction and required synergies for achieving a leadership position in the development of sustainable PPP projects in Africa. It is too early to assess whether this is resulting in stronger collaboration across the institution. **Element 5: The procedures, guidance and rules are in place and sufficiently clear with respect to responsibilities for results but some implementation challenges remain.** From an operational point of view, the Regions through their DGs are generally taking the lead with the support from the sectors. The country and regional levels are typically accountable for delivering results to client countries; however, the sector divisions retain by and large a direct line of responsibility over staff and project performance, ratings review and endorsement. An IDEV evaluation of the Bank's self-evaluation system	2 – 3, 4 – 5, 6 – 13, 14 – 15, 60 – 61, 80 – 99, 100 – 101

and processes in 2020 revealed that accountability mechanisms for achieving results were weak, both internally (by Management) and externally (towards the board). The main challenges raised were not related to the availability of procedures and guidance but to their implementation, particularly with respect to the low level of compliance with established procedures, deficient candour, over-optimism in assessing performance, and limited resources for M&E during supervision. Since that evaluation, the system has been overhauled particularly through the adoption of the Integrated Quality Assurance Plan in 2019 (see KPI 7.2.1 for more details) and the Operational Instructions of 2021 that came to redefine the articulation between the Theory of Change, the RFs, monitoring and risk management, and responsibilities for results. There has been progress on the cascading of top level KPIs and targets down to line managers and task managers. Several VPs have cascaded their performance targets to provide a clear line of sight for delivery of key operational priorities. An updated operational manual, ready but delayed, to coincide with the establishment of other quality assurance measures, will present a compendium of operational guidance including on responsibilities for results. Furthermore, a new delegation of authority matrix was prepared and finalised in January 2022. Finally, a proposal for a new Organisational fine-tuning was approved by the board in September 2021, published in May 2022 and is now effective since 1 August 2022. Private sector operations through PINS, which is detached from the originating units, exerts a monitoring function with responsibility for reviewing and consolidating portfolio data. However, gaps were noted in terms of monitoring of achievements in private sector interventions, including inconsistencies between development objectives set at origination through the ADOA system and the objectives that are tracked during implementation. SNOQ and PINS have been working together to harmonise the results reporting requirements and ensure pro-active management of development results, including a better designation of responsibility for monitoring and reporting results, and better alignment between ADOA indicators at origination and those monitored at implementation. However, the common terms of agreement and the loan agreement are the only legally binding obligations of the contract that the Bank, through PINS, can enforce. Legal agreements now include ADOA indicators therefore, so that they are implemented and tracked.	2 – 3, 4 – 5, 6 – 13, 14 – 15, 60 – 61, 80 – 99, 100 – 101
MI 1.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 1.3: Strategic plan supports the implementation of global commitments and associated results	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.67**
Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, wider normative frameworks and their results	4
Element 2: A system is being applied to track normative results for the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and other relevant global commitments	4
Element 3: Progress on implementation and aggregated results against global commitments are published at least annually	3
MI 1.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The alignment of the strategic plan and the 2030 SDG Agenda and wider normative frameworks is strong. The Ten-Year Strategy (TYS) was formulated and approved in 2013 at the end of a decade of solid and sustained growth in Africa and improvements in human development indicators, a period when the continent was 'rising'. The High 5s initiative came to operationalise the TYS and at the same time to better align the strategy with the SDG 2030, the AU-adopted Agenda 2063 as well as the Climate Agenda.	6 – 13, 14 – 16, 20, 22, 27, 101, 102, 103

The 2017 UNDP study on strengthening strategic alignment for Africa indicates a level of congruence between the High 5s, the SDGs, and the Africa Union's Agenda 2063 as high as 86%. This shows that synergies exist in the combined implementation of the three agendas. The yardstick used to measure alignment is the congruence between agendas in terms of specific development priorities. Also, given the high level of consolidation in the High 5s, the inclusion of the cross-cutting areas further strengthens the congruence with the other two development agendas. Based on recent developments in the continent, and in light of the SDG and climate agreement priorities, the TYS mid-term review finds that the priorities articulated by the Bank's TYS, the High 5s and the cross-cutting priorities of governance, fragility, gender and climate change (CC) remain highly relevant for the continent; no mid-term course correction was considered to be necessary. However, in blending the TYS with the High 5s, GG and CC, one of the TYS objectives, was not fully followed through in terms of indicators and targets in the RF. To some extent, the same can be said for fragility and. to a lesser degree, for gender. However, the Bank overall strategic framework was recently enriched by a new strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience (2022-26), a new gender strategy 2021-25, and a new CC-GG strategy, policy and action plan (2021), with revised indicators and targets, which came to confirm the relevance of the TYS objectives, even if they still need to be incorporated in the next iteration of the RMF.	
Element 2: To increase the strategic focus of the TYS on the five priority areas, the Bank has re-engineered the internal architecture of the RMF to match the Bank's corporate priorities with the SDGs and other relevant global commitments. One of the main novelties in the architecture of the new RMF is that level 1 and level 2 are vertically aligned: both levels are organised around the High 5s. Designing the RMF in this way helps build stronger conceptual linkages between Africa's development challenges (Level 1) and the Bank's actions to address them (Level 2). Thus, for each of the High 5s and the four cross-cutting themes, the RMF identifies a small set of strategic indicators and targets from the strategies approved by the board or uses proxy indicators (such as for GG and CC) of the existing set, for instance as they relate to inclusion or resilience.	6 – 13, 14 – 16, 20, 22, 27, 101, 102, 103
The RMF mid-term review notes that by placing the High 5s at the centre of Levels 1 and 2 of the RMF, the Bank made a conscious effort to i) push towards the highest goals through indicators that measure progress towards results achievement regarding infrastructure development, regional integration, skills and technology, private sector development, and governance, and ii) realise the SDGs given their high level of congruence with the High 5s. The review also found that some specific adjustments are necessary to ensure the continued alignment of the RMF, especially given the multi-layered work ongoing at the Bank, and the new strategies on private sector development, gender, GG and fragility, as well as the proposal to increase the Bank's selectivity. A revision of the RMF is expected in 2023.	
Element 3: Progress data is reported annually and publicly in the ADER, in line with the RMF format, and in the annual report, to assess whether the Bank is on track to meet its targets and enable it to take measures to improve the pace of delivery. The annual report presents the main aggregate results by High 5s and by sector as well as a snapshot of the Bank's achievements, approvals and disbursements for the year and is primarily geared to the interested public and other global stakeholders. As a subset, the Bank also presents the annual report on CC and GG. A dedicated space for reporting ADF results, performance and targets is provided in the ADER to track progress for Levels 1, 2 and 3 of the RMF. At mid-term and at the end of the ADF cycle, summary papers should provide data on performance and results for ADF. The annual portfolio performance report covering both SOs and NSOs was re-introduced in 2019, but no new reports were produced since, which reduces its usefulness in terms of providing an up-to-date (annual) situation of a rapidly evolving portfolio.	

The ADER and the annual report are largely based on the same monitoring data, and hence share similar challenges, such as the meaningful aggregation of results information across country programmes that are based on diverse M&E systems and results frameworks of mixed quality (this point is further reviewed under KPI 7). To be noted that there are no specific level 3 KPIs reported in the RMF on NSOs performance. It appears that some indicators may include aggregation of SOs and NSOs data which is not clearly explained in the methodology and presents challenges to the extent that NSOs do not fit the same performance criteria than SOs, are often not comparable and cannot be aggregated.	6 – 13, 14 – 16, 20, 22, 27, 101, 102, 103
MI 1.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 1.4: Financial framework supports mandate implementation	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.80**
Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited	4
Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency	4
Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/ un-earmarked funding at global and country levels	4
Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that grants, dedicated windows and trust funds are targeted at priority areas complementing traditional financing	3
MI 1.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank Group has been successful in mobilising funding for its three main institutional components (ADB, ADF, and the NTF). The bulk of Bank's funds are "core" un-earmarked resources which is a critical asset for planning and priority setting. This also allows for more flexibility in being able to finance priority areas or adjust to an evolving context. But the Bank's budget is still inadequate compared to the ambitions of its strategies; its agenda on fragile context is an example. • **The ADB** funding derives from: i) subscriptions by member countries (mostly non-regional) known as general capital increases (GCI), typically every 10 years, ii) borrowings on international capital markets, and iii) loan repayments. The last GCI (VII) took place in 2019 and doubled the capital base from $93 billion to $208 billion to be released progressively over the following couple of years. • **The ADF** derives funding from the tri-annual replenishment process in the form of grants from member countries (mostly non regional). ADF-15 (2020-22) saw the contribution of $7.6 billion, up 32% from the previous cycle. The pledged amount under ADF-16 was the largest replenishment in the Fund's history ($8.9 billion). Since 1999, the principle for allocating resources to ADF recipient countries has been according to the Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) formula that integrates the country's needs and population, the infrastructure development index, and its performance (public and social policies, governance, etc.). • **The NTF** is a self-sustaining revolving fund whose objective is to assist the development efforts of the Bank's low-income regional member countries whose economic and social conditions and prospects require concessional financing. An important development of the last five years is the growing access of traditional ADF countries to the ADB window, either through graduation or the revised credit policy. This trend has lifted the share of the ADB Sovereign window from 32% to 41% of Bank Group portfolio in 2019. This trend is being pursued through the ADF-16 negotiations with a proposal to expanding the Fund footprint in private sector	6, 7 – 8, 15, 51, 95, 104

development and non-sovereign operations with a focus on fragile context (July 2022). The Bank should do so by using upstream sovereign investments to improve the enabling environment and overcome barriers to effective NSO investment. In 2018, the Bank carried out a balance sheet optimisation initiative aimed at reducing concentration risk on its non-sovereign portfolio and increasing lending headroom. In December 2020, a new long-term financial sustainability framework was adopted, including the revision of prudential ratios and financial indicators. It also includes two new strategic control mechanisms to supplement the cost-to-income ratio and a target for annual budget growth, established in the cost containment framework. Several initiatives were also launched to: i) optimise its financial policies to improve the range of loan and guarantee instruments it can deploy while conserving risk capital and ii) stepping up engagement with the banks, insurance companies and institutional investors to draw cost-effective private capital into productive investments. Taken as a whole, these approaches have the potential to materially improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which the Bank deploys the capital at its disposal to deliver value for money. Also, these measures both protect the Bank's triple-A credit rating and reinforce its excellent position in global debt capital markets as an issuer. Keeping the AAA rating is a testimony to the Bank's strong financial performance despite difficult circumstances, but it came at a cost. Because of the COVID-19 crisis, the risk profiles and debt sustainability of member countries deteriorated (non-regional and regional), which impacted the AfDB Risk Capital Adequacy ratio which determines, among other factors, the Bank's lending capacity. As a result, there was a significant drop of the Bank's new approvals in 2020. The Bank prioritised sovereign operations to face the COVID-19 pandemic in this unprecedented period over new private sector operations. While approvals were lower for the year, disbursements on sovereign operations were higher than approvals (for the first time in a decade) as most of the COVID-19 Response Facility (CRF) was fast disbursing operations. The timing of the COVID-19 crisis was particularly unfortunate as it happened just after the capital increase of 2019, which would have reset the Bank's prudential ratios to a normal level, but new contributions normally take time to materialise and are spread over a decade. Admittedly, the Bank did well in maintaining a strong financial position despite the COVID-19 crisis, and preserving its AAA rating, as the African continent needs access to low interest loans more than other continents. This was also made possible by the donor's willingness to extend special temporary callable capital to assist the Bank in maintaining the AAA. **Element 2: In 2020, the Bank adopted several measures to strengthen its resource allocation processes and make them more transparent, including through an integrated budgetary framework.** The Bank has engaged in a cost structure review exercise leading to the elaboration of new budget growth scenarios mostly based on staffing measures and other cost avoidance initiatives to align with a sustainable revenues/cost trajectory. To achieve a transition from cost-based to delivery-based budget control, Management implemented a new budget system that enhances budget execution processes, ensures alignment of budget planning with budget execution, fosters a link between budget execution and work programme delivery. A new budgeting approach based on staff weeks and cost coefficients allocates resources for the key elements of the Bank's operational work programme. It uses historical time and cost trends to establish a baseline cost for the Bank's key work-programme deliverables. Resources are then allocated based on the programme of approvals, the planned knowledge outputs (country strategy papers, economic and sector work, and others), and the size of the portfolio under supervision. The Bank also introduced the activity time recording system to enable better planning and monitoring of staff effort. The coefficient-based approach, supplemented with the recording system, aims to improve efficiency and increase accountability in the use of Bank resources. Concerns have been expressed by some board members during the interviews that too many initiatives are being launched, and that their budgets and expected outcomes need to be made clearer. In fulfilling its GCI-VII commitments, the Bank implemented a new process for allocating resources to new initiatives	6, 7 – 8, 15, 51, 95, 104

and other corporate programmes, incorporating a prioritisation and arbitration process in allocating resources based on business cases with detailed cost–benefit analysis for each initiative. An interim template was developed during 2020 and approved by the board in December 2020. It was used by cost centres for costing initiatives included in the 2021 budget proposal. The template has been reviewed and updated in 2022, to reflect learning from the 2021 budget process. Upgrading management information systems, and improvements in ICT, helps better monitor and manage the alignment of people, work programmes and deliverables, the administrative budget and financial resources. It is noteworthy that some recent new initiatives – the Africa Emergency Food Production Facility, the new Climate Action Window, the Africa Disaster Risk Financing Program, and the African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation– received strong support internationally. **Element 3: The review of the financial framework by the governing bodies is strong.** Ahead of the annual meetings, the boards of governors discharge their statutory duties by approving the annual report and audited financial statements for the financial year ending on 31 December. The board of governors approves the distributions of income and surplus account to various development initiatives, listed in the annual financial report. They also adopt resolutions pertaining to the allocation and distribution of allocable income of the AfDB and the distribution of part of the income of the NTF. The board provide strategic and institutional direction to ensure delivery of the High 5s priorities, with specific emphasis on the approval of strategies, policies, loans and grants, equity investments, guarantees, the work programme and administrative budget, and the lending programme. The policies, processes, and practices deployed by the Bank to manage risks are described in the financial statements of the financial report. The Bank has strengthened the monitoring of its loan and equity portfolios with the Risk Capital Utilization Rate and other prudential ratios and metrics and through the launch of an associated taskforce, with regular reporting to Senior Management and the board of directors via the Medium-Term Financial Outlook. In December 2020, the board approved a new long-term financial sustainability framework – one of the GCI-VII commitments –and in February 2020 it approved the balance sheet optimisation framework which should guide the implementation of the Bank's strategy over the GCI-VII planning horizon. Finally, the Bank has engaged in a cost structure review, leading to the elaboration of new budget growth scenarios mostly based on staffing measures and other cost avoidance initiatives to align with a sustainable revenues/cost trajectory. The guiding principles by which the ADF manages its core and non-core risks are governed by the General Authority on Asset Liability Management (the ALM Authority) approved by the board of directors, so as to manage its liquid assets and liabilities within defined parameters. Also, the board of directors avails itself of several committees to conduct exhaustive reviews of matters within the financial areas of competence: i) the Committee for the Whole on the Budget (CWHOLE) which conducts mid-term and end-of-year reviews of performance reports on the implementation of the budget and the work programme, and ii) the Audit and Finance Committee (AUFI) that reviews reports of several audits as well as the Audit Action Plan for country/regional offices and provides effective oversight and monitoring of the implementation of audit recommendations, the administrative budget, the 2020 lending programme, the special operations unit portfolio, group risk management, reports on capital adequacy and exposure, and market risks. **Element 4: While the bulk of Bank financing is through core resources, hence un-earmarked, the Bank maintains funding windows and other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide additional financing for specific areas at global and country levels that meet the Bank and the donor's priorities.** Despite the tough economic, political, and health backdrop globally, the Bank raised additional resources of UA 238.14 million in 2021 from traditional and emerging donors, including foundations and RMCs in the form of multi-donor thematic trust funds and bilateral trust funds. These	6, 7 – 8, 15, 51, 95, 104

amounts are spread over 11 initiatives and 18 partners, with two standing out: German support for the Sustainable Energy Fund and Canadian support for the Climate Finance Facility, representing 65% of the total. The rest of the trust fund portfolio is therefore relatively fragmented. In October 2021, the board approved a new trust fund policy after wide consultations internally and externally with donor partners and other stakeholders. The policy is designed to equip trust funds to respond to current and future demands and to rising RMC funding needs. The policy should enable the Bank to scale up resource mobilisation by offering more flexibility to a wider range of donors, reducing the proliferation and fragmentation of the Bank's trust fund portfolio, lowering transaction costs, accelerating decision-making, and enhancing the trust fund portfolio's overall effectiveness and impact. The Bank continued to explore ways of rationalising the use of thematic trust funds through merging and restructuring to ensure fit for purpose and scale. These measures are relatively recent and are expected to yield results in the near future. **Element 5: Like other IFIs, the Bank's own resources are almost entirely devoted to financing country and regional programmes through sovereign loans. Trust funds, which are kept separate from ADF funds, can play a key role in financing special initiatives through grants, especially at the continental level, for which the Bank regular programme is not well adapted.** The Bank strives to ensure that, while additional grant funding is welcome, it is mobilised in a way that fits in the strategic plans and complement the existing resources allocation systems of ADB and ADF. This is an area that the Bank is pursuing in its resource mobilisation strategy as an opportunity to launch new initiatives that are not necessarily under the purview of governments, and which can provide more flexibility and agility of intervention. Also, some type of interventions, especially for disaster relief etc., are more akin to grant financing rather than lending, making the role of trust funds more relevant. In the Bank, trust funds are completely untied (i.e. the Bank does not accept any contribution to a trust fund that imposes nationality restrictions on procurement). To further pursue trust fund impact maximisation, a new policy was adopted in 2021 allowing trust funds to receive all available types of instruments including grants, loans, equity, and guarantees, as well as promoting multi-donor vehicles for activities that go beyond simple technical assistance. A trust fund and co-financing finder portal site (http://trustfundscofinancing.afdb.org/) gives the Bank's overall trust fund platform visibility, showing the priority areas of each fund and current available resources. A standing committee on partnerships reviews all new partnership proposals and the establishment of trust funds to ensure internal coordination, complementarity with Bank's initiatives and the alignment of proposed partnerships with AfDB's corporate strategy. Despite positive views from borrowing countries, the external survey shows some more negative opinions from board members about the efficient use of trust funds. Five members representing seven countries "somewhat disagreed" or "disagreed". This represents 24% of respondents and 26% of countries represented in the board (including the EU) as some members represent several countries. This may deserve further probing and indicates some possible level of improvement and therefore "substantial implementation" (score 3) but not full (4). (Figure 3)	6, 7 – 8, 15, 51, 95, 104

FIGURE 3. **AfDB MANAGES TRUST FUNDS EFFICIENTLY, INCLUDING THROUGH POOLED AND UMBRELLA FUNDS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=105)

6, 7 – 8, 15, 51, 95, 104

MI 1.4: Evidence confidence	High confidence

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for crosscutting issues at all levels, in line with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda principles	KPI score
Satisfactory	3.29

The Bank recognises gender, climate change, fragility, and governance as cross-cutting themes that ensure that its interventions are aligned with the SDGs. These themes are quite largely integrated across interventions. This integration reflects important commitments made at the Bank level, dedicated strategies and policies, mainstreaming the themes across strategic frameworks and projects, specialised departments dedicated to support and coordination. and strong accountability systems. The partners survey confirms a positive perception of Bank interventions: more than 80% agree to some extent that the Bank promotes and/or addresses these themes through its operations and strategies.

Gender

The Bank has made real progress in mainstreaming gender in its interventions under the 2014-18 Gender Strategy. This goal was included in GCI-VII and ADF-15 commitments. GCI-VII commits to developing a new gender equality strategy and action plan (Action 6, Objective 1), while the ADF-15 replenishment report includes three commitments related to gender: the development of a new strategy, the use of a gender marker system and the development of CGPs. The Bank integrates gender equality in its strategy and functioning in several ways. At the national and regional levels, it does so through CSPs and RISPs; along the project lifecycle, by building staff capacity and providing tools to incorporate a gender perspective, such as the gender market system, and lastly, by producing knowledge on gender, such as country and SGPs. The AfDB has created a strong accountability system to reflect the inclusion of gender organisation-wide using several tools. At the aggregated level, specific RMFs are created with indicators and targets for every level of results. At the project level, a gender marker system, implemented in 2018, allows the Bank to screen sovereign operations during the design phase to identify its level of impact on gender equality. According to IDEV, measurement capacity on gender equality remains a challenge at the Bank and among the RMCs; the implementation of the new Gender Strategy 2021-25 may change this. Strong processes are in place to ensure measures for gender equality are considered systematically for projects. Operations with a gender-informed design reached 87% of new operations in 2021, against 75% in 2015. However, the integration is often too ambitious and lacks coherence, according to IDEV's 2020 evaluation. At the country level, CSPs were mostly gender-informed, but the relevance and consistency of the analysis could be improved.

Human resources dedicated to gender more than doubled from 2018 to 2022, up from 8 persons to 19 persons. This is significant, as capacity had been a sticking point of the gender agenda: according to IDEV's 2020 evaluation, which reported a general perception among staff that there are insufficient resources dedicated to gender, especially at the RMC level. The new

Gender Strategy aims to address these gaps. While all departments take part in implementing the Bank Gender Strategy, a Gender, Women and Civil Society Department was created in 2017. It is responsible for strategic leadership, coordinating gender-related interventions across the Bank and for developing tools and capacity in gender mainstreaming. While several initiatives exist for developing staff capacity on gender, these could be further strengthened. IDEV suggests involving gender specialists at the beginning of a project to strengthen gender diagnostics, to train key stakeholders, and more generally to further leverage the Gender Community of Practice. In 2021, $240 000 were approved to build capacity on gender mainstreaming for the PIU staff.

Climate change

Environmental sustainability and climate change are high on the Bank's agenda, which has demonstrated important leadership on climate at a global level including COP 26 and COP 27. The Bank has made several climate and environment commitments in the GCI-VII and the ADF-16 replenishment. This last replenishment includes a dedicated Climate Action Window ($429 million) and commits to provide 40% of its core financing towards climate finance.

Among MDBs, the AfDB has the second highest share of climate finance, which represents 34% of its operations, and the second highest share of climate finance dedicated to adaptation (63%). The transition to green growth is one of the two overarching objectives of the TYS 2013-22. In 2016, the High 5s agenda confirmed climate change and green growth as a cross-cutting issue.

The Bank has deployed several tools to increase climate change accountability in addition to its RMF. It has updated climate screening tools to support the implementation of the High 5s and the INDCs, developed a guidance note for mainstreaming climate change in CSPs and RISPs, and the GHG Accounting and Reporting Tool and the GG Framework.

With its new strategic framework 2021-25 for Climate Change and Green Growth, the AfDB aims to go further. It seeks to address the important pitfalls of the sector, such as better defining mitigation, adaptation and green jobs, and establishing indicators for biodiversity and land degradation neutrality co-benefits.

Processes in place have successfully supported mainstreaming climate change in operations: in 2021, 92% of new operations had a climate-informed design compared to 75% in 2015. The production of a guidance note on climate mainstreaming has helped to mainstream climate change at country level, but this could be improved by strengthening capacity and using targets and indicators more systematically.

The Bank has invested in human and financial resources to support its climate and GG ambitions. The CC-GG is responsible for implementing climate actions plans and mainstreaming CC, and a CC coordination committee coordinates related interventions. There were 20 department positions in 2018 and 24 in 2022, and the Bank has deployed climate specialists in the regions. However, more could be done to keep addressing the capacity constraints that have thwarted strategy implementation, according to IDEV.

Fragility

As a bank dedicated to the African continent that counts many fragile situations, the AfDB has an important role to play in integrating fragility into development work. Accordingly, the Fragility Strategy 2014-19 (extended to 2021) aimed at placing the Bank at the centre of Africa's efforts to address fragility. Embedding fragility as a cross-cutting issue is an essential dimension of the strategy although it does not suggest additional areas of engagement but rather seeks to support TYS implementation with a fragility perspective and to draw from other strategies and policies. While the GCI-VII includes no specific commitments to fragility, the ADF-15 committed to nine actions to strengthen the Bank's approach to fragility.

The new strategy 2022-2026, seeks to reinforce Bank leadership on the fragility agenda in Africa by focusing on its comparative advantages – its long-standing relationships with RMCs, its convening power as an African institution, and its capacity to engage in trusted policy dialogues, and by evolving towards more integrated, structural, and coordinated approaches. Fragility has been largely integrated across the institution, according to IDEV. The fragility lens was rather well applied in regional and country strategies (80% of sampled CSPs) and supported by the development of cutting-edge tools. The Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA), a standardised fragility assessment tool implemented in 2018 to build the Bank's analytical approach to fragile situations, has helped build the quantitative side of full-fledged fragility assessments that reflect key drivers and dynamics of fragility in a country or region, as well as key operational risks and opportunities, including entry points to address them and programme areas that could help build resilience.

Human and financial resources dedicated to fragile contexts have increased in recent years. The Bank increased its commitments to transition states by 51% during the 2014-19 period compared to the 2008-13 period. It has also successfully increased professional staff in fragile situations, despite the increased cost incurred compared with stable situations. In December 2021, a total of 202 professional staff were in transition states – including fragility, sectoral, and other cross-cutting specialists – a significant increase from 92 in 2019. New incentives are being introduced through the 2021 people strategy to encourage staff to work in fragile contexts.

Governance

While Governance is considered as a cross-cutting issue, its mainstreaming differs from gender or environment issues, which have a more structured process for integration and systematic review. Governance is integrated more in country policy and institutional context rather than at the project level. As such, it is mostly mainstreamed in CSPs, PBOs operations, and policy dialogue, a distinction that appears adequate. While governance is not systematically mainstreamed, all projects may undergo governance analysis on specific issues such as procurement and financial management as required. Clear accountability systems are in place, with a new result framework aligned on the Bank's RMF. The Governance Action Plan (GAP) included two unimplemented commitments designed to strengthen accountability: creating a governance oversight committee to monitor progress against the RMF and KPIs, and the 2016 mid-term review. Governance has benefited from more financial resources in the recent years: UA 6.9 billion was outlaid for governance operations under the strategic framework compared to UA 4.2 billion for the first strategic framework and action plan 2008-12. Regarding HR, the Governance and Economic Reforms Department had 25 professional staff as of June 2022, below GAP II's 2018 target of 40. Of these staff, 80% are in regional offices, above GAP II's 2018 target of 50%.

MI 2.1 Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for gender equality and women's empowerment	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.17**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of application	4
Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	3
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets	3
Element 4: Gender equality screening checklists or similar tools inform the design for all new interventions	3
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address gender equality issues	3
Element 6: Staff capacity development on gender is being or has been conducted	3
MI 2.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Ten-Year Strategy defines gender as an emphasis area, together with fragility and climate change, and the Bank's commitment on this theme is recognised by its partners (Figure 4). The ADF incorporates these themes as cross-cutting issues as well. The Bank's vision and objectives regarding gender are clearly stated in its successive gender strategies, for the period 2014-18 and 2021-25, which are aligned with the TYS, the High 5s, and the other AfDB strategies. The 2014-18 strategy focused on three pillars: legal status and property rights, economic empowerment, and knowledge management and capacity building. The three pillars of the Gender Strategy 2021-25 are the following: • Empowering women through access to finance and markets • Accelerating employability and job creation for women through skills enhancement • Increasing women's access to social services through infrastructure.	6 -13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 79 – 101, 102

Gender strategies include clear targets for gender mainstreaming. Each gender strategy also produces a specific RMF with indicators focused on gender, including targets for every level and an action plan (for the 2021-25 strategy).

Gender is generally mainstreamed to a large extent into other policy frameworks. On this front, the 2014-18 strategy has led to the adoption of more gender-sensitive policies and strategies, increased gender analysis in projects, and reforms in the Bank. However, the degree of mainstreaming varies depending on the policy framework. While it is mainstreamed into policy frameworks focused on cross-cutting issues and private sector development, the integration is more limited for the regional Integration policy and strategy. There is little evidence that a specific gender analysis was included in policy frameworks related to COVID-19 although gender specialists were included in project teams and operations were categorised using the gender marker system (GMS).

FIGURE 4. **AfDB PROMOTES GENDER EQUALITY THROUGH ITS OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

6 -13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 79 – 101, 102

Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets are integrated to a large extent into the Bank's strategic plan and objectives. Gender is reflected in the commitments of the Bank to shareholders: Action 6 of objective 1 of the GCI-VII commitments is dedicated to developing a new gender equality strategy and action plan. The ADF-15 replenishment report also includes three commitments related to gender: the development of a new strategy, the use of a GMS and the development of CGPs. Among ADF-15 commitments for the High 5s, 8 concern women specifically. While some of them have been met (2) or exceeded (1), 5 had been partially met as of April 2022. As of April, 2022, targets regarding gender had been met for the two commitments made for water security and sanitation, one out of three for Feed Africa, and one out of three for Light up and power Africa. Several were being met in 2022.

The Bank integrates gender equality in its strategy and functioning in several ways: gender mainstreaming at the national and regional level through CSPs and RISPs, along the project lifecycle, by building the capacity of staff and providing tools to incorporate a gender perspective, such as the GMS, and by producing knowledge on gender, such as CGPs and SGPs.

In terms of reporting, the Bank's RMF includes specific indicators for gender equality and sex-disaggregated indicators at four levels but obtaining data and reporting on gender-disaggregated data for operations can still be challenging. Reporting disaggregated data has improved over the years,

including for old projects that had not planned for it in their RFs. Data for gender-disaggregated reporting can be obtained in several ways: when information is lacking in project completion reports, gender disaggregated data is extrapolated from a subset of projects for which data is available, and when this is not possible, national-level data can be used to estimate the proportion of women beneficiaries. Gender disaggregated reporting could be further improved by providing greater clarity on which of the aforementioned methods was used to obtain each gender-disaggregated indicator, and by systematising data collection and reporting at the project level for the Level 2 KPIs which are gender-disaggregated in the ADER. **Element 3: While strong accountability systems on gender equality are in place, measurement capacity on gender equality could still be improved**, both at the Bank and among RMCs, according to the 2019 TYS mid-term review and IDEV's 2020 evaluation. The AfDB has set up several tools to reflect the inclusion of gender throughout the organisation: • At an aggregated level, RMFs include specific indicators for the High 5s results, for the results of the Bank's operations for women and girls, and at the country level for the mainstreaming of gender in public operations and CSPs. It also includes gender-disaggregated indicators. • At the project level, a GMS that has been implemented since 2018 allows the Bank to screen each project during the preparation phase to identify the level of impact it will have on gender equality, according to which it will be categorised while at project appraisal, a deeper analysis is conducted. In addition, the IPR guidance note and PCR requires specific analysis on this issue. The IPR guidance note states that *"In assessing outcomes and outputs performance for the various projects components, particular attention is paid to sex-disaggregated indicators to capture overall progress towards achieving gender equality, and to core sector indicators (CSI) to assess bank performance under level 2 of its results measurement framework."* The PCR states, "*The total number of beneficiaries by categories and disaggregated by sex where relevant should be clearly reported."* The PCR further requires specific reference of gender equality in the project be made in assessing effectiveness. Lastly, unanticipated or additional outcomes including those related to gender must be provided. The approach towards measurement has evolved with the new strategy. The 2014-18 Gender Strategy established a specific and comprehensive RMF measuring project results at the country level, regional level and across sectors, which are to be consolidated to measure progress in each pillar. IDEV's evaluation however notes that measuring progress in each of the three gender pillars has not been systematic. The Gender Strategy 2021-25 measures performance across the first three levels of the Bank's RMF, while level 4 indicators measuring gender equality at the institutional level, are to be tracked and designed in the people strategy. A new Bank-wide M&E framework, which is currently being developed, should propose a revised outline of indicators across the first three levels. The generation of knowledge on gender was one of the pillars of the Gender Strategy 2014-18. While the Bank has been successful at developing analytical work on gender, including Country Gender Profiles (CGPs), Sectoral Gender Profiles (SGPs), or the Africa Gender Index, progress however remains to be made regarding their accessibility and their promotion through the Bank's communications, according to IDEV's 2020 evaluation. The 2021-25 Gender Strategy maintains developing knowledge on gender as one of its guiding principles to reinforce the dissemination of gender knowledge products. **Element 4: There are strong processes in place to ensure that gender equality is included systematically in interventions, although the quality of mainstreaming could still be improved.** The Operations Manual (2014) provides guidelines on how to incorporate gender through the project lifecycle; a gender dimension is to be included in Project Appraisal Reports (PARs) and Project Concept	6 -13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 79 – 101, 102

Notes (PCN), which are then examined during the RR, using quality-at-entry standards guidelines. Gender mainstreaming has made progress both at the project and country level, which needs to be further strengthened: • There has been significant progress in the integration of gender in project design, 87% of new operations had a gender-informed design in 2021 against 75% in 2015. The GMS, implemented since 2018, also allows the Bank to screen each project during the preparation phase to identify the level of impact it will have on gender equality, according to which it will be categorised, before a deeper analysis is conducted at the project appraisal phase. In 2021, 100% of new public operations were categorised as using the GMS. While the inclusion of a gender dimension in the RR had provided more visibility to gender mainstreaming, the gender-related interventions in the project often remained too ambitious and lacked coherence, and the RR of the gender dimension in PARs was perceived as happening too late in the project cycle, according to IDEV. There was also a need to enhance gender mainstreaming in private sector operations. • At the country level, CSPs are usually informed by CGPs, which are prepared by gender specialists. The CSPs reviewed by IDEV in 2020 shows that they are mostly gender-informed, but could still be improved.[1] The number of gender outputs and outcomes seemed insufficient; gender-disaggregated indicators are not always aligned with those of the RMF or the relevant sector; and the consistency with the content of the gender analysis and the CGPs was low.	
Element 5: Human resources dedicated to gender have more than doubled from 2018 to 2022, up from 8 persons to 19 persons. This represents an important progress, as capacity had been a challenge for implementing the gender agenda. From an organisational point of view, the ownership of the gender theme has also made significant progress over the years, as highlighted by interviews, and could be further strengthened. The AfDB contains a team specialising in gender, which is clearly identified in the Bank. While all departments take part in the implementation of the gender strategy, the Bank created a Gender, Women and Civil Society Department in 2017 to coordinate gender related interventions across the Bank, departing from the previous organisation in which the gender team worked directly under the SVP. This repositioning has hindered the general ownership of the theme by identifying it closely with the complex, according to IDEV. From a visibility point of view, IDEV's 2020 evaluation concluded to a limited ownership of the gender agenda at the corporate level and highlighted the importance of clear Senior Management commitment, while. In line with this recommendation, the new gender strategy insists that the Bank's senior leadership champion the theme of gender equality. There is a general perception of insufficient resources dedicated to gender among staff, especially at the RMC level, according to IDEV's evaluation. The DBDM process has been positive by facilitating the funding of gender interventions across regions and sectors and brought gender expertise closer to operations. Funding for gender positions is however now more dependent on regional Management, leading to uneven capacity across geographies. The 2021-25 Gender Strategy intends to address these gaps, namely by deploying gender specialists to regional resource centres, expanding the number of multi-skilled gender specialists (especially with private sector expertise), and revamping the Gender Focal Points programme.	6 -13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 79 – 101, 102
Element 6: Several initiatives exist for developing staff capacity on gender, although they could still be strengthened. To build staff capacity, the Bank uses knowledge management products (such as CGPs), gender focal points, routine induction training fur new staff and consultants and regional training on the GMS. Online training is available for all staff and in the operation academy. IDEV's evaluation stresses that staff capacity could be strengthened by involving gender specialists at the beginning of	

1 IDEV's 2020 Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming analysed a sample of 6 CSPS with/without CGPs, ranging from 2015 to 2018.

the project to improve gender diagnostics, by training key stakeholders, and more generally by leveraging the gender community of practice more. The 2021-25 strategy intends to further reinforce gender training, especially for gender specialists, task managers and country teams, gender focal points and external partners. In 2021, $240 000 were approved to build capacity on gender mainstreaming for the PIU staff, according to the Bank's 2021 annual report.	6 -13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 79 – 101, 102
MI 2.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 2.2: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for environmental sustainability and climate change	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of application	4
Element 2: Environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	3
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions	4
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	3
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has been conducted	3
MI 2.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank has a clear agenda for environmental sustainability and climate change, which is recognised by its partners (Figure 5).	13, 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 101, 134

FIGURE 5. **AfDB PROMOTES ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ADDRESSES CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH ITS OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

The transition to green growth is one of the two overarching objectives of the TYS (2013-22). In 2016, the High 5s confirmed climate change and green growth as a cross-cutting issue. The interventions related to them since the last MOPAN's assessment have been guided by the second climate change action plan 2016-20. This Action Plan mainly focused on supporting regional member countries in implementing their National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and on scaling up climate finance, with the target of allocating 40% of approvals to climate finance annually by 2020. In early 2022, the Bank has published a new framework for CC and GG, including a dedicated strategy, policy and action plan. An annual report is dedicated to climate change, which includes a summary of the interventions carried out by the Bank during the year, as well as, for the 2020 annual report, a summary the actions carried out under the second action plan. CC and GG are currently mainstreamed to a large extent into other policy frameworks, although to varying degrees depending on the policy. The 2021-30 strategy intends to strengthen this integration in other strategic frameworks, such as gender, fragility, private sector development, capacity development, and economic governance.

Element 2: Environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets are integrated to a large extent into the organisation's objectives, strategies and policy frameworks. CC and GG are included in the commitments of the Bank to shareholders, both in GCI-VII and of the ADF replenishment report, especially regarding the High 5 "Light up and power Africa", climate finance and support to NDCs. Climate action over the past years, as framed by the second CC Action Plan (2016-20) and the new action plan (2021-25), is well aligned both with the High 5s and with the four pillars from the Paris Agreement (adaptation, mitigation, climate finance, enabling environments). The CC-GG Strategy 2021-30 reflects the Bank's intent to further the integration of climate indicators and targets: the strategy sets the objective of mainstreaming and operationalising CC and GG in all the Bank's complexes, departments, programmes, projects, and interventions; as well as facilitating the achievement and reporting of clear and measurable results from the implementation of the Bank's CC-GG policy.

13, 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 101, 134

Element 3: Indicators for climate change are present at the four levels of the Bank's RMF but they lack centrality as they are mostly included in the special area of emphasis and the High 5 "Light up Africa", instead of being closely intertwined with other development indicators; this is especially important as traditional development indicators and targets can run counter to the spirit of green growth.

In addition, the climate frameworks focus on establishing stronger accountability systems:

The second climate change action plan includes a **dedicated M&E framework**. Several **additional tools** were deployed to increase accountability under it: climate screening tools were updated to support the implementation of the H5s and the NDCs, a guidance note for mainstreaming CC in CSPs and RISPs, the GHG Accounting and Reporting Tool and the GG framework. The Bank also produces an annual report on its interventions related to climate.

However, IDEV's 2021 evaluation on mainstreaming green growth and climate change concluded insufficient reporting during the implementation of Bank-funded projects, both due to limited capacity and to a lack of reporting requirements. IDEV also noted the limited use of GG-CC targets and indicators within Bank-funded projects and recommended to improve monitoring and evaluations of GG-CC investments and results indicators to improve project implementation.

Since then, action has been taken. A new strategic framework 2021-30 was issued (October 2021) to improve tracking, measurement, and reporting of outcomes in this area. In order to do so, it plans to implement a comprehensive monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning system that should contain data on CC and GG targets and outcomes at the institutional level, programme level, and project level, and intervention level. It also plans to establish an integrated results measurement framework, with strengthened and coherent definitions of climate change adaptation, mitigation and GG, and ensure

annual reporting on results of both impact and process indicators, in a manner fully consistent with the definitions adopted under the Building Blocks of the MDBs' joint framework for alignment with the Paris Agreement. As for the indicators used, it seeks to increase its focus on green job creation, by establishing a methodology to identify and measure climate-compatible, climate-responsive, and green jobs created through Bank investments (including sectoral), with the objective to increase them annually. It also plans to establish indicators for biodiversity and land degradation neutrality co-benefits of projects. **Element 4: There has been important progress in mainstreaming climate in interventions design:** • The Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) requires the screening of all projects. • In 2021, according to the ADER, 92% of new operations had a climate-informed design, against a baseline of 75% in 2015. • Mainstreaming systematically CC and GG at the country level, in CSP and RISPs, has also been an important focus for the Bank, according to IDEV's 2021 evaluation, with the issuance of a Guidance Note for Mainstreaming Climate Change in CSPs and RISPS. According to the Climate Change Annual Report, 100% of country/regional strategy papers have mainstreamed CC and GG in their design. **Element 5: The Bank has invested in human and financial resources to support its climate and GG ambitions, and needs to build on that progress to remove capacity constraints which have been a barrier for the implementation of the strategy, according to IDEV.** The Bank established the Climate Change and Green Growth Department (PECG) in 2016 to coordinate the implementation of the Action Plan. The number of positions in the department has increased from 20 in 2018 to 24 in 2022. The Bank has also deployed climate specialists in the regions to support mainstreaming. More is however needed to bring the climate expertise closer to RMCs, as highlighted during interviews: there is currently a single climate change officer covering the region of West Africa. Regarding financial resources, the Bank's commitments related to climate have increased significantly over the past years and amounted to an impressive 41% in 2021, from a baseline of 15% in 2015. In 2020, it had the second climate finance ratio (34% after the EIB at 37%) of the eight development banks participating in the Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance. **Element 6: An active programme of training and awareness but some improvements are still possible to increase capacity development, according to IDEV's 2021 Evaluation, which has been taken up by the Bank.** The Bank systematically conducts training on E&S for staff and external stakeholders. Under the Second Action Plan, the Bank has organised training to build the expertise of climate officers and task managers on sustainable development, and specifically climate change, as well as climate mainstreaming tools. In its 2021-25 strategy, the Bank plans to provide training every six months to relevant Bank staff on CC and GG monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning, and to couple it with assessments on adoption rates and usage of the CC and GG monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning system. However, despite this active programme of training and awareness, IDEV's 2021 evaluation on mainstreaming GG-CC highlighted that key stakeholders in RMCs and in Bank country offices interviewed for this evaluation felt that PECG's mainstreaming guidelines lacked clarity, indicating a need for more awareness and support and more access to GG-CC expertise. This room for improvement to increase staff capacity development on environmental sustainability and climate change justifies the score of 3.	13, 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 101, 134
MI 2.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 2.3: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for addressing fragility situations	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.33**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) available and showing evidence of application	4
Element 2: Fragility indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect Fragile, Conflict and Violence (FCV) situations	3
Element 4: Fragile, Conflict and Violence situations (FCV) screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions	3
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address Fragile, Conflict and Violence situations	3
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on Fragile, Conflict and Violence (FCV) is underway or has been conducted.	3
MI 2.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The TYS defines fragile states as an area of special emphasis. This emphasis is supported by the fragility strategy, 2014-19, which aims to place the Bank at the centre of Africa's efforts to address fragility". In this strategy, the AfDB defines fragility as a condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse or violent conflict, which can entail economic, social, political and environmental dimensions. The strategy focuses on fragile situations rather than on fragile states, to better reflect the cross-border nature of fragility. The embedding of fragility as a cross-cutting issue is an essential dimension of the strategy, since it does not suggest additional areas of engagement for the Bank; rather, it seeks to support the implementation of the Bank's strategies with a fragility perspective. The strategy seeks to focus the Bank's interventions in transition states on three priority areas: building state and institutional capacity; fostering inclusion and building resilience; strengthening leadership in dialogue, partnership and advocacy on fragility issues. The AfDB recently issued a new strategy (2022-26), which aims at more integrated, structural, and coordinated approaches. It also refines its understanding of fragility by using the concept of fragility continuum, which is meant to help use a differentiated, context-specific approach for operationalisation and implementation. It seeks to go further in terms of alignment with other strategies on the themes of jobs, water, healthcare and corporate frameworks. Through this strategy, the Bank seeks to reinforce its leadership role on the fragility agenda in Africa by focusing on its comparative advantages: its long-standing relationships with RMCs, its convening power as an African institution, and its capacity to engage in trusted policy dialogues. Fragility is mainstreamed in other strategies and policy frameworks: in particular, it builds on the Bank's strategies for PSD, governance, gender and youth employment. **Element 2: Unlike other strategies, the Bank's fragility strategies do not rely on operational pillars, which may make their approach to indicators and targets slightly different from other strategies.** While the GCI-VII doesn't include specific commitments on fragility, the ADF replenishment report includes nine actions related to fragility: developing fragility assessments, strategic partnerships, fragility strategies, addressing the regional dimension of fragility and scaling up staffing in fragile countries. The approach of the fragility strategy (2014-19) has been to integrate the theme of fragility throughout the programming documents, the operations and the processes. The programming documents have	13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 112

to apply a fragility lens at the regional and country level, as well as the programme and project level when applicable. RISP and CSPs are to be grounded in fragility assessments and to address key drivers of fragility. All programmes and projects in fragile situations must apply a fragility lens throughout the project cycle. **Element 3: The RMF only includes one indicator specific to fragility, the number of number of refugees and internally displaced people, at level 1, and doesn't include any indicator related to the impact of the Bank's operations. The 2014-19 fragility strategy includes a RF that was evaluated by IDEV as overall satisfactory,** although they were areas for improvement: for instance, the third area of intervention ("Enhancing the Bank's convening power for deeper policy dialogue, partnership and advocacy around issues of fragility") is not considered by the RF. There was no mid-term review, and results were reported on in a self-evaluation carried out by RDTS at the end of the fourth year of implementation and in IDEV's 2020 Evaluation. The new Fragility Strategy 2022-26, indicates that its monitoring and evaluation framework will be consistent with the RMF. The framework seeks to help address fragility as a core consideration when assessing results rather than as an additional dimension. The Bank commits to producing dedicated annual reports on fragility related interventions to provide real-time feedback on progress, as well as a mid-term review and an independent evaluation at the end of the strategy. **Element 4: Fragility has been integrated to a large extent during the design phase across the institution, according to IDEV, and supported by the development of cutting-edge tools.** The fragility lens was rather well applied at the level of regional and country strategies, with 80% of the CSPs sampled by IDEV's 2020 evaluation integrating this lens (an analysis based on a sample of 49 operations approved between 2014 and 2019 in Chad, South Sudan, Liberia and the DRC). This was strengthened with the implementation of the Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA), an assessment tool assessing the different dimensions of fragility and resilience at the country level. It has helped build the quantitative side of full-fledged fragility assessments, which reflect key drivers and dynamics of fragility in a country or region, as well as key operational risks and opportunities, including entry points to address them and programme areas which could help build resilience. The new Strategy intends to sustain the deployment of the CRFA and other fragility assessment tools to improve its analysis capacity, and to focus on identifying sources of resilience in programming. IDEV's 2020 evaluation noted that fragility was not implemented consistently at project level. Since 1 September 2021, the application of the fragility lens in operations has been formally institutionalised through the enhanced RR process and the integration of fragility in the Prioritization and Selection Framework of regional operations. For example, the checklist of the enhanced RR process now integrates an explicit fragility and resilience criterion (criterion 4.1). This allows RDTS to systematically assess all Bank SOs against this criterion at PCN and PAR levels. Since the effective operationalisation of the enhanced RR process on 1 September 2021 to 30 June 2022, 188 of 198 reviews (95%) of SOs have been properly completed by RDTS. This has effectively contributed to ensuring fragility-sensitive design of operations ahead of board consideration, with 87% of PARs rated 'satisfactory' or 'highly satisfactory' for the fragility criterion. The revised 2020 framework for the selection and prioritisation of regional operations is another example where the integration of fragility and resilience considerations have been considered. Under the 2020, the 2021, and the 2022 exercise of the selection and prioritisation of regional operations, CRFA scores were computed as part of the scorecards and fragility Specialists were successfully involved in evaluating all proposals of regional operations and RPGs, against dedicated fragility/resilience screening questions. As a result, all selected regional operations and RPGs in ADF-15 are fragility-sensitive.	13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 112

Element 5: Human and financial resources dedicated to fragile contexts have increased in the recent years. The Bank has significantly increased its commitments to the transition states, by 51% during the 2014-19 period, compared to the 2008-13 period. Although ADF resources decreased slightly (-17,9%) during the same period, the Bank leveraged other instruments, such as the TSF, the ADB window and trust funds. Resources approved through the TSF increased from UA 162.55 million (31 projects) in 2016 to UA 483.9 million (29 projects) in 2021. The latest increase reflects to a large extent the Bank's support to transition states during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Figure 6)

FIGURE 6. **APPROVALS THROUGH THE ADF AND TSF (2012-2021), IN UA MILLIONS**



Source: AfDB (2022), *AfDB Annual Report 2021*

13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 112

Regarding human resources, the Transition Support Department (RDTS) is responsible for providing support and quality assurance on fragility for the Bank's regional and sector departments and manages the Transition Support Facility (TSF). The number of staff in the department has increased from 27 in 2018 to 32 in 2022. RDTS has also decentralised staff to regional hubs/country offices.

The Bank has also been successful at increasing professional staff in fragile situations, despite the increased cost incurred compared with stable situations: in December 2021, there were a total of 202 professional staff in transition states, including fragility, sectoral, and other cross-cutting specialists, which represents a significant increase from the 92 in 2019. In countries where the Bank does not have offices, staff is placed at the regional level. According to interviews, all countries facing situations of fragility now have the required skill mix.

Setting the right incentives is key to increase the Bank's footprint in fragile contexts. According to IDEV's 2020 evaluation, the perception among staff in 2020 was that recognition for working in transition states was still insufficient, especially in terms of career development. The new Fragility Strategy 2022-26 and People Strategy 2021-25 intend to provide an answer to this problem by introducing new incentives, including in terms of career progression, and supporting internal capacity building; according to interviews, the Bank is now better equipped to encourage staff to work in fragile contexts.

Element 6: The Bank carries out internal and external capacity building which is an important lever to increase the integration of fragility in the Bank's operations, and should keep building on the important work carried out so far in this area. The insufficient integration of the fragility lens at the operations level may have been due to a lack of training of sector staff and to the low capacity of RDTS, according to IDEV's 2020 Evaluation. The Bank has structured capacity building programmes to

train staff to adopt a fragility lens, which have not benefitted all staff to the same degree; under the 2014-19 Strategy, 11 training sessions have been organised which have allowed to train more than 455 staff members. This work has reached more beneficiaries than initially planned, including task managers, country managers, and country economists, 83% of whom had been trained in 2020. Most sectoral and operational staff had however not been trained. The Bank is also targeting key external stakeholders in RMCs: for instance, a workshop was organised with RDTS in March 2022 to train CSOs of G5 Sahel countries on the fragility assessment framework.	13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 112
MI 2.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 2.4: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for governance.	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.17**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on governance available and showing evidence of application	4
Element 2: Governance indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect governance indicators and targets	2
Element 4: Governance dialogue screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions	3
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address governance	3
Element 6: Staff capacity development on governance is being or has been conducted	3
MI 2.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Governance and accountability are defined both as an operational priority and as a cross-cutting issue in the Bank's strategic framework. The Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan (GAP II, which covered the 2014-2018 and was extended to 2020) defines governance as a core operational priority, which is to be mainstreamed across the Bank, in line with the One-Bank approach. In 2021, the Bank issued a strategy for economic governance in Africa, for the 2021-25 period, which confirms governance as a cross-cutting theme, in alignment with the High Five, the second strategic pillar of the Bank's ADF-15 commitment — namely, governance and human and institutional capacity for inclusive growth and job creation – and with the commitments agreed to by the Bank with its shareholders for its seventh GCI (GCI-VII). The new strategy clarifies the difference between economic and political governance, which lies outside its remit. It is structured around three main pillars: public sector effectiveness at the national and subnational levels, governance for structural transformation, inclusive governance and accountability. When asked about the support provided by the AfDB to good governance and institutional capacity, partners are slightly more critical than for other cross-cutting issues (Figure 7). **Element 2: Governance indicators and targets are integrated to a large extent into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives.** The governance agenda is led by the Governance and Economic Reforms Department (ECGF) but is bank-wide. Legal frameworks, CSPs, RISPs, lending and non-lending operations, and policy dialogue are therefore to emphasise governance issues. Coordination between departments was mainly ad-hoc, and other departments integrated governance based on the governance components included in the strategies guiding their work. Indicators are set for the expected outcomes of the Bank's interventions, at the pillar level. Each pillar includes several	13, 14, 16, 36, 37, 38

FIGURE 7. **AfDB HELPS DEVELOP INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF BORROWING PARTNERS AND PROMOTE GOOD GOVERNANCE THROUGH ITS STRATEGIES**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

policy targets, with detailed considerations on how they articulate with other objectives and strategies of the Bank. The new 2021-25 strategy includes an updated results framework, with targets related both to the Bank's interventions and to overall progress on governance in Africa. It also indicates that a rolling programming and budgeting process, indicative operation pipeline, and yearly work programme should be developed to support the achievement of the targets.

13, 14, 16, 36, 37, 38

Element 3: Clear accountability systems are in place, which reflect governance indicators and targets, although not all of those planned under GAP II were implemented. GAP II included a results framework, in line with the Bank's RMF to ensure appropriate reporting. Progress is reported yearly in the ADER on one level 1 indicator (Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance) and four level 2 indicators (Countries with improved quality of budgetary and financial management, Countries with improved transparency, accountability in the public sector, Countries with improved procurement systems, Countries with an improved competitive environment). Two commitments were not implemented: GAP II committed to creating a Governance Oversight Committee, responsible for monitoring progress against the RMF and KPIs, which was not established; a mid-term review was planned for 2016, which didn't take place. A completion review was realised in 2020. It should be noted that the DBDM restructuring of the Bank rendered the creation of the committee less pertinent, while progress in decentralisation allowed better policy dialogue with governments. The PBO evaluation and its follow up took over some of the role of the intended 2016 midterm review.

The new 2021-25 strategy also included a results framework, aligned with the Bank's overall RMF to monitor the implementation of the strategy. It is meant to assess both overall progress on governance in Africa and progress that can be directly attributed to the interventions by the Bank. It includes output indicators and outcome indicators by pillar, with a baseline, a mid-term target and an end target. The mid-term review of the strategy is to be conducted in 2023, and a final review in 2025. The strategy invites IDEV to produce an independent evaluation in 2024.

Element 4: Governance differs from other cross-cutting issues in that it takes primarily place at the country level and is not systematically mainstreamed in specific projects. At the country level, the governance analysis is generally performed through Country Diagnostic Notes and Country

Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA). Governance work is performed mainly through PBOs and institutional support projects. Among the 136 governance operations approved during GAP II (2014-18), 62% were PBOs, and 38% for institutional support projects. PBOs, which represented 30% of total approvals in 2016, are however limited to 15% of the ADB's operations since 2017, which is likely to limit the number of governance operations. Policy dialogue and advisory services are other tools which rely on an analysis of governance issues. The Bank has also decided to strengthen its knowledge production regarding governance, with the publication of the *African Governance Outlook* 2017. While governance is not systematically mainstreamed, all projects may undergo governance analysis on specific issues such as procurement and financial management as required. **Element 5: The ECGF is composed of 31 professionals as of June 2022, below GAP II's 2018 target of 40 professional staff. 80% are located in regional offices, above GAP II's 2018 target of 50%.** The department was recently enhanced with the creation of two divisions, and its status in the Bank improved as it went from a coordination office to a department. Financial resources have increased over the years, as UA 6.9 billion were outlaid under GAPII (2014-18), according to the new strategy, compared to UA 4.2 billion for GAP I (2008-12). The new strategy for 2021-25 indicates that a rolling programming and budgeting process, indicative operation pipeline, and yearly work programme should be developed to support the achievement of the targets. The strategy envisages an increase of resources compared to the previous framework, thanks to the successful ADF replenishment and capital increase, given the critical nature of governance for the implementation of the High 5s priorities. **Element 6: The AfDB is conducting initiatives to develop capacity on governance.** According to the GAP II, more capacity was needed to ensure the implementation of the framework. The tools currently used to build staff capacity are a combination of e-learning on topics relevant to governance (integrity, combatting money laundering, integrity due diligence and PBOs), face-to-face trainings and the operations academy, which is underway. The establishment of a public financial management academy was approved. The new strategy 2021-25 intends to build on the expertise gained over the years by recruiting, training staff and building communities of practice, with a special emphasis on cross-cutting issues.	13, 14, 16, 36, 37, 38
MI 2.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability

KPI 3: Operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility	**KPI score**
Satisfactory	**3.43**

The Bank's recent organisational reforms were designed to increase its effectiveness and responsiveness to RMC needs. The implementation of the DBDM in 2016 to align the High 5s agenda with national priorities, streamline business processes, and bring decisions closer to RMCs, was central in this process. The IDEV evaluation considered that the significant long-term impact of the reforms would only become obvious once they had been fully implemented and had time to bed in. However, it found that the Bank had better resourced and empowered field offices and better aligned the organisational structure to the High 5s. This assessment confirms both this point and the positive direction of travel.

The reform included the creation of a regional complex with five regional departments, and the establishment of three sector complexes (Energy, Climate & GG; Agriculture, Human & Social Development; Private Sector, Infrastructure and Industrialisation) which are represented at the regional level, with a strengthening of staffing in regional hubs. The transformation agenda faced several challenges, including an unclear division of responsibility between HQ and regional offices, and difficult coordination between sectors and complexes. This reorganisation was mostly in place in 2018, and a Delegation of Authority Matrix was approved to clarify responsibilities.

The Bank has actively increased efforts to mobilise resources. The two main opportunities for resource mobilisation are the replenishment of the ADF and the GCI-VII. These are also used to set a strategic agenda, including commitments on the effective, efficient use of resources, thereby favouring high consistency between resource mobilisation and strategic priorities. The GCI-VII and the ADF-15 replenishment were finalised before the COVID-19 crisis, which disrupted strategic priorities and decreased the Bank's financial leeway. The GCI-VII was approved in October 2019, and ADF-15 consultations were concluded in December 2019, while COVID-19 was declared a public health emergency in March 2020. To increase its resources, the Bank seeks to improve financing efficiency and flexibility and is considering several options. These include i) blended AfDB and ADF resources; ii) making greater use of co-financing facilities, and iii) attracting more co-financing for both public- and private-sector projects. While the TYS mid-term review indicates that co-financing from other public sector financers and from the private sector did not increase during the 2013-18 period, several measures were taken for greater engagement with third parties from the public and private sector. These included the Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility (2015), the Green Climate Fund (for which it was accredited in 2016), and the 2018 launch of the AIF to attract development financial institutions, commercial bank, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, private investors and policy-makers. The AIF 2021 virtual boardrooms, held in March 2022, drew $32.8 billion in investment interest in 31 bankable projects, including the $15.6 billion Abidjan-Lagos Highway project, a public-private partnership project led by the Economic Community of West African States Commission.

Proximity to RMCs is important for the Bank, whose headquarters are located in Ivory Coast. The Bank has made real progress on its ambitious decentralisation agenda, despite recent slowdowns. The decentralisation action plan was updated in 2016 to align it to the DBDM, to strengthen Bank presence at the regional level, and to ensure that regions have the critical mass of staff, the right skills mix, and level of authority.

More staff have been deployed in regional and country offices in recent years. In 2021, 52% of operational staff was based in regional and country offices, up from 40% in 2015, but still below the 2021 target of 67% and stalled in recent years (ADER 2021). The revised delegation of authority matrix (DAM) provides more decentralised skills and responsibility: five DGs (one for each regional hub – North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, central Africa and South Africa) – an implementation manager to assist with portfolio management at the regional level, a country manager, country programme officer and country hub economist for each country and several sector specialists (task managers).

The decentralisation agenda has stalled in recent years because of conjunctural and structural challenges. The Bank's scale compared to other MDBs makes it more difficult to reach a critical mass to justify the costs of opening a new site (Evaluation of the DBDM, 2019).

The COVID-19 pandemic limited staff movement and has also probably partially limited progress. The new organisational structure and decentralisation efforts have nonetheless strengthened field offices. RMCs have noted the resulting improvement in country dialogue, particularly during the COVID-19 crisis according to the previous-mentioned evaluation and interviews.

The Bank has engaged in a comprehensive reform process to address persistent staffing issues – number, skill mix, and location. The 2020 strategic staffing exercise concluded that core operations, ecosystem functions, cross-cutting issues and quality assurance were critically under-resourced compared to good standards and practices (including procurement, disbursement, financial management, legal support, and safeguards).

To address this, the Bank has deployed several initiatives in line with the GCI-VII commitments:

- A right-sizing approach adopted to align staff allocation with business. This includes hiring 250 additional staff by 2025, increasing the share of staff in operations to 60%, rebalancing the current 27%-63% ratio of local to international staff to 50%-50%. This should have a far-reaching impact on re-profiling skills according to strategic staffing while meeting cost containment measures.
- The 2021 People Strategy to promote a stronger employee value proposition and review total compensation.
- The 2020 performance management framework to revamp staff performance management systems.

This work has already led to positive outcomes: in 2021, the net vacancy ratio stood at 11.2% (just below the 12% target), and 71% of professional staff was in operations.

The 2020 performance management framework seeks to strengthen the Bank's performance-based management, which is a goal of the DBDM, and to address its main sticking points. The AfDB has an automated performance management system. However, it lacks synergies between the different levels of performance assessment and other processes, such as corporate and complex KPIs and individual KPIs, and performance management timelines. In 2021, performance management was still perceived to be a major issue at the Bank according to the new people strategy. Lack of accountability for low performance, managers' reluctance to address poor performance and performance rating by staff are the main challenges. The 2020 framework is based on four guiding principles: i) performance management as a continuous conversation; ii) clarity of expectations; iii) equity and fairness, and iv) transparency. The framework has established rewards for good performance, strengthened guidelines to handle underperformance, and introduced measures to improve the timeliness of performance. Sturdy processes are in place regarding staff complaints. The results of these measures have yet to be assessed but the Bank is now better equipped to implement a results-based culture.

MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are constantly aligned and adjusted to key functions	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.25**
Element 1: Organisational structure is aligned with or being reorganised to align with requirements set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 2: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganised to align with requirements set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 3: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals as set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 4: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent aligned to the priorities of the current strategic plan	4

MI 3.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank has reorganised its structure over the last years, in line with its strategic priorities as set out in the TYS and in the High 5s. Through the DBDM (2016) and subsequent reforms, it has improved the effectiveness and efficiency of the support provided to RMCs, an objective identified in the TYS, and aligned the Bank's structure on the sectoral priorities and cross-cutting issues determined by the High 5s. To do so, the DBDM has led to several changes in the organisational structure: • The creation of a regional complex with five regional departments, and the establishment of three sector complexes (Energy, Climate & GG; Agriculture, Human & Social Development; Private Sector, Infrastructure and Industrialization) which are represented at the regional level, with a strengthening of staffing in regional hubs • A re-organisation of responsibilities for non-sovereign operations • A reconfiguration of the Economic Governance and Knowledge Management Complex. Since then, the mission of the complex is to generate, promote, and disseminate research to support the Bank's policy advice, technical assistance, and lending operations • The creation of new departments: the Syndications and Client Solutions Department, the Gender and Women Empowerment Department, the Energy Financial Solutions, Policy and Regulation Department, as well as new divisions, such as for urban development	2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 39, 90, 99, 100

This transformation agenda was mostly in place in 2018, despite some challenges: the division of responsibility between regional complexes and sector complexes, as well as between headquarter and regional offices, with only 25% of respondents of the TYS 2019 midterm review's survey finding the division of responsibility clear, and 20% finding the coordination between sectors, complexes, and units effective. The DBDM was updated to address these concerns, by giving the pilot role to regional complexes for sovereign operations (while sector complexes were appointed as co-pilots), and to the sector complex for non-sovereign operations (while regional complexes were appointed as co-pilots). Additionally, a new Delegation of Authority Matrix was approved in 2018. As previously mentioned, (in KPI 1), the new organisational structure was approved by the board in September 2021, published in May 2022 and has been effective since 1 August 2022.

Element 2: The Bank has engaged in a series of reforms to address staffing issues, which have been a persistent challenge for the AfDB over recent years in terms of number, skill mix, and location. The TYS set the objective of creating a more result-driven culture and the High 5s of increasing focus on sectoral priorities and cross-cutting issues. However, in 2019, 43% of the staff surveyed for the TYS midterm review found they had sufficient skill and knowledge to confront present development challenges. According to the strategic staffing exercise conducted in 2020, several functions are critically under-resourced compared to good standards: core operations, ecosystem functions, cross-cutting issues and quality assurance. This includes procurement, disbursement, financial management, legal support and safeguards.

To address this issue, the Bank has deployed several initiatives:

- Adopting a right-sizing approach to align staff allocation with business requirements. This gradual approach consists in hiring 250 additional staff by 2025, re-balancing of the local-international staff ratio to 50%-50% and increasing the share of staff in operations to 60%.
- Delivering a new People Strategy to promote a stronger employee value proposition and review total compensation.
- Revamping systems for managing staff performance with the 2020 Performance Management Framework, based on four guiding principles: performance management as a continuous conversation, clarity of expectations, equity and fairness, and transparency. To boost performance and productivity, the Bank aims at implementing talent councils and job families by the end of 2021, which are to facilitate expertise-sharing among staff as well as build an infrastructure for professional development and career path management.

The work engaged on human resources has already led to positive outcomes: in 2021, the net vacancy ratio stood at 11.2% (just below the 12% target); 71% of professional staffs were in operations (exceeding the 69% target), and the employee engagement at the 80th percentile according to the latest 2019 survey (exceeding the target of 75%). Results from the survey however shows that the perception of a lack of staff is still present among partners. Interviews with the Bank have also raised this point. This suggests that improvement is still possible and therefore that the implementation is substantial (score 3) but not full (4). (Figure 8)

2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 39, 90, 99, 100

FIGURE 8. **AfDB HAS A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF STAFF, EITHER IN OR ACCESSIBLE TO COUNTRIES WHERE IT OPERATES TO DELIVER INTENDED RESULTS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 39, 90, 99, 100

Element 3: Resource allocations across functions are rather well aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, including that of the High 5s and of the DBDM. (Figure 9)

FIGURE 9. **DISTRIBUTION OF THE 2022-24 OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME BY HIGH 5**



Source: Source: 2022-24 Work Programme and Budget Document, Strengthening the Bank's work programmes to enhance delivery

Regarding the administrative budget, the biggest share in 2022 was attributed to the Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery Vice-Presidency (RDVP) and operations, including ecosystems, representing close to 49% of the administrative budget. (Figure 10)

FIGURE 10. **2022 ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET BY COMPLEX (UA MILLION) (*left*) AND BY ORGANISATIONAL UNITS (*right*)**



Source: Source: 2022-24 Work Programme and Budget Document, Strengthening the Bank's work programmes to enhance delivery

However, interviews, partners and staff surveys reflect the perception that some areas are underfunded. Budgets are defined through Work programmes and Budget Documents on a three-year rolling basis. In 2019, a minority of staff surveyed (40%) found the resources provided for project preparation and supervision to be adequate; only 25% found them adequate for economic and sector work and for other knowledge products. Interviews and comments from the 2022 partners survey indicated that staffing could be increased and staffing allocation optimised. There have however been positive developments since to ensure that adequate and flexible resources are made available to operations. In 2021, Management implemented a new budget system that enhances budget execution processes by ensuring alignment of budget planning with budget execution, and fostering a link between budget execution, work programme delivery and strategic priorities. The new approach is based on cost coefficients that are used to allocate resources for the key elements of the Bank's operational work programme. For the 2021-23 period, the budget is being allocated to fund the Bank's strategic priorities while adapting its budget allocation to the context of COVID-19. This also includes funds for the implementation of the Integrated quality assurance plan, knowledge and policy dialogue, as well as internal reforms. It should also fund more selective but larger and more strategic operations: quality infrastructures, a debt action plan to address rising debt distress among RMCs; as well as interventions leveraging global private capital and interventions related to private sector interventions, to contribute to Africa's economic recovery.

2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 39, 90, 99, 100

Element 4: The Bank conducts periodical restructuring exercises, based on analyses of needs regarding human resources. In 2020, in line with the GCI-VII commitments, the Bank conducted a strategic staffing exercise, based on an internal analysis of human resource records and benchmarking with key organisations. The Work Programme and Budget Documents assess annually the needs in terms of human resources and establishes working directions. To support skill development among staff, the new People Strategy suggest several initiatives under the dimension "Building a talented future workforce"; these include the creation of a skill bank or talent marketplace, to enable staff to branch out into areas of interest over time; the review and publication of a more transparent training and staff development policy; and the review of the staff mobility policy to provide greater career flexibility.

MI 3.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan	4
Element 2: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector	4
Element 3: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities	4
Element 4: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the strategic plan/relevant country plan	2
MI 3.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The resource mobilisation case at the Bank is strongly aligned with the Bank strategic priorities. This is particularly true as the GCIs and the replenishment of the ADF, which are the two main opportunities to mobilise resources, are also used to set a strategic agenda, including commitments on the effective and efficient use of resources: • The GCI-VII set clear commitments, with seven objectives and 34 actions to be implemented. Among the objectives is an increased alignment with the High 5s, including greater selectivity within the 5 strategic priorities and an increased focus on climate and gender. The commitments have clear targets and a dedicated implementation timetable; a dashboard is used to monitor the progress on these commitments which are presented to Senior Management every month and to the board biannually, leading to the production of a progress report every year. • The ADF replenishment report clearly states the strategic and operational priorities of the new exercise. It is based on two pillars that are explicitly aligned on the TYS and on the High 5s. The ADF-15 replenishment and the GCI-VII commitments were both completed in November 2019 and could not take into account the emerging COVID-19 crisis. **Element 2: Improving the efficiency and flexibility of financing are the main levers the Bank can use to improve its resource mobilisation, according to the TYS.** In this area, it draws out several objectives: • Blend ADB and ADF resources to mitigate the rigidities associated with the traditional distinctions between ADB and ADF clients; • Make greater use of the rapidly expanding universe of theme-specific co-financing facilities and opportunities; • Innovate in fostering Africa-specific mechanisms for aggregating development finance from ADB, ADF and other public and private sources; • Make a priority of attracting co-financing for both public- and private-sector projects; • Seek greater engagement from large-scale investors in the global savings pool (e.g., pension and sovereign wealth fund and foundations and endowments); • Make more creative (and less capital-intensive) use of risk-mitigation instruments such as guarantees • Develop a cost-recovered advisory services business, to scale up the approach to policy dialogue. It should be noted that the ADF does not have a private sector window, unlike other funds. While co-financing from other public sector financers and from the private sector has not increased during	7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 95, 99, 100, 123, 132, 133

the 2013-18, according to the TYS mid-term review, several measures were taken to engage more with third parties in the public and private sector, such as the Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility (launched in 2015), exposure exchanges with other development institutions, purchasing credit insurance from the Africa Trade Insurance Company, a new approach to securitising infrastructure portfolio, funds from global facilities and funds, such as the Climate Investment Fund, the Global Environmental Facility and the Green Climate Fund (for which it was accredited in 2016), increasing its lending spread, and a selective access for ADF countries to ADB financing. The African Investment Forum (AIF) launched in 2018, which attracts development financial institutions, commercial bank, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, private investors and policy-makers, is another tool deployed to leverage the AfDB's franchise and increase resources. The 2021 AIF virtual boardrooms, held in March 2022, drew $32.8 billion in investment interest in 31 bankable projects, including the $15.6 billion Abidjan-Lagos Highway project, a public private partnership project led by the Economic Community of West African States Commission. Partners have a rather positive opinion about whether the Bank actively seeks co-financing with development partners and opportunities to mobilise finance from the private sector, although it differs by category. (Figure 11)

Finally, the second ADF replenishment meeting in July 2022 discussed the opportunity to expand the fund's footprint in private sector development and non-sovereign operations through several measures.

FIGURE 11. **AfDB ACTIVELY SEEKS CO-FINANCING WITH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO MOBILISE FINANCE FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=118)

7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 95, 99, 100, 123, 132, 133

Element 3: GCIs are agreed for improving the lending capacity over a number of years and ADF replenishments provide funding for three-year cycles. In addition to external contributions and trust funds from donor countries, the Bank derives its funding requirements from repayments of previous loans and access to the capital markets. This has allowed the Bank to enjoy a relative stability of financing. The several meetings leading to the replenishment/capital increase give opportunities to discuss how the resource mobilisation should help deliver the organisation's strategy with shareholders, and results in public reports, which include clear objectives and targets. Regarding other sources of funding, although it doesn't mention the predictability of funding, the 2021 Trust Fund Policy encourages the channelling of donor resources into multi-donor trust funds, to enhance the catalytic role of this additional funding and economies of scale.

Element 4: Borrowing countries normally participate in project financing through counterpart funds. The position of the Bank (and multilateral organisations more generally) has been evolving on this matter. While government participation with actual additional resources is recommended and a demonstration of country ownership, in practice the release of such resources has been challenging and has been the source of implementation delays. Counterpart funds are often insufficient and increasingly, government participation in project financing is being thought through in-kind contribution, buildings and recurrent costs (staff salaries, taxes). Leveraging new counterpart funding for development remains work in progress which is being evaluated by IDEV. A dedicated indicator would allow for a better monitoring of counterpart funds and of the challenges related to their mobilisation.	7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 95, 99, 100, 123, 132, 133
MI 3.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.3: Resource reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.75**
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation	4
Element 2: Policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision-making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralised level as appropriate) regarding resource reallocation/programming	4
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level as appropriate	3
Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on resource allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	4
MI 3.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: In line with the DBDM, a new delegation of authority matrix was produced in 2018 (and updated in 2022), which has been instrumental in bringing the Bank closer to RMCs in an organised way. It clarifies what decisions are delegated to different authority levels, how duties are segregated, and to ensure that the necessary control measures are in place. As stated in the foreword, it has been thought of as a living instrument which is to be periodically reviewed and improved. More responsibility is now provided to a new set up at the regional and country level, including five director generals (for each regional hub), and a country manager, country programme officer and country economist for each country, in addition to several sector specialists (task managers). In 2019 a new Implementation Manager was added at the regional level to assist with portfolio management. More recently, the Bank decided to hire six lead private sector specialists at the regional level and in the Nigeria office. **Element 2: The Delegation of Authority Matrix, which provides guidelines on decision-making at the decentralised level, was updated in 2018 and 2022 in the perspective of empowering staff in regional and country offices.** This matrix is based on decision-making roles, rather than on location, like the 2012 Delegation of Authority Matrix, and includes matrices for public sector operations and non-sovereign operations. Countries and regions have responsibility for managing public operations, while the responsibility for managing for non-sovereign operations lies more with sector departments in the HQ. Regional hubs now have sufficient autonomy to take decisions regarding programming and reallocation, and the change has been perceived positively by country and regional offices, according to interviews.	2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 99, 100

Element 3: The delegation of authority has been evaluated by the AfDB Management in the mid-term review of the TYS and by IDEV in the Evaluation of the DBDM, which were both published in 2019. While the delegation of authority was effective in reinforcing the primordial role of regions in driving operations, there was an initial lack of clarity of the division of responsibility between headquarters, regional level and country level, with decisions related to decision-making authority being reversed several times. Regional directors have the required authority to initiate and pursue reallocations and reprogramming at country and regional level in their capacity to engage with governments and local stakeholders. According to the two evaluations, the delegation process has been successful at empowering regional and country offices by providing them the appropriate autonomy, offering greater responsiveness to RMCs needs; this perspective was supported by interviews at the regional and country level. In the case of addressing the COVID-19 situation, while the set-up of the CRF was decided at the central level, the decision to use it according to local needs and the arbitration about the use of budget support was conducted at the decentralised level. The delegation matrix was updated in 2022, and an evaluation of it will be necessary to demonstrate latest results. **Element 4: Defining the right level of decision-making regarding resource allocation is an ongoing process at the Bank, which builds on operational experience and lessons learnt.** The current dynamic is to encourage greater interaction between sectors, regions and ecosystems., The 2018 Delegation Matrix has been updated in 2022 so as to reinforce the delegation process in favor of regional hubs.	2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 99, 100
MI 3.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.4: HR systems and policies are performance based and geared to the achievement of results	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.20**
Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff	4
Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically implemented by the organisation for all staff and to the required frequency	3
Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other entities	3
Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision-making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions, etc.	2
Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints regarding staff performance assessments	4
MI 3.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The AfDB has an automated performance management system, documented in the Staff Performance Management Handbook. All staff, including senior staff, is subject to performance evaluation once a year. While this performance management system has lacked synergies with other processes, according to IDEV's 2017 Evaluation of Human Resource Management Policy, and between the different levels of performance assessment, such as corporate and complex KPIs and individual KPIs, according to the 2019 DBDM review, it has however been strengthened with the 2021 presidential directive concerning the staff performance management system, which bases the new system on four guiding principles: performance management as a continuous conversation, clarity of expectations, equity and fairness, and transparency.	39, 89, 90, 93, 94

Element 2: While the timeliness of performance management and synergies with the other processes at the Bank have been a sticking point for performance management, the 2021 presidential directive concerning the staff performance management system seeks to address these issues. Performance management is still perceived to be a major issue at the Bank, according to the 2021 People Strategy: the main challenges are a lack of accountability for low performance, managers' reluctance to address poor performance and performance rating by staff. While the staff who performs poorly should be placed under a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), a 2016 audit cited in IDEV's 2017 Human Resource Policy Evaluation found that in the majority of the cases in which staff were assessed as needing improvement, no performance improvement plan was implemented; more broadly, no specific guidelines were in place regarding performance improvement plans. To solve these problems, the 2021 presidential directive has established rewards for good performance and strengthened guidelines for handling underperformance. It has also introduced measures to boost compliance with corporate performance timelines, such as disciplinary measures for staff who fail to comply with their obligations. **Element 3: The 2021 presidential directive concerning the staff performance management system contains several principles that can result in organisational improvement, including a stronger synergy between the various processes, which had been a point of attention before:** putting a stronger emphasis on the alignment of performance objectives with the Bank's strategic priorities and RMF across the Bank, performance as a continuous conversation, and a better management of poorly performing staff. The implementation of the framework will demonstrate whether it contributes to organisational improvement. **Element 4: There is a perception among staff of insufficient transparency, fairness, and insufficient performance-based metrics, according to the 2021 People Strategy.** Insufficient accountability for poor performance has been identified as a major challenge. Addressing these shortcomings is one of the priorities of the strategy, which has set several interventions in its 2025 implementation plan to promote a culture of performance and accountability, including the completion and implementation of a new performance management framework. The 2021 presidential directive concerning the staff performance management system seeks to address these points by setting clearer guidelines for performance management, including regarding promotion, incentives, rewards, and sanctions. More time will be needed to assess the results of these initiatives. **Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments, which is detailed in the Staff Recourse Mechanisms.** Performance assessments fall under the umbrella of administrative decisions; in this configuration, staff who disagree with their assessment can refer the matter to several instances, in the following order of priority: first, the Management Review Committee, then to the vice-president who should respond within 30 days, then, if not satisfied, to the Staff Appeals Committee, which may ultimately lead to the president making a decision. If the appellant is not satisfied, they can refer to the Administrative Tribunal. an autonomous body of the AfDB.	39, 89, 90, 93, 94
MI 3.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability	KPI score
Satisfactory	3.04

Since 1999, ADF resource allocation to recipient countries has been performance-based (PBA formula), providing predictability and transparency to member countries and an incentive for stronger performance. PBA criteria for resource allocation are based on i) country poverty levels; ii) population size; iii) infrastructure gap, and iv) the institutional, policy and project implementation performance as determined by the country policy and institutional assessment. Approximately 55% of ADF-15 resources are allocated based on country performance through direct PBAs. The balance is set aside for i) regional operations, ii) the Fragile States Facility, and iii) the Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility to expand AfDB's capacity to mobilise private funds. Adjustments to the formula are possible but rare. Recently, a specific effort was made to ensure that situations of fragility are given sufficient priority. Criteria for allocating trust fund resources depend on individual operational guidelines and whether they are managed by the Bank or by external beneficiaries or governments. The processes go either through a competitive call for proposal or an ad-hoc proposal submitted to the fund manager.

AfDB allocations are determined mostly by country-level risk assessment, debt sustainability, and the Bank's own prudential ratios, anchored on a firm commitment to maintain the Bank's AAA international credit rating for the benefit of all its clients. The NSO policy (2018) describes the principle of allocating resources to private clients. There are no normative allocation criteria but rather depend firstly on the available headroom. It includes: i) strategic fit on development priorities; ii) creditworthiness and commercial viability; iii) development outcomes, and iv) the Bank's additionality. The board approved a revised assessment of additionality and development outcomes (ADOA) framework in May 2022 to improve NSOs quality at entry by evaluating ex-ante their expected development outcomes, improving the coherence between the investments' results-based logical frameworks and ADOA indicators, assessing the Bank's additionality and the contribution to inclusive and GG. There is some tension between development outcomes assessment and financial viability overall, which often prevails in the prioritisation of NSO investments. These issues have recently been addressed through a combination of the Bank's integrated quality assurance plan (2020) and the 2022 PSD plan that defines and sharpens the areas, instruments, and procedures for interventions.

Allocations to sectoral or thematic priorities in countries go through a consultation process with national stakeholders, which leads to the preparation of a CSP/RISP that is approved by the board. The process essentially tries to align the Bank's strategic thematic/sectoral priorities as expressed in its strategic documents (TYS; High 5s; sectoral/thematic strategies, etc.) with those of the government and presents the strategic pillars and areas of intervention likely to benefit from Bank support for policy dialogue, lending programme, and knowledge products. To help sharpen selectivity and operational focus (a GCI VII commitment), Management is fostering a more effective, efficient use of available resources by focusing on investing in fewer but larger, more transformative operations to increase the development impact and value for money proposition. Quality of Development Aid (QuODA 2021 ranked ADF second on alignment with and ownership by client countries.

There has been mixed progress so far in disbursing project resources in a timely fashion. This seems to be one of the most resilient implementation issues. The Annual Development Effectiveness Report shows an overall disbursement ratio in 2021 of 14% (13% for ADF countries) against a baseline for 2015 of 21% and a target for 2021 of 23%. Timeliness in project execution has generally received a low score from IDEV during the 2016-2020 period (between 2.25 and 2.45) but increased to 2.52 in 2021. The percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better is also low at 45% in 2021 but improving. In addition, the percentage of projects facing implementation challenges and delays (30%) in 2021 is higher than the target for that year (21%) and the baseline (29%) (ADER 2022). When assessing first disbursement and signature delays against targets, the system raises red flags and makes operations eligible for cancellation (29% of the portfolio in 2021). The majority of projects experience lags up to 15 months between approval and loan effectiveness, and 20.8 months from concept note to first disbursements (27.4 months in 2021). Approved by a presidential directive in 2015, ambitious "stretch" targets have tended to make targets less realistic (reportedly under revision currently). One-third of Bank projects suffer implementation delays: 63% of the 65 projects that were closed and validated in 2019 were scored unsatisfactorily for project implementation timeliness.

A range of issues contribute to implementation delays: incomplete project design and the risks associated with shortening project approval time; late procurement plans and feasibility studies; validation of E&S assessment studies; carrying baselines over into implementation; low implementation capacity and setting up project implementation units (PIUs). Staff assumptions tend to be over-optimistic and downplay the risks related to project implementation, especially in complex projects and fragile areas.

The Bank has made the budget process and execution more transparent by providing clear costing methods to realise its programmes, among other things. Improved product costing allows for better harmonisation across cost centres. The new coefficient-based approach uses standard amounts, allowing complexes and regions/countries to assign resources based on the composition of the work programme (lending, supervision, policy, and sector work). These coefficients were used to prepare the 2021 budget proposal. The new approach also includes budgeting staff time, which gives a more transparent view of the excess or deficit of the time required and spent for each product. For this, the Bank has been upgrading the activity time recording system (ATRS) to monitor staff activities, since staff time represent some 70% of the administrative budget. Training is on-going to ensure strong compliance which has implications for monitoring budget execution. The Bank has also engaged in a review of cost structure leading to the elaboration of new budget growth scenarios based mostly on staffing measures, and other cost avoidance initiatives to align with a sustainable revenues/cost trajectory. While the budget aligns by and large with strategic objectives and the High 5s priorities, interviews indicate a perception of insufficient strategic decision-making within the planning process that can lead to a proliferation of new initiatives. To address that point, a new template was developed for cost centres to cost initiatives included in the 2021 budget proposal during 2020 and approved by the board.

Control systems in the Bank, through external and internal audits, confirm compliance with international accepted standards across functions including for independence and transparency. At the conclusion of their annual audit, the external auditors prepare a Management letter for Senior Management and the board of directors, which is reviewed in detail and discussed with the Bank board AUFI. The Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department has the overriding mandate to carry out independent investigations into allegations of corruption, fraud and other sanctionable practices in Bank Group-financed operations. Internal audit recommendations feed into a monitored tracking system, including through a corporate KPI. Of the 354 internal audit recommendations to be implemented in 2021, 51% were implemented during 2021 according to the SVP front office. This compares positively against the rate of 36% reported in the budget document for 2019, but also shows that progress remains below the target of 70% for 2021. IDEV evaluations may also cover similar topics and issues, although mostly from an effectiveness and efficiency perspective, and come up with new sets of recommendations. The cumulative percentage of "highly" and "substantially" implemented recommendations from IDEV evaluations increased from 26% in 2019 to 43.5% in 2021, mostly because they were late in implementing but the level is still insufficient. Lack of timeliness is one of the main obstacles to a higher implementation rate. Interviews reported cases of redundancy of evaluated areas and recommendation overloads that may contribute to some degree of evaluation fatigue. The Bank has been ranked among the most transparent development organisations by the timeliness and comprehensiveness of reporting on ODA interventions (The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA), 2021).

Guidance and procedures for addressing the Bank's safeguard system (ISS) architecture is on par with international best practice, but there is room for improving its implementation. The thematic coverage of the ISS is adequate and E&S work before project approval is strong with satisfactory compliance. However, the 2019 IDEV evaluation of ISS identified several weaknesses: i) the application of ESAP has been by far limited for programme-based operations (PBOs) and co-financed operations; ii) the E&S due diligence during early project stages is poorly documented; iii) the E&S assessment studies analysed show certain quality gaps and an inconsistent practice for category 2 operations; iv) the quality of the Bank's E&S work of the FI lending during implementation is inadequate and their lower performance can be explained by the poor FI compliance with AfDB reporting requirements. The most significant constraint to implementing the ISS was reported to be the low number of E&S specialists to support supervision, which creates a significant reputational risk for the Bank. Since the evaluation, the Bank has addressed points (notably with new recruitments) and should be going to the board in 2023 with a new safeguard policy.

Staff guidelines and procedures to report identified issues of integrity and anti-corruption, ethics, environment and social safeguards, and external complaints on project impact are generally comparable to peer organisations and in line with best practices. The Bank is revising its whistle-blowing and complaints handling policy (2007) to provide an avenue for raising concerns about prohibited practices and to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation. Also, communities and/or individuals who feel that they are unfavourably affected by a Bank-financed project or that the Bank has not complied with its own policies, can take recourse to grievance redress through the independent recourse mechanism (IRM), an independent body reporting to the board.

The Bank articulated its zero-tolerance for all forms of sexual harassment (SH) and sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) in a presidential directive of 2021. The Directive covers both SEA and SH and demonstrates the Bank's commitment to tackling SEAH. However, the Directive does not distinguish between the two. This has made it more challenging for the AfDB (and the assessment team) to demonstrate that appropriate approaches, capacity, and resources have been adopted, implemented, and appropriated for both SEA and SH which are very different in nature and context: SEA generally applies to external cases where the victim is a project beneficiary), while SH covers internal cases (where the victim is staff. In preparing the new directives the Bank benchmarked itself against other IFIs and has been engaged at international level in inter-agency fora. The Bank has also adopted a code of conduct for the Bank, for service providers, suppliers and contractors that specifically includes SEAH. In 2021, the Bank's Ethics Office (PETH) launched the use of the SPOT system, a third-party artificial intelligence tool to enhance reporting of misconduct in line with its whistle-blower policy; however, to date, there has been no opportunity to assess the functionality of this system for SEAH complaints. Also, a SEAH awareness campaign was carried out during six months of 2021 for all staff including training sessions, video messages, featured speakers, and awareness events. PIAC's Annual Reports are the main vehicles to inform the board about SEA and SH but there is little evidence available to illustrate the extent by which the institution ensures that it acts in a timely manner on formal complaints or allegation of SEA or SH. The human resources department produced an internal document, Case Management Report on Disciplinary Cases for 2019 and 2020 which reports on i) summary of all allegations of irregularities, ii) factual findings, and iii) final consequences including disciplinary measures; this includes SEAH when applicable. Also, PETH implements a risk assessment tool (not public) that identifies the ethics risks, including harassment. A risk mapping is undertaken by considering the ethical dilemmas that were recorded against each department/division as well as in regional and country offices. This risk-based approach is used to select countries for ethics outreach and to focus PETH work programme and reporting including on SH when relevant. Of the 12 PARs reviewed, four have addressed the risk of SEA and gender-based violence towards host populations.

The Bank reported no cases of SEAH in 2020 or 2021. Some evidence from internal surveys seems to question whether the system is trusted enough to serve as an incentive for staff to come forward. There is scant evidence that intervention designs have examined potential measures to prevent sexual abuses, that a victim-support function is in place on SEA, and that related sensitisation campaigns were integrated into work contracts. The introduction of guidance and rules for SEA are still relatively recent for the organisation, which may explain why partners responding to the MOPAN survey knew little about Bank's efforts in this field.

MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities over time (adaptability)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.75**
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy is available which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to RMCs	4
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 3: Resource allocation mechanisms allow for adaptation in different contexts	4
Element 4: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	4
MI 4.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: the PBA system continues to be the bedrock of the ADF's resource allocation system, in a transparent and effective way, since its adoption in 1999. The allocation of ADF resources to ADF-eligible RMCs is a process which takes place every calendar year: First, resources are set aside for	9, 11, 34, 41, 95, 101, 102, 131

i) the Regional Operations envelope for regional operations to promote regional integration in Africa, ii) eligible countries in a situation of fragility are entitled to receive supplementary financing under the TSF in support of their recovery and in recognition of exceptional need, and iii) the Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility, created in ADF-13 to expand the ADB private funds mobilisation capacity. Second, resources are allocated to eligible countries using the PBA formula based. Of the expected ADF-15 resources, 55% were allocated through the PBA, 25% through the Regional Operations Envelope, and 18% through the TSF. As of February 2022, the utilisation rate for the PBA was at 60% (see https://adf.afdb.org/adf-15/) In the case of non-concessional sovereign resources (ADB), allocation is determined mostly by country-level risk assessment, debt sustainability as well as the Bank's own prudential ratios, anchored on a firm commitment to maintain the Bank's AAA international credit rating, for the benefit of all its clients. Criteria for allocating trust fund resources depend on individual operational guidelines. Certain trust funds can only accept proposals from internal Bank staff (as a need may arise in the RMC) such as the KOAFEC fund. Others allow for external beneficiaries to apply directly to the funds such as Agriculture Fast Track Fund or SEFA. Most thematic trust funds allow for direct access. The Bank's normal Trust Fund processes are generally similar, i.e. either through a competitive Call for Proposal process or by an ad-hoc proposal submitted to the fund manager. In both cases, the criteria to assess proposals include, among others, the alignment of the proposal to the operational objectives of the fund, the capacity of the implementing agency to effectively achieve the project' objectives while complying with the Bank Group's fiduciary and safeguard rules. **Element 2: The criteria used for resource allocation target the highest priorities of interventions in line with the Bank High 5s. At the country level allocation mechanisms are determined by the PBA and by the CSPs/RISPs in terms of sectoral allocations to national/regional priorities.** The distribution of resources by High 5 and by sector is well documented in the work programme and budget document submitted to the board annually and indicating the priority areas, institutional reforms, emerging needs, special emphasis, and indicative resource requirements for the next 3-year rolling period. High 5s allocations show important variations, especially in the last 2 years during which most of the COVID-related operations were classified in the Quality of Life High 5, while the "normal" portfolio composition (by sector) shows that the social sectors have traditionally represented a minor share of the portfolio (less than 5%). This points to the need of rationalising the Quality of Life High 5. Also, some concerns were raised during interviews about the perceived "proliferation" of new initiatives that may not be subject to the same level of prioritisation (see MI 4.3.4.). At the country level, PBA criteria for resource allocation are based on i) countries' poverty levels; ii) the size of their population; iii) the infrastructure gap; and iv) the institutional, policy and project implementation performance as determined by the CPIA. The PBA formula has been adjusted in ADF-13 in order to better align the PBA system with the ADF's operational priorities and the Bank Group's mandate. This has permitted to strengthen ADF's responsiveness to fragile situations while preserving its performance principle. The outcomes of the ADF-15 resource allocation exercise demonstrated a successful implementation of these adjustments as the level of PBA channelled to transition states has significantly increased by 38% compared to the ADF-14 period. Meanwhile, the PBA performance principle has been preserved. In a "normal" year (like 2019), total approvals are shared as follows: ADB 70%, ADF 17% and Special Resources 13%, while in 2021 it was ADB 54%, ADF 28% and Special Resources 17%. In the case of NSOs, the principle of allocating resources to private clients, as described in the NSO policy (2018), depends firstly on the available headroom and include: i) strategic fit on development priorities; ii) creditworthiness and commercial viability; iii) development outcomes and iv) the Bank's additionality. The composition of the overall non-sovereign portfolio is expected to comply with the	9, 11, 34, 41, 95, 101, 102, 131

rules, standards and limits outlined in the Bank's Operational Risk Framework, the Capital Adequacy and Exposure Management Framework and the Credit Risk Management Guidelines. The new Private Sector Development Strategy (2022) also defines and sharpens the areas and instruments of priority interventions and procedures around three axes: i) improve investment and business climate, ii) enhance access to social and economic infrastructure, and iii) foster enterprise development.

Element 3: Resource allocation mechanisms allow for adaptation in different contexts. At the global level, to maintain the balance between performance and needs, the PBA formula can be tweaked from time to time if needed, to ensure the right weight of the different components of the CPIA or other dimensions. While adjustments to the formula are not common, Management analyses on a regular basis the inclusion of new indicators in the resource allocation framework either directly in the PBA formula or for the allocation of TSF while meeting all criteria of replicability, availability, and transparency for ADF-eligible countries. This was the case particularly for fragility, vulnerability, climate and regional security. At the country level the Bank's work programme should continue to be guided by the High 5s as part of the CSP process in the way resources are further allocated by sector, for both ADF and ADB.

A vivid case of adaptation of resource allocation mechanisms occurred as part of the COVID-19 response, which carried out the repurposing the lending programme and gave priority to relief operations under emergency procedures. Also, to be able to disburse quickly the Bank opted for the budget support instrument and modified the PBO ceiling from 15% to 30% of the lending programme. Figure 12 reflects the responses to the MOPAN external survey on the matter.

FIGURE 12. **AfDB HAS BEEN ABLE TO ADAPT ITS OPERATING MODEL IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 TO ENSURE OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

9, 11, 34, 41, 95, 101, 102, 131

Element 4: Reviewing and updating the organisational policy or statement on resource allocation is possible but rare, as the PBA system works through a fixed formula. In the case of ADB it is subject to a review of the risk and debt situation at the country level, to be corroborated with the CSP priorities. As noted above, the ponderations among the different elements of the formula are monitored and analysed on a regular base to ensure their relevance to the evolving context while maintaining the principles of transparency and rigor in its application. An example is a recent effort to ensure that fragility is adequately covered in the criteria and weights of the formula. Changes to the PBA system require

board approval. Adjustments of criteria for other elements such as the TSF or the Credit Enhancement Facility are also possible subject to clear criteria. The trust fund resource allocation mechanisms are more flexible and adjustments are subject to criteria negotiated with the donors.	9, 11, 34, 41, 95, 101, 102, 131
MI 4.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.50**
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement to partners	3
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	2
Element 3: Clear explanations, including changes in context, are available for any variances against plans	3
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than to internal procedural blockages	2
MI 4.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Disbursement targets are set for each project and are then aggregated at the corporate level to feed in the RMF. All projects approved by the board include clear disbursement profiles and targets. Disbursement profiles vary from operation to operation with some sectors being more front-loaded than others. The overall Bank's corporate targets are as good as the targets of individual projects. While, the targets are clear, the level of ambition of some targets may exceed the capacity to achieve them (see element below). Beyond the disbursement ratio which may depend on other factors than performance, time taken from concept note to first disbursement is set at a level (15 months) which seems out of reach (27.4 months in 2021). This has been reset in May 2022 to a more realistic level in line with performance achieved by comparator organisations. Recent efforts to address this systemic challenge include the enhanced RR which came into effect in September 2021 and is designed to look at whether the project has mechanisms in place to facilitate timely start up and first disbursement. This issue is common among IFIs and is also dependent on national ratification procedures at the country level. **Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were often not met within institutionally agreed margins.** Disbursements are monitored during supervision and reported on every 6 months through implementation progress reports (IPRs). Also, ODD monitors this drawing information directly from SAP financial data. The information gets aggregated and presented by country, sector or High 5 in various reports and tools among which i) the Delivery Dashboard for on-line, real-time monitoring, as an accountability tool vis a vis Management; ii) the annual report, the iii) ADER, and the underlying RMF. The Bank performance in disbursements has historically been below targets and time taken to first disbursement has worsened in 2021 probably as the consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Typically, disbursement and procurement go hand in hand, as swift procurement time from bid reception to contract signature is critical to implement projects on time and contribute to a reasonable disbursement ratio. Delays in procurement processes almost inevitably lead to low disbursements and to weak implementation performance. Historically both have been problematic. Delays in procurement are mostly linked to lack of readiness of the projects for implementation. The current corporate disbursement ratio in 2021 is 14% overall (versus 17.3% in 2016), against a target of 23% and a baseline of 21% (for 2015). The disbursement ratio is of 16% in ADF countries and 13% in transition states.	6, 41, 78, 101, 102, 108, 124, 108, 131

Timeliness in project execution and implementation performance have had the lowest score, at 2.25 and 2.74 respectively (over a range of 4) in the batch of the 65 projects validated by IDEV and reported in the Synthesis report 2019 (latest data available). In the case of NSOs, disbursements cannot be compared in the same way. Loans are often disbursed in one bullet payment after signing; guarantees are provided but hopefully not disbursed unless the accompanying loan gets into default, and equities are disbursed in exchange of shares until sold at exit. **Element 3: Explanations are available for variances against plans but resolving them has proven challenging.** Variances against plans are normally reported on as part of project supervision processes and reviewed by Management through the IPRs and the PCRs, as well as through the on-line executive dashboard and IDEV validations. Reasons for variances range from unrealistic targets, procurement delays, low implementation capacity, bureaucratic hurdles, project effectiveness delays, incomplete design, and late feasibility studies. Even though the origin of the problem is often well-known, there has been so far mixed progress in resolving what seems to be one of the most resilient implementation issues. Explanations provided in the APPR 2019 suggest insufficient progress in taking advantage of advance procurement to accelerate project implementation, limited availability and quality of design studies, weak PIU capacity, insufficient understanding of procurement rules and regulations and weak market conditions. Advance contracting can only take place if the project designs and implementation documents are ready during appraisal, which is seldom the case. As a result of inadequate project readiness and start-up delays, implementation periods are often underestimated. The COVID situation has created an anomaly in the typical disbursement profile of the Bank as despite a reduction of the lending programme, disbursements in 2020 have been higher than approvals (for the first time over the last decade). This is because the CRF has mostly consisted of one-tranche fast-disbursing budget support operations. The client connection platform, a new system allowing for electronic submission of client documents needed for disbursements has been introduced and is now in use, reducing transaction costs for both RMCs and the Bank, but it is too early to assess impact. **Element 4: Variances relate to both internal and external factors.** Disbursement variances compared to plans are an expression of implementation delays, of which a third of Bank's projects suffer. In 2019, the average time achieved between approval and first disbursement was 15 months. As noted in the APPR these delays suggest weak quality at entry, in particular the absence of technical design studies and bidding documents ahead of project approval. Design and procurement readiness as well as institutional capacity of the executing agencies are critical factors to ensure start-up delays are minimised and development results achieved expeditiously. 89% of projects completed over 2018 and 2019 were extended for an average of 2.2 years. The introduction of "stretch targets" in the presidential directive 02/2015 for signature and first disbursement lead time – significantly more ambitious than sister institutions- has led to the escalation of operations flagged for performance delays and those eligible for cancellation. This has now changed as these targets were reset in May 2022. While the Bank is adamant about achieving faster project design and approval, there is also a risk that critical design activities such as procurement plans, feasibility studies, validation of E&S assessment studies, setting up PIUs, and baselines, get carried over into implementation, which results in initial delays and lagged disbursement. Evidence from the external survey shows that borrowers concerns are concentrated in this area, as well as a high incidence of "don't know/no opinion". (Figure 13) Externally, responsibility for low disbursements can often be shared with the government and particularly by the capacity of PIUs to carry out this function smoothly. In situations where the Bank's goes through country systems, there are instances where there are significant delays in procurement.	6, 41, 78, 101, 102, 108, 124, 108, 131

FIGURE 13. **IN [COUNTRY], AfDB MANAGEMENT PROCESSES (E.G. HIRING, PROCURING, DISBURSING) DO NOT CAUSE UNNECESSARY DELAYS FOR PARTNERS IN IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=63)

New investment instruments such as results-based financing could allow the Bank to tie its support to the results of specific government programmes of expenditures, thereby incentivising governments to shift their focus from inputs to outcomes.

6, 41, 78, 101, 102, 108, 124, 108, 131

MI 4.2: Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 4.3: Principles of results-based budgeting applied	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.75**
Element 1: The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current strategic plan	3
Element 2: A budget document is available which provides clear costing for the achievement of each management result	3
Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs from activity to result (outcome)	2
Element 4: There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)	3
MI 4.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The 2022-24 work programme and budget is aligned with delivering the High 5s, the Bank's cross-cutting priorities, and the GCI-VII and ADF-15 commitments. The alignment with the TYS priorities, as described under KPI 1, is mostly done through the High 5s lens. The objective of alignment between resources and strategic objectives is pursued by the Bank without the need of a results-based budgeting system being in place. Indeed, the relevance and possible implementation of a results-based budgeting approach was assessed to be generally challenging and there is no evidence of its use among other MDBs as well. Such an approach is made difficult because it is not possible to forecast results at the time of budgeting and cannot be used as an allocation parameter. Therefore, because results on the ground are known several years after the project implementation, it is difficult to make a direct link between budget execution and results. Also, interventions such as ESW and country dialogue should help to achieve results on the ground well after the budget is allocated. The budget allocation in the Bank reflects the strategic priorities of the Bank, however although it reports on financial allocations by High 5s in its work programme and budget documents, and in the ADERs, that is an ex-post classification. Ex-ante, the Bank uses a sector classification in its projects data-	8, 15, 96, 99, 100, 128

bases, not a High 5-based or other thematic classification system. A project can contribute to several High 5s. This makes planning for the High 5s priorities more difficult. The Bank's Indicative Operational Program comprises SOs and NSOs that are aligned with the High 5s priorities. The budget document shows how much of wat was approved is falling under each High 5 and Cost Centres and also details the Bank's lending targets as well as the overall resources required for the effective implementation of the proposed work programmes. While the COVID-19 pandemic has imposed some constraints to the effective and efficient implementation of the Bank's priority programmes, Management strives to meet the needs of RMC in line with its strategic priorities and signals at the same time a progressive return to a normal lending situation. **Element 2: The Bank has been improving the transparency of the budget process and budget execution including through the provision of clear costing for the achievement of the Bank's programmes.** Product costing has improved and allows for better harmonisation across Cost Centres. The new coefficient-based approach allows to assign the resources based on the composition of the work programme (lending, supervision, policy, and sector work) by complexes and regions/countries through standard amounts. The coefficients were used to prepare the 2021 budget proposal. The new approach also includes the budgeting of staff time which allows a more transparent view of the excess or deficit of the staff time required and actually spent for each particular product. For this, the Bank has been updating its activity time recording system (ATRS) to monitor staff activities since staff time represent some 70% of the administrative budget. Training is on-going to ensure strong compliance which has implications for monitoring budget execution. **Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs but mostly at intervention and output level, less at outcome level.** The Bank has made efforts in moving to a budget allocation based on the work programme and strategic objectives. The operational deliverables translate into workload requirements to which staff-week coefficients are applied. Of the total operations budget, 50% is allocated based on coefficients and directly related to projects and country programmes. The coefficient-based budgeting approach has strengthened accountability in managing resources by enabling Management to track down resources by type of deliverable through work programme planning and execution. Also, the Bank has taken measures to reduce budget transfers among line items of the budget to improve compliance with the thresholds specified in the revised rules on budget fungibility. It is recognised, however, that the budget document could be more of a tool to track expenditures while moving from input to output to outcome in line with the results frameworks. Claims in results-oriented annual reporting cannot always be substantiated as they need to be measured against actual results rather than against financial delivery. **Element 4: The evolution of budget allocation shows positive change in terms of incorporating emerging priorities, strategic initiatives, and greater harmonisation of the costing of the various products.** During the GCI-VII and ADF-15 discussions, shareholders agreed on a set of reforms to reinforce the Bank's ability to deliver on its mission and maximise its use of resources. Among those reforms, the commitments made are to improve the transparency of budget procedures, cost sharing arrangements among the three components of the Bank Group, the review of the cost-to-income ratio to control its operating costs, the development of a cost containment framework as a key component of long-term financial sustainability framework. There is evidence of more budget resources shifted towards strategic priorities. For instance, the budget document for 2022-24 includes a section on principles and priorities for the planning cycle which leads to the identification of special emphasis areas to accelerate recovery (sometimes beyond RMF areas), such as: trade and regional integration, promoting PPP in infrastructure, the capacity development initiative, support to the pharmaceutical sector, jobs for youth, health infrastructure, economic governance, CC and GG, and increased knowledge	8, 15, 96, 99, 100, 128

services. Yet, as already noted, interviews carried out signal a perception that there is an insufficient level of strategic decision-making within the planning process, which may result in a proliferation of new initiatives. To address that point, a new template was developed during 2020 and approved by the board, for cost centres to cost initiatives included in the 2021 budget proposal.	8, 15, 96, 99, 100, 128
MI 4.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certify that international standards are met at all levels, including with respect to internal audit	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**4.00**
Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards	4
Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions	4
Element 3: Management response is available to external audit	4
Element 4: Internal audit function meets international standards, including for independence and transparency.	4
MI 4.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The financial statements are audited by an independent audit firm, in accordance with international standards. Auditors are given unrestricted access to all financial records and related data. The external auditors' reports accompany the audited financial statements. The auditor's responsibility is also to express an opinion on the African Development Bank Group's internal control over financial reporting. This attestation is provided by the external auditors as a report separate from the audit opinion. The audit engagement is conducted in accordance with the international standard on assurance engagements 3000, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. It requires that the auditor plan and carry out the procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, effective internal control was maintained over financial reporting. The Bank Group boards of directors established an AUFI to assist the board, among other things, in their oversight responsibility for the soundness of the Bank Group's accounting policies and practices and the effectiveness of internal controls. AUFI oversees the process of selection of external auditors and makes a recommendation for such selection to the board of directors, which in turn makes a recommendation for the approval of the board of governors. AUFI meets periodically with Management to review and monitor matters of financial or auditing significance. The external auditors and the internal auditors regularly meet with AUFI to discuss the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting and any other matter that may require AUFI's attention. A significant development in the external audit space is the adoption of an expanded audit opinion following the publication of new and revised auditor reporting standards by IFAC which, among other benefits, enhances auditor reporting by explaining the basis of the audit opinion and provides more relevant information to users of financial statements. **Element 2: In the opinion of the auditor, the African Development Bank Group, in all material respects, maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of 31 December 2020**, based on criteria established in "Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the committee of sponsoring organisations of the Treadway Commission. The auditors audited the financial statements of the AfDB, the ADF and the NTF as of and for the year ended December 31, 2020, in accordance with the international standards on auditing, and have expressed unqualified opinions on those financial statements. The Institute of Internal Auditors evaluated the work of the Bank's internal audit function in 2021 and provided a top-rated "generally conforms" assessment, signalling full compliance with international standards.	7, 98

Element 3: Management response is available to external audits. At the conclusion of their annual audit, the external auditors prepare a Management letter for Senior Management and the board of directors, which is reviewed in detail and discussed with the board AUFI. The Management letter sets out the external auditors' observations and recommendations for improvement on internal controls and other matters. Management response includes actions for implementation of the auditors' recommendations. **Element 4: By and large, the audit functions respond to criteria of independence and transparency.** Bank policies stipulate that the Office of the auditor general report directly to the president and carry out its functions in total independence and may not be influenced directly or indirectly in how it conducts his/her works. The president resident shall appoint and remove the auditor general in consultation with the board of directors. The appointment of the auditor general shall be for a period of five years renewable once and he/she shall not be eligible for staff appointment thereafter. The auditor general shall meet and report regularly to the president, the AUFI and the board on the interventions of the Office and on the sufficiency of resources. The auditor general shall be an ex-officio member of the Oversight Committee on Corruption and Fraud. He/she shall coordinate internal audit efforts with External Auditors so as to provide adequate audit coverage, minimise possible duplication of efforts and provide maximum review of the Bank's interventions. If during an audit, the auditor general believes a detailed investigation is necessary, he/she may refer the cases to the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department (PIAC). Audit and non-corruption related cases may also be referred to PAGL for action.	7, 98
MI 4.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) are adequately addressed	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how issues identified through internal control mechanisms/reporting channels (including misconduct such as fraud, sexual misconduct) will be addressed	4
Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues and include timelines	3
Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified	3
Element 4: A tracking system is available that records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues	3
Element 5: Governing body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external) with clear timelines for action	2
MI 4.5: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Control systems are underpinned by policies and institutional arrangements. The Bank has a code of conduct for staff members and a separate code of conduct for executive directors. Their purpose is to outline basic principles of professional ethics expected from international civil servants. The Bank also has clear institutional arrangements on how issues identified through internal control mechanisms should be addressed. This includes designated roles and responsibility and procedures for the various Units in the way they implement their mandate. The Office of the auditor general is responsible for managing a comprehensive programme of auditing both internally and externally. If	7, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 85, 86, 88, 110

during the course of an audit, the auditor general believes a detailed investigation is necessary, he/she may refer the cases to the Office of Integrity and Anti-Corruption (PIAC). PIAC has the overriding mandate to carry out independent investigations into allegations of corruption, fraud and other sanctionable practices. PIAC reports to the president. The primary purpose of the Bank's Ethics Office is to make available to Bank staff, advice on work-related ethical issues and dilemmas and to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest. It is the custodian of the Bank code of ethics and strives to build an ethical culture. It is also in charge of training and sensitisation aimed at prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) in the Bank and in its financed projects. The Ethics Office reports to the president. The Safeguards and Compliance Department (SNSC) has a dual role: mainstreaming Environmental and Social (E&S) considerations into Bank-financed projects and oversight of the Integrated Safeguard System (ISS) compliance. The Bank's Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures (ESAP) provide guidance on the specific procedures that the Bank and its borrowers or clients should follow to ensure that Bank's sovereign and non-sovereign operations meet the requirements of the Operational Safeguards (OSs). **Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues; evidence of timelines is not always available.** The Bank will pursue disciplinary action and other measures against perpetrators of fraud, including recovery of financial loss suffered by the Bank, or referring a matter to local or national authorities. The Bank has developed an action plan to strengthen its oversight, compliance, and accountability functions in 2020, as per the GCI-VII commitment. It identifies three main areas of reform: i) strengthening the oversight role of the board of directors and the Ad Hoc Committee on Governance, ii) actions to strengthen the Bank's compliance and accountability functions, focusing on three critical departments—the Office of the auditor general (PAGL), Independent Evaluation Department (IDEV) and the Anti-Corruption Department (PIAC), – and increasing compliance with audit and evaluation recommendations, and iii) actions aimed at strengthening the Bank's culture of compliance and accountability, including ethical behaviour, strong IT systems and improved staff performance management. Following the technical upgrade of the case management system and the revision of the case intake processes, PIAC management made the decision to review and update the investigation manuals in 2021. Given that PIAC's mandate covers investigations of sanctionable practices and staff misconduct, the manuals for both areas of responsibility were reviewed and finalised in July 2021. PIAC completed drafting its Confidentiality Policy in 2021. The Policy sets out the principles applicable to access, usage, storage, disclosure, transfer and administration of information generated, received or managed by PIAC. As noted by the IDEV ISS evaluation (2019), guidance and procedures for addressing the Bank's ISS architecture is on par with international best practice, the thematic coverage of the ISS is adequate and E&S work before project approval is strong. However, a number of weaknesses were identified mostly related to implementation as: i) the application of ESAP has been by far limited for program-based operations (PBOs) and co-financed operations; ii) the E&S due diligence during early project stages is poorly documented; iii) the E&S assessment studies analysed show certain quality gaps and an inconsistent practice for category 2 operations; iv) the Bank E&S work quality for FI lending is inadequate and their lower performance can be explained by the weak FI compliance with AfDB's reporting requirements. The issues raised in this evaluation have since been taken up in an action plan (SSAP 2020-25) as part of the GCI VII and ADF 15 commitments focused on strengthening the E&S safeguard and compliance function. Management reports that the Bank has achieved 100% coverage (from 40% in 2019) in ensuring screening and appraisal of E&S risks at approval stage. In addition, SNSC is now revamping the safeguard policy which is due in 2023 and innovates on a number of fronts such as	7, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 85, 86, 88, 110

the definition of indigenous people, the simplification of the E&S frameworks, more clarity on climate, human rights, sexual abuse and harassment. **Element 3: Generally speaking, guidelines and procedures for staff to report identified issues are available and comparable to peer organisations.** Several mechanisms are set up for Bank staff and external stakeholders to report issues. In addition to typical channels, such as anonymous reporting to PIAC and the Ethics Office, the Bank avails itself of the Whistle-blowing and Complaints Handling Policy (2007), currently under review by the board. The main aim of the Policy is to provide an avenue for staff to raise concerns related to fraud, corruption, SEAH or any other misconduct and to assure that the persons who disclose the information will be protected from retaliation. The IRM handles complaints coming from external stakeholders according to procedures that ensure rigorous and independent treatment. Complaints may be reported to secured telephone numbers, by email or in person. Secured hotlines numbers are provided on-line for several RMCs and a central number. To encourage speak-up and reporting of unethical behaviours, including SEAH, the Bank introduced SPOT, an automated, interactive system that uses artificial intelligence and allows employees to report ethical concerns confidentially and anonymously. The SPOT system is accessible using the link: http://www.talktospot.com/afdb. **Element 4: A tracking system is available that records number of cases being treated or closed, and their typology. The Audit Management Tracking System monitors progress in the implementation of the actions to be taken and timetables.** In addition, PAGL submits to AUFI a follow-up report on a semi-annual basis with implementation status and timelines for all outstanding recommendations. The Bank's annual report summarises the activity and incidence of cases by i) the Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (through its Independent Recourse Mechanism); ii) the Ethics Office; iii) the Office of the Auditor's General; iv) the Integrity and Anti-corruption Department; iv) the Office of the Ombudsman; v) the Administrative Tribunal; vi) the Staff Appeals Committee; vii) The Sanctions Commissioner's Office; and vii) the Sanctions Appeals board. PIAC has its own annual report which is public and reports statistics on cases and investigations dealt with. The Ethics Office prepares quarterly and annual reports on their activities which are shared with the president but are not publicly available, although shared with staff. Generally speaking, these reports record incidence of the various cases, statistics on closure, and information on training, but there is scant evidence about actions taken and implementation/ resolution timetables. There is no requirement for the Ethics Office to report to the board on action taken in specific SEAH cases, however, a joint presentation was made to the board by PIAC and PETH on "progress made in combating SEAH in May 2021. IRM publishes Annual Reports which include a description of complaints handling, compliance review, problem-solving process and case studies. As part of GCI-VII measures, the Bank committed to improving fraud and corruption prevention and detection in Bank operations. A report to CAHR on the outcome of internal investigations conducted in the period 2016 to 2020 was presented in May 2021. From 2022, this report should be prepared annually. Management has also presented a framework for consequence management to CAHR for discussion. IDEV's Comparative Review of Sanctions Practices across Multilateral Development Banks (2018) suggests publishing fully reasoned legal opinions from the Sanctions Appeals board in the interests of promoting greater transparency and accountability in formal sanctions proceedings. It was argued that the Bank should explore with other MDBs the possibility of a restricted-access joint IT platform to facilitate sharing of case statistics and decisions across MDBs and timely coordination on cross-debarment matters. **Element 5: Bank documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed and are reviewed by the board, however implementation of recommendations is well off targets.** Of the 354 internal audit recommendations to be implemented in 2021, 181 recommendations have been implemented during the year 2021 representing a 51% implementation rate according to the SVP Front	7, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 85, 86, 88, 110

Office. This compares positively against the rate of 36% reported in the budget document for 2019, which also shows a target of 70% for 2021. In addition to internal audits, IDEV evaluations may cover similar topics and issues, mostly from an effectiveness and efficiency perspective rather than from a conformity angle and come up with new sets of recommendations. In 2021, the cumulative percentage of "highly" and "substantially" implemented recommendations from IDEV evaluations was 43.5%[11], with lack of timeliness being one of the main obstacles to a higher implementation rate. Interviews reported cases of redundancy of areas being evaluated and recommendation overloads which may contribute to a certain degree of evaluation fatigue. The reporting on E&S covenants and mitigation measures was found to be weak and inconsistent in the Bank's supervision reports, and even more for NSOs. Few of the periodic reports due to be sent by the borrower or by the client are available. IDEV evaluation found deficiencies in the Bank's archiving system of E&S documents to verify compliance with the requirements of the ISS. Also, it is observed that the Integrated Safeguards Tracking System (ISTS) has not been fully operationalised and has not been systematically used.	7, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 85, 86, 88, 110
MI 4.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public	4
Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define/s Management and staff roles in implementing/complying with them	3
Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted on policy/guidelines	4
Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g., through regular monitoring and reporting to the governing body	3
Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and "whistle-blower" protection policy)	4
Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption, and other irregularities, including actions taken, and ensures that they are made public	3
MI 4.6: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Policies and guidelines are in place to prevent and address fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities. In November 2020, the Bank's board approved PIAC's updated terms of Reference (ToR) which set out in detail the reporting obligations of PIAC to the board and the president, while still preserving its strong functional independence in terms of core work and clarifying PIAC's mandate on the investigation of staff misconduct allegations. The Bank Group Due Diligence Guidelines and Screening Procedures on Anti-money Laundering, Counter Financing Terrorism and Counter Illicit Financing Flows (AML/CFT/CIFFs) were approved by the Bank's president for implementation in 2020. They provide guidance to operational departments on mainstreaming AML/CFT Know Your Client (KYC) measures in their respective operations and activities. As part of the NSO policy, the Bank may sanction any person or enterprise shown to have engaged in sanctionable practices, including debarment from participating in the preparation or implementation of operations financed by the Bank. Finally, as part of its strategic preventive framework to optimise the integrity and fiduciary safeguards as stated in	65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98

the NSO Policy, the Bank uses its integrity due diligence processes and guidelines to mitigate integrity and fiduciary risks. Most of these documents are public, such as the PIAC annual report and Standard Operating Procedures, the Whistle Blowing and Complaints Handling Policy, the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption, the Disclosure of Information Policy, Prevention of Illicit Financial Flows. To align with best practices of peer institutions, the board authorised the establishment of an ad-hoc committee of the board of governors to oversee a review of the Bank's ethics and complaints handling governing framework. This review should consider and update the Whistle Blowing and Complaints Handling Policy, the Code of Conduct for Elected Officers, the Terms of Reference for the Ethics Committee of the board of directors, and any other relevant rules to strengthen governance of the Bank Group. Responding to the travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on field investigations, PIAC developed the "Guidance on Remote Investigation Interviews". It sets standards, principles and operational procedures for conducting remote investigation interviews during the period of lockdowns and travel restrictions. **Element 2: The roles and responsibilities in carrying internal control functions are explicit in policy and guidelines covering a range of offices in the Bank.** Specific provisions are inserted in financing agreements in relation to sanctionable practices in which the Bank's clients and counterparties may engage, or have engaged, in connection with the project to be financed. • The auditor general's office is responsible for planning, organising, directing, and controlling a broad programme of auditing both internally and externally including without limitation all projects and programmes of the Bank Group, including identifying possible means of improving accountability, efficiency of operations and economy in the use of resources. If, during the course of an audit, the auditor general believes a detailed investigation is necessary, he/she may refer the cases to PIAC. Audit reports are not public. The auditor general reports to the President. • The overriding mandate of PIAC is to carry out independent investigations into allegations of corruption, fraud and other sanctionable practices in Bank Group financed operations. PIAC implements its Integrity Strategy by mainstreaming integrity issues into Bank Group operations and activities and providing technical support to regional member countries in integrity issues and enhancing accountability. In 2020, PIAC started implementation of the Triage Strategy, an integral part of the Policy on Enhanced Investigation Process and System (EIPS Policy) aimed at evaluating, classifying, and prioritising cases. PIAC does not make sanction decisions but submits its reports as follows: Reports on findings of sanctionable practices are submitted to the sanction's commissioner and reports on staff misconduct are submitted to Senior Management of the Bank. • The Ethics Office has the main responsibility for making available to Bank staff, advice on work-related ethical issues, dilemmas, and challenges, to avoid real, perceived, or potential conflicts of interest in the performance of their duties. The Ethics Office is responsible for developing the framework, guidelines as well as administration and interpretation of the code of ethics, which sets out acceptable standards of conduct including on SEAH. IDEV's Comparative Review of Sanctions Practices across Multilateral Development Banks, recommends pursuing a more proactive, prevention-focused approach that looks beyond individual sanctions cases to better identify areas of systemic vulnerability and red flags, and find longer-term solutions to address recurring types of misconduct, including strengthening engagement between integrity/sanctions and operations staff and other relevant stakeholders. In September 2021, PIAC in collaboration with the World Bank Integrity Compliance Officer initiated the formation of an MDB Platform for information exchange on integrity compliance processes, best practices and challenges encountered.	65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98

Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted on policy/guidelines (SEAH will be reported in 4.7, 4.8). In 2021, PIAC conducted a total of 53 outreach and capacity building sessions, 62% of which were focused on external stakeholders. The sessions attracted the participation of 1732 Bank staff and 2 844 public officials implementing Bank-funded projects, anti-corruption and law enforcement agents working in RMCs, academics, and development professionals. In 2020, PIAC conducted six Integrity Due Diligence (IDD) training sessions with a total of 164 Bank staff in attendance. The training included an introduction to the Bank's IDD Guidelines and processes, specialised training sessions for NSOs and various Complexes. Training on IDD, such as the Integrity Risk Tool and the Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) Check Tool, were provided to all Bank staff via the Bank's intranet. Monitoring of the usage of these tools showed that they were accessed a total of 753 times, an 8.6% drop from the 824 times in 2019. To create awareness on the Bank's guidelines to implement AML/CFT/CIFFs in Bank operations, PIAC conducted six AML/CFT and online training in sanctions screening in 2020, attended by a total of 296 Bank staff. In 2021, PIAC issued two Integrity Newsletters covering topical integrity issues within the context of the Bank's activities.

Regarding external audiences, PIAC conducts training and fiduciary clinics on a regular basis through online Institutional Capacity and Fiduciary Clinic Training for RMCs and Business Opportunity Seminars in collaboration with the African Development Institute. In 2021, PIAC organised seven anti-corruption training sessions with a total of 347 agents from the law enforcement and anticorruption agencies of 41 RMCs participating. The purpose of these training sessions is to build capacity of the PIUs in these countries, and to understand the Bank's rules and procedures. All the training sessions were conducted virtually in response to the COVID-19 travel restrictions. PIAC annual report indicates a three-year review of training for staff and stakeholders (Figure 14)

FIGURE 14. **THREE-YEAR STATISTICAL REVIEW OF TRAINING (ON THE LEFT: STAFF TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING ON THE RIGHT: STAKEHOLDER TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING)**



Source: PIAC Annual Report, 2021

The Ethics Office conducts virtual ethics awareness sessions to enhance employees' understanding of the Bank's code of ethics and highlight the importance of upholding acceptable conduct in the workplace. In April 2021, the Ethics Office conducted a training of ethics champions to enhance understanding of their roles and strengthen their capacity to partner with the Ethics Office and work towards improving the ethical culture in the Bank. The office also organised ethical leadership exchanges with senior managers and directors. The Ethics Office participated in fiduciary clinics for nineteen countries. The aim of the clinics was to build the capacity of project managers to enable them to adopt ethical values and comply with the rules and regulations as they implement Bank-financed projects.

Element 4: PIAC and PETH's annual reports provide evidence of policy/guidelines implementation for the practices under their purview. The various units involved with control systems and accountability submit an annual report with statistics on the cases under their purview. For example,

65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98

PIAC Annual Report in 2021 records and describes complaints received alleging sanctionable practices in Bank-financed projects, staff misconduct, debarments, anti-money laundering, integrity due diligence etc. The report is presented to the board and is public. An analysis of completed cases in 2017-20 shows that fraud has been the most prevalent sanctionable practice, representing 61% of investigations completed in 2021. The energy and power sector has the highest incidence of cases completed and closed in 2021. In 2021, the Ethics Office Annual Report provided information on the request received for advice and guidance (185 requests). The most recurring requests received were from external cases (59), that were resolved. Of the other cases, 10 were referred. The fact that PETH's annual reports are not public, somewhat detracts from the overall transparency of the reporting system and its usefulness for accountability, even if they are shared internally. IDEV's Comparative Review of Sanctions Practices across Multilateral Development Banks 2019 recommends using joint periodic reports from the integrity and sanctions units to the EDs to provide a comprehensive overview of activities, trends, and policy issues. Such reports could be harmonised across MDBs. **Element 5: PIAC, PETH and IRM are mandated to receive complaints from within and outside the Bank.** In order to enhance good governance and transparency, the Bank has a Whistle-blowing and Complaints Handling Policy (2007) to provide an avenue for raising concerns related to prohibited practices and to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation. PIAC is designated as the advocate for whistle-blowers and is authorised to implement the Policy. PIAC, working with the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services, completed the technical part of the review of the Bank's Whistle-blower and Complaints Handling Policy, as recommended by the board, and is currently under revision by the governing body. The Policy sets forth the conditions and procedures for investigations of allegations of corruption, fraud, and any other misconduct. It is issued consistent with the establishment of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department by the Bank's board of directors, and the board's adoption of Guidelines for Combating Fraud and Corruption in Bank Operations. Upon receipt of a complaint, PIAC follows the complaint evaluation criteria to determine if the facts indicate the commission of a sanctionable practice. The criteria also involve conducting a preliminary evaluation to determine if the complaint falls within PIAC's mandate (i.e. relates to a Bank-financed activity) and if the complaint is credible, verifiable and material enough to warrant an investigation. Based on these criteria, a decision is taken on the suitability of the complaint for investigation. Communities and/or individuals in project areas who feel that they are (or will be) unfavourably affected by a Bank-financed project can get recourse to the various Bank Group's grievance redress mechanisms: (i) at project level through the mechanism established and managed by the sponsor and relevant local stakeholders; (ii) at the Bank's country office which has responsibility for receiving and responding to requests for redress in coordination with relevant stakeholders. In the event that the above-mentioned mechanisms are not able to resolve the dispute, the claimant may submit a complaint to the Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) of the Bank Group. There are 12 cases under investigation. The IRM reports directly to the board. **Element 6: Regular reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities take place at least annually through the Annual Reports.** PIAC and the Sanctions Appeals board produce Annual Reports, which are public. The Ethics Office prepares quarterly and annual reports for internal use, they are not public, but they are shared among staff. Reporting on the implementation of safeguard policies is carried out at project level through various reporting tools and self-assessment procedures all along the project cycle. PCR scores are validated by IDEV and submitted to the board as part of the Synthesis Reports, which are now going to be bi-annual. The IRM prepares an annual report which is submitted to the board and is public.	65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98
MI 4.6: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.7: Prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.38**
Element 1: Organisation-specific dedicated policy statement(s), action plan and/or code of conduct that address SEA are available, aligned to international standards, and applicable to all categories of personnel	3
Element 2: Mechanisms are in place to regularly track the status of implementation of the SEA policy at HQ and at field levels	2
Element 3: Dedicated resources and structures are in place to support implementation of policy and/or action plan at HQ and in programmes (covering safe reporting channels, and procedures for access to sexual and gender-based violence services)	3
Element 4: Quality training of personnel / awareness-raising on SEA policies is conducted with adequate frequency	3
Element 5: The organisation has clear standards and due diligence processes in place to ensure that implementing partners prevent and respond to SEA	2
Element 6: The organisation can demonstrate its contribution to interagency efforts to prevent and respond to SEA at field level, and SEA policy/best practice coordination fora at HQ	2
Element 7: Actions taken on SEA allegations are timely and their number related to basic information and actions taken / reported publicly	2
Element 8: The organisation adopts a victim-centred approach to SEA and has a victim support function in place (stand-alone or part of existing structures) in line with its exposure/risk of SEA	2
MI 4.7: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank has set SEAH as a priority policy area and has adopted a code of conduct for the Bank, and for service providers, suppliers and contractors that specifically includes SEAH. The 2006 presidential directive establishing rules and procedures for dealing with harassment was reviewed to include SEAH and adopted in May 2021. The Directive demonstrates the Bank's commitment to tackling SEAH. It responds to the commitment made during the GCI-VII and the ADF-15 to enhance institutional integrity and safeguards by updating the directive on harassment to include SEA and to develop a mechanism to address and report on it. In this document the Bank restates its zero-tolerance policy toward all forms of harassment including SEA, it strictly prohibits harassment by all stakeholders and provides guidance on the recourse processes and mechanisms, as well as clarification of the responsibilities of the relevant organisational units. The presidential directive also imposes a duty on employees to report all acts of SEA and expressly prohibits any form of retaliation against those who report. In preparing the new Directives the Bank benchmarked itself against other IFIs. However, even if the presidential directive serves practically as a policy document, it did not go to the board and did not benefit from inputs from the shareholders. The presidential directive has been classified as "confidential" by the DAI committee and can be disclosed on a need-to-know basis. In contrast, a policy is a public document that could be easily accessible, including to potential victims/survivors of SEA. The presidential directive is applied to all staff and by and large aligns with the IFI Joint Statement on Continuous Advancement of Standards to Prevent Sexual Harassment, Abuse, and Exploitation, to the extent that it i) commits the organisation to i) fostering a culture of respect and high standards through codes of ethics/conduct to which all staff must adhere, ii) introducing standards aimed at preventing SEAH both through internal rules and behavioural clauses in external contracts, iii) offering confidential reporting channels and encouraging staff to report suspected misconduct, iv) developing a policy	67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

that protects whistle-blowers against retaliation, v) establishing procedures to address allegations, vi) providing training, and vii) supporting clients address SEA. The integration of PSEA is relatively recent in the Bank and evidence is not fully available for assessing implementation performance. The presidential directive is applied to all staff and by and large aligns with the IFI Joint Statement on Continuous Advancement of Standards to Prevent Sexual Harassment, Abuse, and Exploitation, to the extent that it i) commits the organisation to i) fostering a culture of respect and high standards through codes of ethics/conduct to which all staff must adhere, ii) introducing standards aimed at preventing SEAH both through internal rules and behavioural clauses in external contracts, iii) offering confidential reporting channels and encouraging staff to report suspected misconduct, iv) developing a policy that protects whistle-blowers against retaliation, v) establishing procedures to address allegations, vi) providing training, and vii) supporting clients address SEA. The integration of PSEA is relatively recent in the Bank and evidence is not fully available for assessing implementation performance. The MOPAN methodology follows commonly accepted good practice where SEA is considered to be applicable to external cases e.g. situations of exploitation and abuse where the victim/survivor is external to the organisational structure and the alleged perpetrator can be Bank staff, government staff, suppliers, contractors. SH covers internal cases of sexual misconduct between staff. In the Bank, the directive covers both SEA and SH. Its objective is to propose ways and means to implement SEAH prevention and management through its various mechanisms and units dedicated to dealing with misconducts in the Bank and in Bank-financed activities. PETH, PIAC and IRM are the main entities involved and they each have a work programme that covers SEA and serves as an action plan. However, there is no evidence of an organisation-wide action plan covering all measures to protect from SEA by the various units. Implementation arrangements and procedures to ensure coherent and effective PSEA and SH is not separately articulated in the presidential directive. While policy matters related to SEA and SH are not clearly articulated it will continue to be challenging to monitor, and to demonstrate that appropriate approaches, capacity, and resources have been adopted and committed for these two different types of interventions. **Element 2: Mechanisms are in place to report on PSEA-related activities mostly through PIAC, PETH, SNSC, HR and IRM but information provided is mostly about the incidence rather than actions taken and status of implementation to deliver on the commitments made in the PD. No evidence was available on PSEA implementation** through a reporting system that would track the status of implementation of SEA commitments in projects, as well as implementation of prevention and response activities. The Corporate Human Resources Management Department has produced an internal document on "the Case Management Report on Disciplinary Cases for 2019 and 2020" that provides i) a summary of allegation, ii) factual findings, and iii) final consequences including disciplinary measures. (SH would be reported in the same way when applicable). PIAC and PETH Annual Reports are mostly about incidence and typologies of cases but scant evidence on status of implementation and no evidence on time taken to resolution. The Ethics Outreach programme includes a survey carried out to determine the frequency of occurrence of SEAH. When asked whether they had experienced SEAH, the 67 Bank staff respondents indicated that in 2020, 9% (about 6 staff) had experienced SEAH compared to 6% of the 103 project managers that responded to the survey question. Despite this, no SEAH cases were reported in 2020 or 2021. (Figure 15) The Ethics Office is part of the informal recourse mechanisms and handles complaints in an informal manner. The unit does not investigate or sanction. Formal complaints are handled by PIAC and CHHR and would follow the formal recourse mechanisms of the Bank. The Ethics Office however reports on the resolution (or referral) of complaints brought before it in its annual report which is shared with	67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

FIGURE 15. **SEAH SURVEY RESPONSES**



Source: Ethics outreach programme survey (n=67)

employees but is not public. The annual report notes that an evaluation of PETH was carried out in 2020 to provide recommendations on actions to be taken to improve upon the effectiveness of PETH, but the report could not be made available.

Element 3: The AfDB has dedicate resources and put structures in place to support implementation of SEA commitments. However, the team has not been able to ascertain the adequacy of the resources allocated. Nonetheless, the Bank's internal cross-departmental coordination group on SEAH has developed a communication document prepared in consultation with the Ombudspersons Office, various departments, and the Staff Council, including an action plan to address SEAH concerns in the Bank. PIAC was allocated 2 additional staff positions to strengthen the investigation function in 2021 within the Department which includes investigation of SEA cases, and to enhance the Bank's response to harassment, including SEA, and the capacity to independently conduct enquiry and provide advice on reported instances of SEA. In regional and country offices 30 "ethics champions" have been appointed to enhance the role of COs in awareness raising. SEA is mentioned in the ISS policy and procedures and has been expanded on in the revised ISS policy draft that went through an extensive external consultation and is due for approval later in the year. SEA aspects (such as vulnerability) are considered under the E&S due diligence process and the E&S specialist takes care of related issues during project implementation, as part of the Bank mandate in the implementation support to Borrower. SEA is covered/eligible under the Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM), during the project life through completion. The IRM has also initiated research for an advisory note on SEA in Bank-financed operations. In July 2021, the Bank's boards of directors approved the new IRM Operating Rules and Procedures, which make the complaints mechanism more accessible, efficient, and transparent.

67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

In the first quarter of 2021, the Ethics Office adopted and launched the use of the SPOT system which is a third-party artificial intelligence tool to enhance reporting of misconduct. The SPOT system is an automated, smart and anonymous tool for reporting and addressing incidents of misconduct including sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment. The SPOT tool comprises of an interactive platform, to interact with employees on their concerns and can be used at any time or from any location and it responds to what is written by the user, asks follow-up questions and maintains the user's anonymity if that is their indicated preference. Issues reported through SPOT are safe as the data is encrypted and the issues reported are confidential. SPOT is developed, owned and operated by a third-party provider. Following the launch of SPOT in January 2021, the Ethics Office organised sensitisation sessions aimed at encouraging its use and building employees' capacity to use the system. The effectiveness of SPOT has not yet been assessed.

Element 4: Training and awareness raising is implemented to enhance the effectiveness of SEA prevention. In 2020, the Ethics Office initiated the refresher training for Mandatory Ethics. It also raised awareness of ethics during the Institutional Capacity and Fiduciary Clinic Workshops in 14 country offices sensitising project officials on the importance of upholding ethical conduct to promote the name, image and reputation of the Bank. The Ethics Office also delivered training in 19 fiduciary clinics in RMCs. The Ethics Office launched a SEAH campaign in 2021 during 6 months for all staff including training sessions, video messages, featured speakers, awareness events, etc. It also contributed to the review of the Bank's Performance Evaluation system by providing key ethical consideration through the inclusion of ethics and behaviour-based assessment. In 2021, the Ethics Office trained 1,352 staff members on the code of ethics and conducted targeted trainings for project teams and implementing partners. The participants' level of awareness of ethical conduct is enhanced by the use of illustrative examples of abusive behaviours. The Office developed the Bank's communication document on safeguarding staff from SEAH in close coordination with PIAC. A series of joint awareness events were carried out as shown below. Given the COVID-19 "work from home" policy and travel restrictions that were in place for most of 2020 and 2021, most of the training was carried out remotely. The following video link was part of a broader awareness campaign https://vimeo.com/588852825. Awareness raising on SEAH • SEAH Misconduct: Complaints and Investigation Processes Training – Mars 2022 • Managers' Interactive Session on Workplace Harassment – April 2022 • PIAC Newsletter on SEAH – Nov 2021 • SEAH Misconducts: Complaints and Investigation Processes Training – April 2021 • Since 2021, PIAC has mainstreamed anti-SEAH messaging in all new staff induction • In 2021 PIAC facilitated 21 integrity sessions during Fiduciary Clinics for Executing Agencies/PIUs. On 5 May 2021, the Ethics Office alongside PIAC updated the board of directors on action taken by the Bank to safeguard employees and other stakeholders from SEAH. • As part of the six-months long SEAH awareness campaign carried out by PETH, a keynote speaker series held on 4 November 2021 focused on formal recourse mechanisms handling harassment including SEAH in the Bank. This includes complaints and investigation processes. The session featured the Human Resources Department (CHHR), The Office of Integrity and Anti-Corruption (PIAC), the Office of General Counsel and Legal Services (PGCL), the Staff Appeal Committee (SAC) and the Bank's Administrative Tribunal (BATR) which in essence covers all of the actors involved in handling formal complaints. The SEAH awareness campaign had previously focused on the informal complaints handling mechanisms (Ombudsman and the Ethics Office). All keynote speaker series had an average of 200 participants. Overall, the campaign disseminated information on SEAH with input from several Bank departments and units aimed at educating employees on the concept comprised in the SEAH acronym, preventing SEAH in the workplace and Bank-financed activities. • PIAC reports 1543 people sensitised on Bank's zero-tolerance to SEAH (653 Bank staff, 890 external stakeholders). • An example that can be provided is the PAR of the Uganda-Kabale-Lake Bunyonki/Kisoro-Mghinga Roads Upgrading Project 2020, where gender HIV/AIDs, Sexual and Reproductive Health, sexual harassment related sensitisation campaigns are integrated under the works contract with an estimated value of at least USD 250,000 which should be undertaken by an independent specialized women/youth led sub-contractor nominated by UNRA.	67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

Element 5: There is some limited evidence that the Bank has begun to set out due diligence processes to ensure that implementing partners prevent and respond to SEA and that SEA criteria are applied in project design and implementation. Awareness raising and training of vendors including sensitization of third parties in RMC on SEA is reported. These events can be argued re-affirm the Bank's zero- tolerance to SEA, promote a speak-up culture in reporting SEA cases and encourage reporting misconduct incidence in Bank-financed activities. While this strengthens the understanding of SEA and builds capacity on preventing and responding on SEA, evidence was not available on how extensive and regular the training of vendors and contractors is. Progress has been made in safeguarding against SEA in operations through the integration of additional requirements in the August 2020 Standard bidding documents for large works and promulgation of a code of conduct for service providers, suppliers & contractors since 2018. Out of the 12 PARs of recent projects reviewed, four make reference to SEA and Gender-based Violence in works contracts, but with no clear specific action to be taken, which seems to point to weak adoption of SEA criteria in operations. There is little evidence that at design stage SEA criteria are part of the RR and that at implementation stage SEA is covered as part of the due diligence/ supervision process. **Element 6: While the Bank has made tangible efforts at the corporate level on interagency coordination on SEA, advancement in the field is slow.** In an international meeting in 2018, PETH was nominated to coordinate the efforts of nine IFIs and to prepare a report on progress made in safeguarding against SEAH. The event was repeated in 2021 under the chair of the EIB. The institutions reaffirmed their commitment to prevent SEAH, both within their own institutions and in their operations. The Ethics Office played a lead role in coordinating the Heads of Ethics from multilateral organisations and UN agencies and discuss implications of teleworking on compliance and wrongdoings. PETH also prepared and conducted an annual conference which attracted over 142 participants drawn worldwide. The three-day event was an opportunity to share key ethics lessons and experiences. PETH participated in the DFID Cross-Sector Safeguarding Group that brings together representatives from multilateral development organisations, intergovernmental agencies and non-government entities to share ideas and experiences on possible approaches to safeguard against SEAH in their financed activities. Evidence of the Bank's contribution to inter-agency efforts in addressing SEA at the field level, however, is scant. Also, a question in MOPAN's partner survey asking whether "the Bank participates, at the country level, in joint/inter-agency efforts to prevent, investigate and report on any sexual misconduct by personnel in relation to the host populations" let to a high number of "don't know / No opinion" (46% of the total respondents) which signals little visibility about Bank's inter-agency efforts in the field. (Figure 16) **Element 7: Little evidence was available on the timeliness and quality of response/reporting on actions taken in response to SEA allegation.** The Bank is committed to supporting victims and witnesses of SEA, enhancing accountability and transparency, and following up to ensure reported cases are addressed. In doing so the Bank aims to: i) protect the privacy and confidentiality of victims and witnesses when handling SEA related issues, ii) encourage the use of SPOT system as it has functionality for anonymous reporting, iii) ensure victims undergo counselling sessions when issues are confirmed. Sixteen Harassment and Abuse of power cases were reported in the Ethics Office Annual Report 2021, but no instances of SEA were reported in 2020 and in 2021. The HR Department produced an internal document presenting a summary of Case Management Report on Disciplinary Cases for 2019 and 2020, including SEAH, but it is not public. None of these documents offer information about the time taken for resolution. As already mentioned, the PIAC annual report is public, but the PETH annual report is not. Additionally, interviews reveal doubts about whether the system is trusted enough to serve as an incentive for staff or project beneficiaries to come forward. Despite efforts to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of whistle-blowers, the fear of reprisal seems to persist.	67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

FIGURE 16. **AfDB PARTICIPATES IN JOINT/INTER-AGENCY EFFORTS TO PREVENT, INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON ANY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY PERSONNEL IN RELATION TO THE HOST POPULATION**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=91)

Additionally, interviews reveal doubts about whether the system is trusted enough to serve as an incentive for staff or project beneficiaries to come forward. Despite efforts to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of whistle-blowers, the fear of reprisal seems to persist.

Staff members whose contract has been terminated for misconduct (including SEAH) are no longer eligible for re-hire. It is unclear how the AfDB shares such information via joint mechanisms with other entities to prevent them from re-hiring such individuals.

Element 8: The commitment to adopt a victim-centred approach to SEA is referred to in various documents but little evidence could be found about its implementation. Like for other actors, issues of access, remote project locations, and availability of service providers pose challenges and there is scant evidence that intervention designs have examined potential measures to prevent the occurrence of sexual abuses and that a victim-support function is in place on SEA. Little evidence was gathered that would point to possible mitigation and redress measures vis-à-vis host populations and that related sensitization campaigns were integrated in the works contracts. There is some evidence of project design considering the risks of gender-based violence from the sample of PARs reviewed.

Furthermore, the staffing of project teams to be equipped to deal with PSEA requires competencies that are not currently available. This requires further attention to project entry criteria and during supervision. This creates the need for further training of project teams to ensure that SEA risk mitigation measures such as regular sensitization for project teams have been put in place and are being implemented as part of periodic fiduciary clinics conducted by the Ethics Office and PIAC in coordination with the Bank's African Development Institute (ECAD).

67, 68, 69, 70, 71 – 73, 74 – 76, 77 – 88, 135

MI 4.7 Evidence confidence While the assessment team found evidence that speaks to efforts currently being made to establish systems and processes, evidence was often insufficient to substantiate progress in implementation, and thus the analysis remains limited. This is not, however, linked to any confidentiality issues, as MOPAN does not collect information on individual cases, but rather, information on the existence of systems, structures, resources and mechanisms.	**Medium confidence**

MI 4.8: Prevention of and response to sexual harassment (SH)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.43**
Element 1: Organisation-specific dedicated policy statements and/or codes of conduct that address SH available, aligned to international standards and applicable to all categories of personnel	3

Element 2: Mechanisms are in place to regularly track the status of implementation of the policy on SH at HQ and at field levels	2
Element 3: The MO has clearly identifiable roles, structures and resources in place for implementing its policy/guidelines on SH at HQ and in the field: support channel for victims, a body coordinating the response, and clear responsibilities for following up with victims	2
Element 4: All managers have undergone training on preventing and responding to SH, and all staff have been trained to set behavioural expectations (including with respect to SH)	3
Element 5: Multiple mechanisms can be accessed to seek advice, pursue informal resolution, or formally report SH allegations	3
Element 6: The organisation ensures that it acts in a timely manner on formal complaints of SH allegations	2
Element 7: The organisation transparently reports the number and nature of actions taken in response to SH in annual reporting and feeds into inter-agency HR mechanisms	2
MI 4.8: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank articulated its zero-tolerance for all forms of harassment in relation to all staff in the code of conduct and in the presidential directive establishing rules and procedures for dealing with harassment in 2006. The Directives have vested specific Bank organs with the responsibility of receiving complaints, verifying allegations and where applicable conducting disciplinary processes, all within the bounds of respect for the rights of the persons involved. The Directive sets out the definition of harassment, the types of harassment and reporting channels. To do that, the Ethics Office collaborated with PIAC to review the 2006 presidential directive on harassment, based on feedback from staff and implementing organs of the Bank. Several townhall meetings were held and the Bank's SVP led a consultative process to engage staff on their experiences with harassment and their perceptions of how it is being addressed within the Bank through a 2019 survey on harassment (see 4.7 (2)). The Ethics Office, in coordination with PIAC, was tasked by the Senior Management Committee (SMCC) to prepare a communication to staff on the action being taken to safeguard staff from SEAH. The communication document prepared in consultation with the Ombudspersons Office, various departments, and the Staff Council, proposed an action plan to address SEAH concerns in the Bank. The action includes joint sensitization sessions and organisation of regular open days on harassment entailing walk-in sessions whereby PIAC, PETH, SNOM, SCO and medical Centre provides SEAH information to staff and responds to Harassment concerns. Subsequently, the presidential directive was updated and SEA included, and promulgated in May 2021. However, the Bank decided to have a single document covering both SEA and SH. This limits the possibility to demonstrate that appropriate approaches, capacity, and resources have been adopted and committed for external (SEA) and internal (SH) cases, each with its own procedures. **Element 2: Reporting mechanisms exist, but their effectiveness in tracking the implementation of measures laid out in the PD with regard to SH – both at HQs and at field level – is questionable,** as is their ability to identify lessons and good practice from implementation. PETH and PIAC produce annual reports which account for their activities and provide statistics on the various cases being handled	66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 88

including harassment, and separately on SH. (No SH cases were brought forward in 2020 or 2021). The report is circulated to staff, but it is not publicly available. Critically, however, the current reporting is mostly about incidence and typology of cases rather than about status of implementation of the PD (it describes the nature of individual cases, rather the Bank's performance in implementing the policy directive at HQs and at country level. Also, the reporting tools do not distinguish between SEA and SH, hence the overlap with elements described under 4.7. The conflation of SH and SEA makes the analysis of the measures being put in place and resources allocated to each domain more difficult. Yet, application of the two concepts takes place in very different environments, one being internal and the other one external, the latter implying a stronger involvement of country offices which is little documented. As part of the efforts to gauge staff opinions on the implementation of the existing policy, in 2019, the office of the SVP conducted a survey on harassment. The survey was a consultative process to engage employees on their experiences and perceptions of harassment within the Bank and how these are being addressed. The participation rate was low at 14.5%. Although the survey outcomes are not robust enough, responses provided by respondents have been useful in determining some of the safeguard measures taken against SH. Some respondents indicated that information on complaint reporting channels was not clear, while others felt uncomfortable reporting harassment incidents for reasons that include privacy concerns and perceived fear of reprisals. Some employees also expressed concern about their perceived impunity associated with the treatment of perpetrators of harassment, because of inadequate information on complaint handling processes and the outcome of disciplinary processes. As a consequence, a communication document prepared in consultation with the Ombudspersons Office, various departments, and the Staff Council, proposed an action plan to address SEAH concerns in the Bank. The action includes joint sensitization sessions and organisation of regular Open Days on Harassment entailing walk-in sessions whereby PIAC, PETH, SNOM, SCO and Medical Centre provides SEAH information to staff and responds to Harassment concerns. It is unclear how the Bank reports to the Governing Body on progress in implementing its PD with regard to SH. **Element 3: The AfDB has dedicated resources in place for implementing the PD's provisions on SH through the various units involved, but there is no body in place that would coordinate responses to SH. Also, there is no evidence on the effectiveness of support channels for victims of SH.** The Bank has allocated additional staff to PIAC, to enhance the Organisation's response to harassment, and the capacity to independently conduct inquiry and provide advice on reported instances of SEAH. However, there is little evidence that the response capacity including coordination mechanisms, clear roles and responsibility for following up on victims is effective. While roles and responsibilities are articulated in the PD, the Bank does not have a body to coordinate responses to SH. In 2021, the Ethics Office adopted and launched the SPOT system, a third-party artificial intelligence tool designed to enhance reporting of misconduct in an automated and anonymous way, including sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment. No assessment of the effectiveness of the SPOT system has yet been conducted to date, however. Information was not available on whether resources were available and allocated including for support to victims/survivors of SH. **Element 4: Training and awareness campaigns are conducted on a regular basis.** The Ethics Office conducted an awareness campaign on SEAH in November 2020, to enhance employee understanding on SEAH and to encourage to speak up. The session attracted over 200 participants from the Bank's HQ, regional and country offices. During the awareness sessions, key concepts were elaborated upon, and examples were given of the forms of misconduct which constitution sexual exploitation, abuse including abuse of power and harassment including sexual harassment. Employees were made aware of the Bank's policy on harassments and modifications in the presidential directive on SEAH.	66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 88

Employees were reminded of the importance of reporting incidents of SEAH, the protection granted to whistle-blowers by the Bank and were also cautioned against false and malicious allegations which in themselves constitute misconduct and are sanctionable by the Bank. Most the trainings provided on SEA (see 4.7(3)) also covered SH. Specifically on managers' training, reference was found to managers' Interactive Session on Workplace Harassment of April 2022. In 2021, the Ethics Office organized a Joint Awareness Session on SEAH which attracted 257 participants from the Bank's HQ, regional and country offices. The sensitization activity which was informed by the Bank's GCI-VII action plan to conduct joint training on SEAH issues to raise awareness and eliminate incidents of employee misconduct benefited from the 2019 SVP-led survey on employees' experiences and perceptions of harassment and how these are being addressed. In 2021, the Ethics Office organized a sensitization session to enhance employees' use of the SPOT system to report on SEAH incidents and other ethical dilemmas. The training attracted the participation of 210 employees from the Bank's HQ, regional and country offices. In addition to two SEAH focused staff sensitization sessions conducted, PIAC mainstreamed SEAH themes in seven internal and 19 external training sessions, thereby sensitizing a total of 1543 participants on the Bank's zero tolerance policy to SEAH. Others were reached through the Integrity Newsletter dedicated to SEAH issues, and anti-SEAH cartoons circulated among Bank staff as part of PIAC's contribution to the Bank's SEAH Awareness Campaign that ran from May to December 2021. Finally, to sustain the momentum, the Bank is developing an on-line course on SEAH to be launched in Q1 2023 as part of the mandatory country manager accreditation. **Element 5: Multiple mechanisms can be accessed to seek advice, pursue informal resolution or formally report SH allegations.** SEAH Complaint Channels for Bank Employees depend on the level of formality requested: i) the Ethics Office in cases of objectionable behaviour which in the opinion of the complainant is not grievous enough to be dealt with through the formal procedure may be resolved informally between the complainant and the person engaged in the objectionable behaviour. ii) the Office of the Ombudsman for cases of objectionable behaviour that can be addressed in confidential, informal/impartial and independent setting of the Office of the Ombudsman; and iii) PIAC for allegations of harassment bordering on misconduct, including abuse of authority, physical assault, bullying, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, sexual harassment. Complaints of harassment against external stakeholders should be made to PIAC. PIAC will liaise with PGCL and other Bank organisational units to channel the complaint to the appropriate national authorities. The assessment team was not in a position to ascertain whether these channels had gender-sensitive reporting mechanisms and processes in place. Anti-retaliation policies are clear and stated in the Whistle Blowing and Complaints handling policy. These mechanisms are well documented and are being used, as reported in the Annual Reports. In 2021, 26 new allegations of staff misconduct were received, resulting in a total investigation pipeline of 38 cases. Investigations into 29 cases were completed and reports issued to Management where appropriate, but none of them concerned sexual harassment. Three reports were not substantiated but submitted for Management's information; 7 were substantiated for administration under the Bank's disciplinary mechanisms; 2 completed cases were referred to other Bank units while the remaining completed cases were closed at the level of PIAC as unsubstantiated and not warranting further action. **Element 6: There is little evidence available to the MOPAN assessment team to assess the extent to which the institution ensures that it acts in a timely manner on formal complains of allegation of SH.** As noted in Element 2, the annual reports produced by PETH and PIAC provide statistics of the cases being handled, but not on the time taken to address and resolve the cases. It is not clear what the benchmarks and the standards are with respect to the timeliness of case resolution.	66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 88

Two SH cases were filed in 2019, but from the documentation made available, it was difficult to assess and whether responses were timely, or the standards that the Bank sets for itself in this regard. This is also the case for all other reporting on irregularities as presented in the annual reports. It was suggested that the generalised lockdowns and suspension of missions may have reduced opportunities for complaints to be made confidentially, in person, to trusted superiors or focal points. **Element 7: The organisation transparently reports the number and nature of actions taken in response to SH in annual reporting but does not publicly report on the actual resolution that was brought to reported incidents.** Also, it does not report on mechanisms to prevent re-hiring of offenders. PIAC and the Ethics Office produce annual reports with numbers and nature of SH cases being handled. PIAC's annual report is public, while PETH's Annual Report shared internally. There is no evidence of the extent of any information sharing with other agencies to prevent re-hiring of offenders (see also 4.7.7), and the PD does not require or recommend any specific measures for inter-agency coordination on case handling. While no instances of sexual harassment were reported in 2020 and 2021, in 2019 among the 10 harassment and abuse of authority cases, two were sexual harassment concerns, one of which was examined and resolved by the Ethics Office while for the other, a determination was made that a detailed investigation was required and was referred to PIAC for investigation and recommendation for Management action. Investigations are carried out by PIAC according to its Investigation Manual that covers all the topics under its purview, including SH. The Ethics Office reports on incidents by category and whether the incidents were resolved or referred for resolution. Given confidentiality safeguards, the Ethics Office or PIAC cannot provide information on the actual resolution that was brought to reported incidents, but the time taken for resolution is typically not available. Also, the Corporate Human Resources Management Department produced an internal document, the Case Management Report on Disciplinary Cases for 2019 and 2020, that reports on the following: i) summary of allegation; ii) factual findings, and iii) final consequences including disciplinary measures. When applicable, SH would be reported in the same way. In addition, the Ethics Office implements a risk assessment tool that identifies the ethics risks run by the Bank. Harassment is an important element of the risks being assessed. In targeting the ethics intervention, a risk mapping is undertaken by considering the ethical dilemmas that were recorded against each department/division as well as in regional and country offices. This risk-based approach is used to select countries for ethics outreach and as a way to focus PETH work programme and reporting including on SH when relevant. The document is not public.	66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 88
MI 4.8: Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, leverage effective solutions and maximise results.

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships	KPI score
Satisfactory	**3.11**

Central to the Bank's work is a commitment to support nationally led action. This is driven by strong partnerships with national governments, comprehensive socio-economic needs analyses, and a collaborative assessment of national capacity. Preparing CSPs and RISPs involves a well-structured contextual analysis that has been further strengthened by introducing country/regional diagnostic notes that describe the analytical underpinnings of the strategic and programmatic pillars. Most country/regional strategies generally link intended results internally to the High 5s and externally to individual SDGs, and also explain how they will support government strategies. The links between the CSPs and the national results are subject to country/regional data availability, the quality of the results frameworks in every CSP/RISP and the use of SMART indicators. The situation analysis is also informed by the CPPR presented together with the CSPs, and which provides valuable lessons. The quality of CSPs varies but has been improving overall in recent years with a score of 3.1 in 2021 (on a scale of 1-4) as reported in the ADER, against a target of 3.4. The quality of CSPs as evaluated by IDEV since 2017 (12 countries) is satisfactory or above for two-thirds of the countries evaluated.

The Bank enjoys a privileged relationship with African governments and prides itself on being the partner of choice and a trusted advisor. The physical proximity gained through the DMDB and the cultural affinity of its staff to the African continent represents an asset for policy dialogue and partnership. Survey respondents generally recognise that there is a high degree of trust between the Bank and governments and perceive this as giving the Bank an edge over other development organisations. The DBDM has considerably expanded the Bank's capacity to adapt to local context and needs. Identifying governments as the only basis for interventions can also create political and reputational risks in situations of political instability or "de facto" governments, where the Bank discontinues its work despite very clear needs of the poor populations that it serves (as dictated by its de-facto Governments presidential directive). In that respect, the IDEV evaluation of civil society engagement suggests missed opportunities and risks in not engaging more with other partners. There is only limited evidence of effective collaboration to achieve common objectives such as policy dialogue, partnership, outreach, and communication, especially at the regional level. One Board member noted in the survey, that it remains to be seen whether the Government is also used to pursue tough reforms, as a "frank truth teller".

Intervention design is informed by capacity analysis and is part of project readiness criteria. Capacity analysis in project documents covers implementation capacity, institutional arrangements, safeguards, fiduciary requirements, monitoring and evaluation, and the skills of the project management team. Several IDEV evaluations on quality at entry and supervision (2019) pointed to the fact that incomplete project design, notably in assessing implementation capacity and availability of procurement plans, is often the primary cause for implementation delays and slow disbursements. The Bank began implementing a new procurement framework in January 2016 and introduced a readiness review after IDEV evaluation. The diagnostic notes that are produced as part of the CSPs preparation are also an important input into capacity analysis. While the use of country systems is in accordance with Busan agreements and is actively pursued, the risks of additional delays need to be managed as government standards do not always meet Bank standards.

On the NSO side, there has traditionally been less emphasis on contextual analysis as interventions are often guided by investment opportunities and the financial assessments of private partners. Also, indirect lending through financial intermediaries has somewhat distanced NSO operations from contextual analysis and from the knowledge of the final clients. The new country private sector profiles are meant to expand the contextual analysis of relevance to private sector interventions. The 2022 ADOA framework is meant to inform the approval process on the additionality of the proposed financing and therefore performs a contextual analysis for private financing. It also better aligns ex-ante indicators with the results frameworks and monitoring reports used during implementation, as reflected in the legal agreements and in the XSRs.

Reasonably adequate operational risk management systems appear to be in place albeit with some gaps in implementing project mitigation measures. Based on the MOPAN methodology, risk management capacity was analysed from a safeguard, political, reputational, and operational perspectives (see KPI 5.4 in Part 2). This enabled and a comprehensive assessment of the extent to which the Bank ensures sufficient identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks. The Bank has implemented reforms to improve the overall internal control environment and risk management. At the corporate level, it closely monitors debt sustainability situations and stringent treasury rating eligibility criteria for counterparties and adheres to a framework of exposure limits based on counterparty credit rating and size. At portfolio level the executive dashboard is an effective instrument for monitoring the portfolio with risk as one performance criteria, and for tracking supervision reporting compliance. At project level the Bank updated project readiness criteria and adopted new operations directives in 2021 to more strongly articulate risk management with results frameworks and monitoring systems, emphasizing the importance of identifying and analysing the risks that could affect achieving development results. Therefore, the treatment of risk has been elevated. All projects must include a separate section of the PAR on risk management and mitigation measures for implementation, particularly those related to safeguard policies. Evaluations of completion reports raise the fact that issues are not always reported in IPRs and MTRs and acted upon in a timely manner. This undermines their capacity to be effective tools for taking corrective action, especially when issues may require project restructuring that staff tend to avoid because of high transaction costs. For NSOs, the ADOA framework systematically assesses political risk mitigation at the project level stemming from instruments (partial risk guarantees) provided by the Bank or partner DFIs, and through the use of the "Politically Exposed Persons Tool" to conduct background checks on counterparts involved.

Regarding cross-cutting issues, the Bank has made considerable progress in mainstreaming gender, climate, fragility, and governance. It publishes country gender profiles, environment/climate assessments, and applies country resilience and fragility monitoring tools to operations. However, the Bank has staff shortages in these areas, particularly when it comes to implementation support, which is being addressed through new recruitments. Project M&E systems include attention to cross-cutting issues but less than at design stage. While greater disaggregation of data and better M&E systems are needed, the social and environmental safeguards system presents an opportunity for the Bank to enhance its treatment of cross-cutting issues for gender and climate. For NSOs, integrating cross-cutting issues in investment M&E has proven challenging as most cover cross-cutting themes only to the extent that social and environmental safeguard issues are concerned.

The COVID-19 pandemic was an opportunity to test the Bank's capacity for contextual analysis at a large scale as it made radical adjustments to its lending programme and portfolio. In a very short time, the Bank able to translate the contextual analysis into a massive reorientation towards budget support to mitigate the most urgent and compelling hardship situations confronted by vulnerable populations. This risked delaying other programmes as the pandemic upended project schedules. The Bank demonstrated agility with partnerships and took the lead in providing fast and effective responses to lessen the severe economic and social impact of COVID-19. While the Bank's capacity to respond to the COVID-19 situation swiftly and with agility is recognised, borrower country governments were more positive than donors in the external survey.

At the design stage, the Bank works hard to incorporate aspects of sustainability and to build national capacity as part of interventions. However, financial sustainability (see KPI 12, figure 28) remains an area for improvement with 41% to 54% of projects rated unsatisfactory or worse over 2016-2020, and only 2021 doing better. The sample of appraisal reports reviewed indicate that sustainability issues are identified and described. However, financial sustainability issues persist and often serve to build the case for follow-up operations, where the same institutions still need to be supported. Mitigation plans are often presented but often prove difficult to implement in practice or over-ambitious. The 2021 directive on results planning has addressed this issue through the ToC and the risk matrix but there is mixed evidence that sustainability is part of the approved monitoring plan and IPRs reporting. Further improvements may come by facilitating project restructuring when needed, through the recent approval of the new restructuring policy for SOs (November 2022). For NSOs, investment profitability is closely linked to long-term sustainability since the private sector considers the rate of return one of the main determinants of success and durability.

Despite the availability of mechanisms and procedures to track implementation speed, projects continue to experience significant implementation delays. Standards and targets to monitor the speed of implementation are available in the regular supervision and project exit tools (IPRs and PCRs) particularly for procurement, disbursement, and implementation delays. Gaps are reported in the executive dashboard for on-line and real-time monitoring and early warning systems. The ADER reports every year against several indicators on implementation performance and projects facing implementation challenges and delays. When asked in the survey whether "the Bank's processes (hiring, procuring, disbursing) do not cause unnecessary delays for partners in implementing operations at the country level," responses from governments show some disagreement and great uncertainty from donors and peer organisations. Beyond the procedures as such, unrealistic planning is often at the base of the issue and the Bank should try to mitigate the tendency to overrate implementation capacity, particularly when confronted with overly complex projects or in fragile contexts and provide more realistic targets for execution time and disbursements.

MI 5.1: Interventions/strategies aligned with needs of beneficiaries and regional/ country priorities and intended national/regional results	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: The organisation's country or regional strategies refer to national/regional body strategies or objectives	3
Element 2: Reviewed interventions/strategies refer to the needs of beneficiaries, including vulnerable populations	3
Element 3: Organisation's country strategies or regional strategies link targeted results to national or regional goals	3
Element 4: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow them to invest time and effort in alignment process	3
MI 5.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank's strategic documents (CSPs/RISPs) are strongly aligned with national/ regional strategies at design stage[2], however, the alignment tends to weaken over time as changes of priorities in the countries are seldom formally incorporated. The CSP/RISP process is underpinned by two important innovations described in the "Proposal for Revised Country and Regional Strategy Paper (CSP & RISP) (2018). First, the CSP/RISP preparation starts with the elaboration of a Country/Regional Diagnostic Note (CDN/RDN) which provides sound analytical underpinning for the strategy and rigorous analytical assessment of the country's most pressing development challenges and opportunities. Second, a new Results Framework ensures i) strategic alignment of the CSP's Priority Areas with both the Government's National Development Plan and the Bank's own priorities; and ii) a Performance Matrix which measures a wide range of results that should be regularly tracked during the CSP/RISP period through the portfolio, but also includes cross-cutting issues, financial leveraging, harmonization, portfolio performance, etc. This process of diagnostic and strategic alignment is facilitated by the decentralization efforts implemented by the Bank which promote deeper policy and sector dialogue with its stakeholders. While CSPs are highly relevant when they are approved, to maintain relevance during implementation a higher level of flexibility would be required to include changes in Government priorities at MTR or CSP updates as needed. This may require a modification of outputs and outcomes in the results frameworks which requires renegotiating with Governments and going back to the board, which seldom happens. All of the 11 CSPs' MTRs reviewed[3], except one, provided a confirmation of the relevance of the existing strategic pillars and their continuation without the need of any modification, despite the fact that many countries went through major changes, including COVID-19-related. **Element 2: Reference to poverty is ubiquitous in Bank's documents, and poverty is analysed in all projects and CSPs at least as part of the diagnostic work.** The reference to beneficiaries including vulnerable populations is pervasive throughout the Bank's documents as poverty and inequality are embedded across the various interventions. The review of the CSPs of the 12 countries selected for the survey reveals that in most cases the analysis of poverty is adequately covered but it is not carried out with an objective to target specific populations and addressing their specific needs. This echoes the findings that emerge from IDEV evaluation of the strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa (2014-19) and from the TSF evaluation (2022) which note that while the Bank has promoted	2, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 58, 101, 107, 108, 113, 125, 126

2 12 CSP evaluations by IDEV from 2017 to 2021. Gabon, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Egypt, Mali, Eswatini, Malawi, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria
12 CSPs of he countries selected for the external survey: Congo, Egypt, Angola, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cameroon.

3 Congo, Egypt, Angola, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ethiopia, Niger, Mozambique, South Africa, Cameroon

the upstream fragility-related knowledge work and capacity development, more needs to be done to identify key entry points for interventions at the country and regional level. The situation of vulnerable populations and beneficiaries is often described, but their needs are not necessarily addressed specifically unless these populations are part of the direct objective of the project (e.g. youth projects) or through safeguard policies. To address the COVID crisis the Bank took the lead in putting in place an immediate response mechanism (the CRF) that came to protect the populations most exposed and vulnerable people through fiscal measures and support packages. In the case of NSOs, intervention strategies are most of the time driven by financial opportunities and risk analysis rather than by the needs of vulnerable populations. In the case of Financial Intermediation, the Lines of Credit (LOCs) are considered to be an appropriate instrument for reaching a large number of beneficiaries while also keeping project origination and supervision costs at an acceptable level. However, the evaluation of LOCs by IDEV (2018) notes that the relevance of LOCs to the end-beneficiaries is open to debate as it can be a challenge to find a balance between achieving profitability on the one hand, while providing financial services to underserved and riskier market segments on the other hand. **Element 3: CSPs and RISPs' targeted results are linked to national/regional goals, but the effectiveness of the link depends on the quality of the Results Frameworks.** The Strategic Alignment Matrix in annex to the CSPs demonstrates the alignment of the CSP's with Government national and sector plans, and the Bank's own priorities. By and large most CSPs link the intended results internally to the High 5s and externally to the individual SDGs and explain how they come to support Government strategies or priorities. However, the effectiveness of the link depends both on the availability of data at country/regional level and the results framework of the country/region that serves as the basis of the CSP results Framework, whose results orientation is also a factor. This is usually the case in Transition Countries where capacity is generally weak. At the regional level the Bank pursues the preparation of the RISPs which provides a unique framework for policy dialogue and investments within a regional dimension. RISPs are aligned with the principles of the Regional Integration Strategic Framework (RISF) 2018-25, and also with the priorities of the Regional Communities. However, linkages between country results and regional goals are constrained by the difficulty to apply the concept of sovereign regional projects and lack of SMART indicators in the Regional Development Plans that can be informed by available data. IDEV validation of the West Africa RISP (2019) found satisfactory achievement of outputs but could not provide an assessment on outcomes due to lack of data. **Element 4: Staff are committed to assist clients and deliver good quality products as in the last couple of years more attention has been devoted to the achievement of results through implementation support.** Continued focus on decentralization has brought the Bank's staff closer to the client, enhancing its capacity to interact on a daily basis, building policy dialogue capacity and trust. This has increased the time available for the alignment process and more effective interaction with local stakeholders. Issues about insufficient staffing capacity were raised in several evaluations and are now being addressed by Management through additional positions particularly in the areas of safeguards, gender, climate, and transition states with 28 additional positions recruited in 2022 compared to 2018. This point was also addressed by the Right-sizing exercise and by the Board decision to earmark new positions for the most critical areas to enhance operational capacity. Allowing technical staff to invest time and effort in the alignment process could be fostered by ensuring that sufficient project preparation time is available for capacity analysis and key studies. Similarly, the incentive structure could favour staff proactiveness in fixing implementation issues rather than project approval.	2, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 58, 101, 107, 108, 113, 125, 126
MI 5.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.2: Contextual/ situational analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape intervention designs and implementation	Score
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**4.00**
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement positioning the intervention within the operating context	4
Element 2: Reflection points with partners take note of any significant changes in context	4
MI 5.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: By and large intervention designs position the intervention within the operating context as mostly determined by government programmes. Project appraisal documents (PARs) have standard templates which are revised on a need basis and cover the mandatory areas as requested by the guidelines in order to shape design according to the operating context. They all present a results framework including a baseline and align the operation to the High 5s (with reference to the CSP) and to external strategic priorities vis-à-vis national development challenges and priorities. They systematically cover implementation arrangements (procurement, financial, M&E, etc.) as well as thematic and cross-cutting areas (gender, climate, fragility, governance). Quality varies, especially for items that are not mandatory in the guidelines. For instance, the sample of 12 PARs examined shows that 2 PARs had an analysis of the Theory of Change, 3 had a Procurement Plan, 5 had a Monitoring Plan. All these elements, however, have become mandatory for SOs since 2021 and the "annotated formats" for SOs are changing. The COVID-19 pandemic was an opportunity to test the Bank capacity for contextual analysis and its adequacy vis a vis Government needs, at a large scale as the Bank implemented radical adjustments to its lending programme as a consequence of a change of the operating environment. On the side of NSO, there has traditionally been less emphasis on contextual analysis as interventions are often guided by investment opportunities and financial assessments of private partners. Also, indirect lending through financial Intermediaries has somewhat distanced NSO operations from contextual analysis and from the knowledge of the final clients. The new country private sector profiles are meant to expand the contextual analysis of relevance to private sector interventions. The 2022 ADOA framework is meant to inform the approval process on the additionality of the proposed financing and therefore performs a contextual analysis for private financing. New tools have been introduced recently to allow better alignment between ADOA indicators and results frameworks and monitoring reports used during implementation as part of an effort to monitor the performance according to the same standards, as reflected in the legal agreements and in the XSRs. The new tools are available in the Bank's NSO Support Portal. **Element 2: The Bank engages with partners at the global and local level in case of significant change in context.** In case of major events and unforeseen circumstances (for instances political crisis, epidemics, debt crisis, disasters, change of Government), reflection points with partners are carried out pro-actively especially with the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and humanitarian agencies, as well as at the global level to monitor debt sustainability situations (Paris Club creditors), and to present the African situation in the international context. The case of COVID response is being evaluated by MOPAN including to know whether a reasonable level of coordination was ensured by Multilateral Organisations. The Bank participates in coordination Committees at country level in various forms (regional country, sectoral, ad hoc). These coordination efforts can happen with or without the Government. While coordination with Government is strong at both strategic and project level, coordination with development partners varies but a significant change of context would trigger stronger joint reflexion	6, 52, 53, 54, 101, 107, 108, 131

with partners. Some CSPs illustrate strong consultation mechanisms and shared approaches with other partners, while others essentially show an Annex with the list of interventions by other donors. At the regional level the Bank plays more of a leadership role as its mandate for regional integration and its High 5s – Integrate Africa – offer opportunities for coalescing partners interests. Reflection points during project supervision are less frequent unless the partner is a co-financing agency.	6, 52, 53, 54, 101, 107, 108, 131
MI 5.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.20**
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	3
Element 2: Capacity analysis, from the perspective of using and building country systems, considers resourcing, staffing, monitoring and operating structure.	3
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been jointly developed with country partners and shared with development partners	3
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability, where applicable developed jointly with development partners	3
Element 5: Reflection points with partners take note of any significant changes in capacity	4
MI 5.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Intervention design is informed by executing and implementing agency capacity analysis and is part of project readiness criteria. Capacity analysis in project documents covers several aspects including implementation capacity of government partners, institutional arrangements, safeguards and fiduciary requirements, Monitoring and Evaluation, needs for the Project Management Team. The analysis of the sample of 12 PARs, reveals that capacity analysis is always carried out, even if it does not always offer a realistic assessment as a function of the complexity of the interventions. Several IDEV evaluations (2019 PCR Synthesis Report, 2018 Quality at Entry and Quality of supervision and exit, and 2019 Self-evaluation Systems) have pointed to the fact that incomplete project design is often the main cause of implementation delays and issues in timeliness of execution. Some aspects of capacity analysis required for smooth project start up are sometimes pushed into implementation to shorten the approval time, which tends to result in start-up delays. This can also hinder the opportunity to use capacity analysis to build commitment among stakeholders by fully involving them. The PCR Synthesis Report of 2019 points to the fact that at design stage, the capacity of executing/implementing agencies is often over-stated. Management has overhauled the readiness criteria at design stage to reflect more on factors that influence project performance and increased the quality of the peer reviewing process. Also, it strengthened the link between capacity analysis of partners and risk and put in place a more supportive function for task managers through the quality enhancement process. **Element 2: Capacity analysis to assess the adequacy of implementation arrangements is carried out at design stage including on the possibility of projects to use country systems.** Design documents address capacity analysis by providing a description of implementation arrangements, staffing and resources assigned to specific positions, roles and responsibilities, technical assistance, and coordination mechanisms. This is also reviewed as part of project readiness and entry criteria. The review of the PAR sample confirms that this is indeed the case. In assessing whether the use of country systems is feasible, the Bank has been applying a higher degree of capacity analysis of local institutions,	52, 53, 54, 101, 107, 108, 110, 124, 125, 126

particularly when it comes to procurement and fiduciary arrangement, considering that in many cases country systems are not at par with the standards of the institution and can lead to additional delays. In a number of cases the Bank has been partially adopting country systems only for some components where the level of comfort, as informed by capacity analysis, is higher. The Bank has also been reserving the right to revert to the use of the Bank Systems in case of non-compliance with the agreed provisions. The performance of the Borrowers in project implementation is reported in the last batch of validated PCRs (2019) as satisfactory for 74% of the projects with a score of 2.84 (on a scale 1 – 4). The possibility to use technical assistance and capacity building as part of project preparation to upgrade national systems is not common and the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) is not much used. Procurement contracts for all African countries using national systems are at 33% of total (in value), which is well above the target of 10% and the baseline of 0% in 2015 (ADER 2022). **Element 3: Capacity analysis statements are developed jointly with country partners and to some extent shared with development partners. Typically, the Bank can build on its strong relationship with country partners to pursue capacity analysis jointly or in consultation with them.** The CPIA offers a vehicle to examine jointly with country partners an assessment of the institutional capacity including from a policy and governance perspective. This is similar to what is carried out by the World Bank in IDA countries and shared. At the CSP level, capacity is discussed through the various consultations that take place with country partners and also with development partners, as typically CSPs have a high degree of ownership by country Governments and are subject to more extensive discussions. At the project level, capacity is typically assessed by the Bank in strong collaboration with local institutions but contribution from or sharing with development partners vary from country to country, with the possible exception of co-financiers, who get more direct access to information. Overall, this element is rated 3 considering that the Bank fully meets the requirements with respect to developing and sharing capacity analysis with country partners but to a lesser extent with development partners. **Element 4: Strategies for addressing weaknesses with a view to sustainability are part of the project readiness review and are systematically included in the PARs; there is less evidence, however, that they are shared with development partners.** Progress is noted on the overall project sustainability criteria since 2018 in IDEV's PCRs Synthesis Reports, even if weaknesses persist on financial sustainability. The 12 PAR documents reviewed show that projects have addressed the factors that would lead to sustainability but may tend to be optimistic in some cases about the implement ability of the measures and post-project performance. Government ownership of these measures is also a factor. For instance, measures range from the intent to apply the user pay principle, to ensuring that operation and maintenance costs will be recovered from customers using revenues collected by utility companies, or the introduction of tariffs that have been assessed to be affordable while ensuring sufficient cost recovery. While many of the measures are technically sound their implementation has been challenging, as incentives to address issues that may become relevant only at the end of the project are weak. Also, from this review and interviews, mention is made of the potential to further take advantage of the involvement of relevant national civil society organisations, the private sector and the communities as part of capacity analysis in design and implementation for sustaining project benefits, particularly in highly challenging operating environments where capacity constraints to sustainability are higher. **Element 5: Reflection points with partners happen on a regular basis through consultations at the country level.** In the case of country partners reflection points are common as part of policy dialogue or project supervision to assess progress, required adjustments, and to assess changes in capacity. In the cases when changes in capacity are significant and require a higher level of collaboration,	52, 53, 54, 101, 107, 108, 110, 124, 125, 126

reflection points include development partners to ensure coordination of interventions. This was the case in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic which required to re-examine the response capacity of local institutions and a more coordinated approach for the interventions of the various partners. The Bank is quite active on other reflexion points that take place locally through sector/programme coordination mechanisms and intra-partners harmonization meetings.	52, 53, 54, 101, 107, 108, 110, 124, 125, 126
MI 5.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.4: Detailed risk management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.80**
Element 1: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	3
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for safeguard risk	3
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	3
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	3
Element 5: Intervention design is based on contextual analysis including of potential risks of sexual abuse and other misconduct with respect to host populations	2
MI 5.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: There appear to be adequate operational risk management systems in place albeit with some gaps in the implementation of mitigation measures at project level. The Bank has implemented a number of reforms to improve the overall internal control environment and risk management. At the corporate level, the Bank maintains close monitoring of debt sustainability situations and stringent treasury rating eligibility criteria for counterparties and adheres to a framework of exposure limits based on counterparty credit rating and size. At project level the Bank has updated project readiness criteria and has adopted new Operations Directives in 2021 to more strongly articulate risk management with results frameworks and monitoring systems, emphasizing the importance of identifying and analysing the risks that could affect achievement of development results. Therefore, the treatment of risk has been elevated, with all projects having to include a separate section of the PAR on risk management and mitigation measures related to implementation, monitoring, technical, financial, socio/economic, and particularly those related to safeguard policies. Risks are also now systematically reflected in the log-frame with a categorization of risks in three categories of low, moderate, and high. Some gaps remain on the capacity to implement mitigation measures and monitor risks through project supervision tools, as mitigation measures often lack specificity on the course of action to be taken, especially for high-risk elements. Project completion reports and their evaluations raise issues related to the persistence of implementation (disbursement) and safeguard risks (see 5.4.E4). This stems from the fact that issues are not always reported timely in IPRs and MTRs and acted upon in a timely manner, which undermines their capacity to be effective tools for taking corrective action. The Executive Dashboard is an effective instrument to allow portfolio level monitoring, with risk as one of the performance criteria, and for tracking supervision reporting compliance. On the NSO side, the nature of the risks is different as it covers credit risk and market risks including exchange rate, interest rates and liquidity management. NSO performance monitoring and reporting on the safeguard side presents some challenges as noted by IDEV evaluation of the PSD strategy (2020). Improvement is needed on client reporting especially for financial sector operations. The Bank approved a new PSD strategy in 2022 and has committed to strengthening mechanisms for mitigating	52, 54, 62, 86, 97, 110, 126

NSO credit risks and increasing attention to NSO corporate governance risks, including a credit readiness filter. Through its integrity due diligence assessment of NSOs the Bank provides for integrity monitoring at portfolio level. Also, PIAC conducts integrity risks assessments on the NSO portfolio.	
Element 2: Analysis and mitigation strategies for safeguard risk are included in intervention designs. When a project is prepared, it is screened and categorized according to E&S criteria and the level of risk determines the nature of the safeguard's response and mitigation action plans to be put in place. IDEV evaluation of ISS (2019) noted that the Bank's ISS architecture is on par with international best practice. However, some areas for improvement were identified to better cover relevant safeguards risks particularly on the implementation of the policies and procedures. Since this evaluation Management has taken action to reinforce safeguard support by overhauling the reporting system and revamping the Readiness Review process to make compliance to E&S requirements a mandatory decision criterion. Six new safeguard specialist positions were recruited since 2018 and SNSC is currently in the process of revamping the safeguard policy, for presentation to the board in 2023 (see KPI 4.1). The preparation of a Safeguard Strengthening Action Plan (2020-25) is still on-going. The application of ISS at design stage is considered adequate, except for PBOs where the application of E&S assessment procedures has been limited by the nature of the instrument.	
On NSOs, the applicable policies and procedures for E&S reviews are the same than for SO, but there is less guidance about E&S reporting and risk management than there is for SOs, in particular for Financial Intermediation operations which represent about 40% of the NSO portfolio. There is little evidence that FI operations notified or submitted impact assessment and mitigation plans even for high-risk sub-projects.	
Element 3: The Bank has several instruments that allow to address what could be perceived as a political risk. Political issues are not strictly speaking in the realm of the Bank's mandate. However, other tools are useful to assess the "political" risks that a country or a project may face. Political risks are mostly addressed at country strategic level (CSP) rather than at project level. Political risks have also an implication on reputational risks and require country offices to take the lead. The CPIA provides an assessment of institutional performance and governance, the Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA) looks at resilience and fragility using seven key criteria: political inclusiveness, safety and security, justice, the economy, social cohesion, the regional contagion effect, and climate change. The Bank benefits from a privileged relationship with Governments which represents an asset in terms of policy dialogue but can also represent a challenge in dealing with sensitive issues, political instability, and de-facto governments, where the Bank discontinues its work despite very clear needs of the poor populations that it serves (as dictated by its de-facto Governments presidential directive). Those situations are however coordinated with international partners. For NSOs, the ADOA framework, as part of the additionality assessment, systematically assesses political risk mitigation at the project level stemming from instruments (e.g., partial risk guarantees) provided by the Bank or partner DFIs. The Bank also uses the Politically Exposed Persons Tools to conduct background checks on all counterparties involved. It considers this as high risk and conducts further enhanced due diligence before taking decisions. Further jurisdictional analysis for AML/CFT assessment informs political risks. This element is rated 3 because while the Bank responds satisfactorily to expectations under this criteria, "political risk" is not systematically addressed in SOs interventions design.	52, 54, 62, 86, 97, 110, 126
Element 4: Among the sources of reputation risks, environment and social issues are among those to which the Bank is most exposed, similarly to other MDBs (see 5.4-E2). The Bank's focus on infrastructure projects and fragile situations could make reputational issues more compelling particularly with respect to resettlement, land tenure, gender, climate, inequality and SEA issues. Financial and market risks could also be covered as reputational risk to the extent that the Bank's	

position in accessing capital markets is strongly influenced by its credit rating and its capacity to maintain its AAA. The Bank must attest to Credit Agencies or Banks, about its integrity and AML/CFT processes. Also, since 2020 the PAR template has integrity as an integral part of board approvals for NSOs. The Bank position vis-à-vis debt situations in the countries is coordinated with the World Bank and the IMF. The rating for this element is aligned with the one of 5.4 (element 1 and 2) since operations and safeguards represent the bulk of the reputational risks. **Element 5: Intervention design is by and large informed by contextual analysis of risks, but there is insufficient evidence that contextual analysis is used to assess potential risks of sexual abuse with respect to host populations (see 4.7). As noted in element 1 above, the analysis** of risks has been strengthened with all projects having to include a separate section of the PAR on risk management and mitigation measures and systematically reflect the categorization of risks in the log-frame. On ISS, all projects are categorized for E&S risks (see above) and informed by contextual analysis. On SEA, of the 12 PARs reviewed, 4 have addressed the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and gender-based violence vis à vis host populations. The introduction of guidance and rules with respect to SEA were made in the presidential Directives (PD) on sexual harassment in 2021, hence they are relatively recent for the organisation. SEA has not been sufficiently mainstreamed in readiness criteria and due diligence work and could be strengthened considering the long-lasting damage that these cases can inflict to the reputation of an institution. PETH has produced in 2022 an Ethics Risk Assessment for the Ethics Office. The annual risk matrix allows the Ethics Office to identify and prioritize awareness sessions and training to high risks areas that have a potential to create significant reputational impact on the Bank. It also allows the Ethics Office to have a reasonably clear view of the risk environment and the ethical factors that could impact the Bank's reputation by department and by country office with potentially high impact. The broader risks identified and categorized under high and medium risks should be the Ethics Office focus for 2022. This includes SEA as applicable. While the score for taking account of SEA risks vis-à-vis host populations in intervention design is judged to currently stand at 2 (unsatisfactory), recent progress is noted.	52, 54, 62, 86, 97, 110, 126
MI 5.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Approval procedures require an assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design	4
Element 2: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross-cutting issues	3
MI 5.5: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Evidence suggest that substantial efforts have been made to systematically incorporate the review of cross-cutting themes into project design as evidenced in appraisal reports. Corporate reporting is focused on Bank E&S safeguards work before board approval, and both gender and climate are being tracked separately in the RMF at design stage. Almost all appraisal reports include specific sections on environmental/climate, gender, fragility and governance. E&S is categorized according to the safeguard criteria and mitigation plans prepared according to ESAP policies, which may include Environmental and Social Impact Assessments [ESIAs], Environmental and Social Management Plans [ESMPs], and Resettlement Action Plans [RAPs].	52, 54, 59, 107, 108, 109, 110, 133

Impact on climate is categorized according to the Bank's Climate Safeguard System (CSS) according to three level of likely impact, and the Climate Action Plan (2016-20), which includes reference to the country Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). Specific KPIs address climate at strategic and at project levels. Compliance to E&S requirements is a mandatory decision criterion for the revamped Readiness Review process. Gender: Gender is mainstreamed in all Sovereign Operations in a systematic way and requires the inclusion of a gender analysis, results and indicators. 54 operations approved in 2021 had outcomes to directly empower women and girls (up from 39 in 2020), including 5 having this as the sole purpose, up from 2 in 2020 Governance is analysed as part of project implementation and includes issues such as procurement, financial management, contract management to address fiduciary issues, audits and anti-corruption measures. However, broader Governance issues at the policy and institutional level are more attuned to CSP preparation, PBOs and policy dialogue. Thirteen governance lending operations were approved in 2021, and 4 webinars and 3 sessions on public financial management were carried out. Fragility and resilience are addressed through several tools including the Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA) which brings more rigour and effectiveness to the assessment of resilience and fragility by taking greater account of the national context. Dedicated resources through the Transition Support Facility (TSF) are also available and 29 operations were approved through the TSF (UA 483.1 million total). Staff presence in fragile situation has been considerably strengthened which facilitates the addressing of issues. From the sample of PARs examined it appears that gender and climate are systematically covered and there is evidence of sector specialists participating in the design and appraisal process. Fragility assessments are available for fragile situations even if fragility is not part of the standard template of PARs. Inclusion of governance is more dependent on country situations beyond project procurement and financial management, and CPIAs for CSPs, which are carried out in all cases. In the case of NSOs, as noted in the ADOA evaluation (IDEV 2021), gender and social effects tend to be over-claimed and often based on evidence from a very small part of a project (IDEV finding based on a sample of 11 case studies out of a pool of 230 operations assessed by the ADAO framework over the period 2015-20). By their nature, NSOs are less conducive to addressing fragility and governance in the same way and are not subject to the same mainstreaming objectives. However, specific adjustments have been introduced to ensure the continued alignment of the ADOA Framework and cross-cutting strategies such as gender, green growth, and fragility. **Element 2: Intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross-cutting issues but not at the same level as efforts made for the assessment of these issues at the design stage.** By and large intervention monitoring includes cross-cutting issue to various degrees. The assessment of this element and its rating is aligned with the more detailed analysis of KPI 2. More specifically, on monitoring, the ISS evaluation in 2019 found that the sections on E&S safeguards compliance did not provide sufficient information about the implementation of E&S mitigation measures, using the template proposed in the ESAP. Indeed, safeguard measures are often a tool for further mainstreaming, and Bank's monitoring uses E&S covenants and mitigation measures seen from a safeguard point of view as well as the social and environmental sustainability indicators for cross-cutting themes mainstreaming implementation and monitoring. Since the evaluation took place, Management has updated the ISS/ESAP to provide clarification and sensitize stakeholder on these topics. It has also revamped the PCRs/XSRs templates and is in the process of updating the IPRs. In 2021, $240,000 were approved by the Bank for capacity building on gender mainstreaming for the PIU's staff of Bank-funded	52, 54, 59, 107, 108, 109, 110, 133

projects to develop their capacity in gender mainstreaming and implementation of the Gender Marker System. In the RMF, 15 indicators require disaggregated gender data. In the case of fragility and governance monitoring and reporting is more limited to specific cases and not fully mainstreamed in reporting tools. In the case of NSOs, the same ESAP policies also apply, and cross-cutting issues are incorporated in the monitoring and evaluation of investments to the extent that social (including gender) and environmental (including climate) issues are concerned from a safeguard perspective. The nature of the NSO investments is not always conducive to address fragility and governance in the same way as for SOs.	52, 54, 59, 107, 108, 109, 110, 133
MI 5.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed, realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.50**
Element 1: Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate	3
Element 2: Intervention design defines key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment required to sustain the expected benefits of successful implementation	3
Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan	2
Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required for sustainability, the intervention plan directly addresses these reforms and processes in a time-sensitive manner	2
MI 5.6: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: At design stage the Bank does a good job in looking at key aspects of sustainability. The Operations Manual expects that intervention designs address sustainability in an effort to assess whether i) there is enough evidence that the country is committed to the project and will own it; ii) there are relevant policies to support the intervention; and iii) the ownership of the project by stakeholders will be assured. Similarly, design should assess whether there are other factors that are critical to the sustainability of the project's benefits, and that the design of the project attempted to address the critical factors on how recurrent costs will be financed. The sample of 12 appraisal reports reviewed, indicates that sustainability issues are identified and described. Mitigation plans are often presented, such as cost recovery measures, the introduction of tariffs that have been assessed to be affordable, new types of maintenance contracts, community involvement, special funds, private sector participation, etc… While most of the measures pass the readiness review criteria, in practice they often prove difficult to implement and their realism is challenged by local capacity constraint to sustain the interventions particularly with respect to financial sustainability which still suffers of unsatisfactory ratings from IDEV. **Element 2: By and large, intervention design defines key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment required to sustain the expected benefits of successful implementation. The Bank analyses policy and institutional requirements for the project's sustainability at design stage.** In addressing sustainability, projects designs consider the need for an adequate policy and legal environment to be in place. Most projects propose to address these issues during project implementation and supervision, and some require for these measures to be in place as a condition precedent approval or disbursement. While conditions of disbursements may not be feasible because	52, 54, 79, 107, 108, 109

new policies and regulatory framework take time to be put in place, the option to put project approval on hold is rarely considered, mostly relying on measures to be implemented during implementation. A typical example is for road maintenance funds, which are often of weak sustainability and would require a higher degree of commitments or legal changes by the Government. As part of the review of the sample of 12 PARs, 3 projects requested for prior actions as project covenants for policy or institutional measures that were considered critical for sustainability. The other projects were comfortable that results will be sustainable or proposed a number of measures to be taken during implementation but often without a dated covenant or a plan. **Element 3: The 2021 directive on results planning has addressed the sustainability issue through the ToC and the risk matrix in the results frameworks, but there is mixed evidence that sustainability is part of the approved monitoring plan and IPRs reporting.** Further improvements may come by restructuring when needed through the recent approval of the new restructuring policy for SOs (November 2022). Evidence available shows gaps in the effective coverage and in making specific reference to sustainability issues in the IPRs with respect to approved monitoring and evaluation plans. This impacts PCRs which are fed by IPRs in monitoring delivery of outputs and outcomes and identify main issues during implementation including likely sustainability. PCRs include a specific section on sustainability that considers the extent to which the project has addressed risks during implementation and put in place mechanisms to ensure the continued flow of benefits after project completion. However, this is an ex-post measure and does not allow for regular monitoring, adjustments and corrective action. The disconnect between PCR and PCREN scores for the sustainability criterion is 17%, revealing over-optimistic expectations by staff on the sustainability of the project after completion. The same Synthesis Report noted that it is not infrequent to find that previous projects have addressed very similar, if not the same, issues, and have concluded the unlikely sustainability of the operation. And yet, a few years later, a follow-up project is required to address again substantially the same issues. PCRs may have been less optimistic on this point if they had taken into account the fact that more or less the same project has already been undertaken in the past, and that project results were judged to be un-sustainable. In the case of NSOs, investment profitability is closely linked to long-term sustainability as for the private sector the rate of return is one of the main determinants of success and durability. The validation of 46 XSR by IDEV (2019) rated Investment Profitability positively for 31 projects (67.4%). The disconnect for sustainability of XSRs was at 8% in 2019. For 2020 and 2021 it has not been measured because the 7 and 9 projects assessed were not sufficiently representative. **Element 4: Policy and legislation changes required for sustainability are identified as part of intervention design, however there is less evidence that the intervention plan directly addresses these reforms in a time-sensitive manner.** While sustainability measures are often identified in project document, acting on them has been more of a challenge. Financial sustainability is a recurrent issue in the Bank which may require continued Bank involvement when projects end. Improvements may come by providing incentives for staff to proactively follow-on sustainability measures and restructure projects when needed. Also, the skills required to be able to pursue the level of policy dialogue and institutional changes for those adjustments to take place is not always present in the project teams. Sometimes the clout of the Bank in pursuing policy and regulatory changes during project supervision is limited. Hence, the PBOs (budget support operations), could be seen as a better instrument to pursue policy and regulatory reforms where appropriate rather than investment operations. This instrument supports RMC expenditure and policy reform through the national budget and can be a powerful tool to enhance sustainability at the broader economic and institutional level and pave the way for more sustainable investment operations.	52, 54, 79, 107, 108, 109
MI 5.6: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for hiring staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation and adaptability in line with local contexts and needs	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.75**
Element 1: The organisation has internal standards set to track implementation speed	4
Element 2: Institutional procedures are adaptable to local contexts and needs	2
Element 3: The organisation's benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on implementation speed across different operating contexts	3
Element 4: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed	2
MI 5.7: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Mechanisms and procedures to track speed of implementation are available in the Bank. Standards and targets to monitor the speed of implementation are available and used in the regular supervision and project exit tools (IPRs and PCRs), particularly with respect to procurement, disbursement, and implementation delays. Related indicators are also reported in the Executive Dashboard for on-line and real-time monitoring and early warning systems. The RMF through the ADER reports every year against established targets on: time from concept note to first disbursement, time for procurement of goods and works, disbursement ratio of ongoing portfolio, projects facing implementation challenges and delays, procurement contracts using national system, non-performing operations – operations at risk. The recent Integrated Quality Action Plan (2020) has put in place measures to ensure timely execution and proactive management of operations. This is being tracked as part of the GCI VII commitments. **Element 2: Institutional procedures can be a significant hindrance to speed of implementation while efforts are made to adapt to local context and needs.** Procedures for procurement, financial management, hiring and disbursing are part of standard policies and procedures whose application is monitored and controlled. Hence, adaptation depends on circumstances that need to be well justified and are not common. In the case of emergency situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, programme level adaptation has been made possible as the Bank decided to repurpose a large share of its lending programme in very little time to be able to address the crisis, including a major shift towards budget support which required a waiver of the established ceiling. Also, adopting country systems can bring the Bank to use country procedures when they can demonstrate a sufficient level of standards. However, this does not guarantee faster implementation. Also, budget support operations do not involve procurement and therefore are less subject to institutional procedures than investment projects need to go through. Notwithstanding the above cases, issues are raised both internally (interviews) and externally (client survey) about Bank's cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures, particularly with respect to procurement, disbursement, hiring of PIU staff, safeguard measures, and non-objection letters. IDEV reported on this in several evaluations including quality at supervision and exit, and self-evaluation systems and processes. Tackling some of these issues could be facilitated by addressing them at design stage rather than during implementation. Borrowers also point to these aspects as the main cause of implementation delays. When asked in the external survey whether "the Bank's processes (hiring, procuring, disbursing) do not cause unnecessary delays for partners in implementing operations at the country level", responses show some disagreements, especially from Governments (27% of 37 respondents). This is one of the most negative responses from Governments of the whole survey. Donors and peer organisations show little knowledge about this point ("do not know" answer in white) while the private sector perception is overall positive.	60, 79, 81, 82, 83, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109

FIGURE 17. **IN [COUNTRY], AfDB MANAGEMENT PROCESSES (E.G. HIRING, PROCURING, DISBURSING) DO NOT CAUSE UNNECESSARY DELAYS FOR PARTNERS IN IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=125)

Element 3: Reporting tools allow for benchmarking implementation speed performance internally and externally. The corporate reporting tools (Annual Performance Reports, RMF cum ADER, the Work Programme and Budget document) allow to compare indicators and ratios by countries and by sectors, hence benchmarking performance to different contexts. These documents are public. The Executive Dashboard is a management tool that offers real-time and on-line monitoring and benchmarking capacity of the portfolio. The PCRs/XSRs validations by IDEV is also an important learning tool to assess trends in performance by country and by financing instrument and allows for benchmarking among different portfolios. Making these tools public is a powerful mechanism for comparability and accountability as managers don't want to expose unsatisfactory performance of their departments. Making information available widely is likely to improve compliance by flagging omissions and delays. It is recognized, however, that the learning opportunities offered by the PCR/XSR review or by the Portfolio Performance Reviews are not sufficiently taken advantage of in terms of sharing lessons among countries and being able to adopt solutions that worked elsewhere.

60, 79, 81, 82, 83, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109

Externally, the Bank benchmark itself with peer organisations which overall have similar issues. In the Bank, the total time from concept note to first disbursement increased to 27.4 months in 2021 from 20.8 months in 2020, probably because of the COVID-19 impact. The Bank seems to be doing better with respect to average time between Concept Note and board approval but worst with respect to average time between approval and disbursement. This can be due to delays in ratification of the project and lack of readiness for implementation due to inadequate technical design and procurement documents. The 2015 presidential directive asserts that any project not disbursing in the first 6 months should be eligible for cancellation. Comparing with other IFIs, this metric does not appear realistic. An important element in benchmarking performance on speed of implementation is also the role played by Governments and implementing units as ultimately, they are in charge of implementing projects. Government low capacity may be an important obstacle to smooth implementation. Typically, Borrower performance in PCRs and PCRENs is rated low.

Element 4: Procedural delays (both within the Bank and Governments) play a big part in hindering speed of implementation. As revealed by the APPR 2019, inadequate project readiness and start-up delays means that implementation periods are often underestimated. The average implementation period for investment projects is stated at 7.3 years against a planned duration of five years. The start-up phase takes on average 1.4 years before first disbursement. This performance underscores the overly optimistic implementation timelines of five years at design stage. Interviews carried out mentioned

that the Bank does not sufficiently take into account the tendency to overrate implementation capacity, particularly when confronted with overly complex projects or in fragile contexts and provide more realistic planning and targets for execution time and disbursements. Also, the Bank has adopted stringent targets in an effort to reduce the time between concept note and disbursements. However, by reducing design time, processes have to be shortened to speed up delivery through the board. This may have caused a number of preliminary steps to be pushed into implementation (procurement plans, feasibility studies, setting up M&E systems, establishment of Implementation Units, etc..) at the risk of delaying project start up. At the Government level procedures vary from country to country and can be an important factor behind the performance of some projects. National processes are outside the task manager or the Manager's control. For instance, the time needed to get ratification of a loan through the country government/ parliamentary system, the application of procurement laws (when using country systems), the staffing of Implementation Units, etc. can cause delays more than Bank processes.	60, 79, 81, 82, 83, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109
MI 5.7: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 6: Working in coherent partnerships to leverage and catalyse the use of resources	**KPI score**
Satisfactory	**3.19**

Procedures to encourage joint planning and programming are in place and allow for adjustments in partnerships when conditions change, but they could be strengthened. Several procedures exist in the operation manual for example, which has a dedicated section on partnerships in CSPS. In addition, the Bank has a committee on partnerships, and participates in coordination platforms. However, these lack mechanisms to strengthen the development of a partnership culture.

AfDB's comparative advantage for partnerships is documented, although the analysis of core strengths could be stronger. IDEV's 2021 evaluation of partnerships rated AfDB's approach to partnerships Satisfactory in its evaluation. The Bank promotes selectivity, coherence, and complementarity in partnerships, which is necessary to deliver on the High 5s ambitions. But IDEV considers the search for selectivity to be limited in practice because the Bank does not sufficiently analyse its core strengths. Partnerships are also undermined by inefficiencies in staff resources, communication, coordination, and incentives which explains IDEV's rating of the efficiency of the Bank's partnerships as unsatisfactory. In response to this evaluation, management agreed that it was necessary to better allocate resources across the partnership ecosystem – people, processes, and systems critical to ensure that goals were successfully implemented. There is an ongoing effort to provide regional offices with more support for resource mobilization and partnerships.

The Bank emphasizes principles of country ownership, and development effectiveness in the spirit of the Paris Declaration and the Accra agenda of action. At the country level, CSPs analyse the alignment of global frameworks with national priorities while country fiduciary risk assessments analyse how much country systems can be relied upon. The Bank mostly supports South-South cooperation through its emphasis on regional integration, convening power, partnerships with regional organisations, and other initiatives. Internal structures support collaboration, although this dynamic could be strengthened; 78% of partnership projects (50 of 64) sampled by IDEV are highly satisfactory or satisfactory on the institutional and capacity component, but 21% of the projects (14 of 64) were scored unsatisfactory in 2019. This score improved to 92% in 2021. However, the performance of ownership and sustainability of partnerships could be strengthened: 85% of partnership projects (51 out of 61) sampled by IDEV (2021) are highly satisfactory or satisfactory in this area but 16% of the projects were unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory in 2019. This score improved to 92% in 2021 according IDEV's communication. However, the performance of ownership and sustainability of partnerships could be strengthened: 85% of partnership projects (51 out of 61) sampled by IDEV (2021) are highly satisfactory or satisfactory in this area but 16% of the projects were unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory.

The Bank identifies synergies and complementarities with development partners and other stakeholders (including private sector) systematically through its strategic work strategies (Ten-Year Strategy, High 5s agenda, sectoral strategies, and most of the time through CSPs/RISPs). Engaging with partners from the public and private sector is a way for the Bank to ensure financial leverage. It has developed several mechanisms to encourage private sector finance mobilization and fund mobilization from other partners. Whereas the Bank supplies more finance for infrastructure projects with private sector participation in Africa than any other MDB (CGD), more could be done at the country and project levels to maximize leveraging of resources, notably mobilizing counterpart funds from governments, and exploiting the full potential for co-financing.

The Bank sometimes assumes a leadership role in donor coordination and has been active by and large in terms of dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments at international, regional, and country levels. This has been observed for instance at G20, G7, UNGA, Paris Club, Finance in Common, Paris Peace Forum, COP, African Union Summits, ECOWAS, SADC, ACP, TICAD, EU-African Union Summits, Global Food Security Summit, and the Africa Adaptation Summit. At country level, the harmonization of operations with other donors is considered satisfactory. Several examples of an active role at field level have been emphasised through interviews with AfDB's regional and country offices. This was confirmed by survey respondents of the MOPAN assessment which are overall positive regarding AfDB's capacity to coordinate its activities with partners to ensure coherence. Overall, the decentralisation process which created regional hubs and country offices has helped to strengthen collaboration with technical and financial partners where possible. However, there is room for improvement in some specific cases due to internal and external limitations that are common to some and specific to the AfDB.

There is a need of renewed regional frameworks for dialogue with RECs (notably CEMAC and ECCAS) and for greater ownership of RECs in implementing regional programmes in Central Africa. IDEV (2017) noted in Eastern Africa insufficient coordination between regional economic communities (RECs) and RMCs and between RECs and the Bank but there are positive recent developments. Participation depends on the policy of each country towards development partner coordination. A balanced approach is sometimes needed because of limited internal capacity. In addition, according to the IDEV 2021 evaluation of AfDB's partnerships, the Bank's culture of focusing primarily on its own lending programme and board approvals can limit leadership and coordination roles.

The AfDB is committed to transparency and openness in conducting its operations and executing its projects and programmes, including in partnerships. The Bank is ranked first for its SOs out of 50 global development institutions in the Global Transparency Index 2022 of the "Publish What You Fund" Global Campaign for Aid and Development Transparency. However, for the non-sovereign portfolio, it ranks twelfth. In the 2021 QuODA/CGD rankings, the ADF is seventh on transparency. The commitment to share key information with strategic/implementation partners is anchored in the signature of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in 2011, and in the disclosure and access to information policy (2012). The Bank is committed overall to empowering its external stakeholders, which translates into efforts to make information promptly available to them, to help them understand, support, and participate in its development activities.

The Bank does not yet have a fully operational information system that provides detailed reporting on partnerships to partners and shareholders. If an assessment of options is currently coordinated for establishing a shared services platform for partnerships, it is not set up to date. However, several efforts have been made or are ongoing (archiving system called SANKOFA, work to improve the functionalities of trust fund management system).

The Bank has established clear accountability standards and procedures for beneficiaries, which were strengthened in 2021 by a new policy framework for the independent recourse mechanism (IRM), and a new set of rules making the IRM more participatory, culturally appropriate, and gender responsive. In addition, the new rules broaden the range of actions, including by empowering it to make recommendations to the Bank. Several tools exist to ensure that procedures for accountability for beneficiaries are implemented, including a new policy framework for the IRM and the disclosure and access to information (DAI) policy. In addition to guidance for staff for implementing the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries (DAI Staff Handbook, communication, and outreach activities to increase awareness), the IRM conducts external and internal awareness-raising outreach events and activities (on its independent accountability mechanism for CSOs and project affected peoples). However, programming tools are not fully implemented to ensure accountability to beneficiaries at country level. At country level, 7 of the 12 CSPs that were sampled analyse issues concerning the implementation of procedures for accountability and transparency (Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal) in a dedicated section ("Accountability, Integrity and Transparency") but there is little or no analysis in the other 5 CSPs (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria).

The Bank's environmental and social assessment procedures are on par with international best practices. They could also be applied to co-financed operations and synchronized with other MDBs. The safeguard policy is currently being updated.

Participation in joint performance reviews of interventions is satisfactory (targets for joint ADF-assessments in a fragility context, participatory approach for CSPs, CSP MTR and CSP completion reports). The Bank also regularly uses methods other than surveys to gather feedback from its partners. Surveys are conducted after business opportunity seminars to evaluate partners' satisfaction but there is no evidence to conclude that this tool for gathering feedback from other partners is preferred.

Becoming a 'credible knowledge broker' is one of the objectives mentioned in the TYS. The Bank has made progress in this by becoming a key player in generating and disseminating knowledge about development issues in Africa, and especially on infrastructure. It also produces diagnostic studies and high-level analytical work. Its knowledge work is useful to partners for improving the effectiveness of projects and interventions, informing policy dialogue, and helping RMCs identify and address development challenges. However, several challenges exist including weak accountability and coordination of knowledge work, insufficient incentive systems to encourage knowledge work, weak strategic partnerships with other key knowledge stakeholders, lack of adequate resources and funding to implement the Bank's knowledge management efforts, among others

MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures make partnerships more agile when conditions change	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Procedures in place to encourage joint planning and programming	3
Element 2: Mechanisms, including budgetary, in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change	4
Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at the appropriate level to ensure efficiency	N/E
MI 6.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Procedures to encourage joint planning and programming are in place but could be strengthened. The Operation Manual gives indications on partnerships with borrower countries and development partners, which are encouraged as a way to align the action of the Bank on countries' development strategies and priorities, and to ensure complementarity with development partners (DPs) rather than duplication of interventions. At the country level, CSPs include dedicated section to partnerships and participation to coordination platforms, such as "Aid Coordination and Harmonisation Mechanisms". The standing committee on partnerships (SCP) established in 2012, assesses and reviews proposals relating to the establishment of new Bank partnerships to ensure internal coordination, complementarity with Bank's initiatives, and alignment with its priorities, strategies, and policies. The senior management committee (SMC) is another instance where partnerships are discussed across the Bank. In addition, the empowerment of DGs/DDGs and country offices contributed to strengthen partnerships on the ground. AfDB's harmonisation procedures are aligned to a large extent with the rules and procedures of the World Bank including in areas of procurement, safeguards, financial management. In sum, IDEV's 2021 evaluation of partnerships found the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of the Bank's partnerships to be satisfactory. However, the efficiency of the Bank's partnerships was rated unsatisfactory. It was the case at institutional and operational levels due to weaknesses in organizational performance. The Bank's partnerships have not been coordinated with optimal resources to ensure results delivery in the most cost-effective manner. The Bank could also enhance the coordination of operations and harmonisation of donor procedures and contribute to reinforce dialogue between development partners.	52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 79

Element 2: The Bank has a dedicated committee on partnerships. It participates in coordination platforms in countries where they exist. These instances allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change. For instance, interviews with AfDB staff at regional/country levels, combined with IDEV evaluations provide evidence that the Bank participates in coordination platforms and seeks coordination and harmonisation with other DPs. In the absence of a standardized and functional aid coordination framework (responsibility of recipient countries), the Bank actively assisted to DP coordination meetings and led specific working groups. The Bank also looks to scale up efforts to leverage additional resources through co-financing partnerships. For instance, the AfDB has co-organised the third edition of the Finance in Common (FiC) Summit in Abidjan from 19-20 October 2022 with the European Investment Bank and in partnership with other actors (AFD, CDP, CEB). FCIS aims at contributing to the emergence of a global financial framework for green and SDG aligned investment. The AfDB and the EIB have also signed a joint partnership action plan with the European Investment Bank to promote co-financing. Over the past 5 years, the shared portfolio of the two institutions has grown to EUR 3.4 billion, leveraging investment totalling under EUR 10.2 billion for 26 projects across the continent. **Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at the appropriate level to ensure efficiency** Insufficient evidence.	52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 79
MI 6.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.2: Partnerships are based on an explicit statement of comparative or collaborative advantage i.e. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.67**
Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership	3
Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organizational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership	3
Element 3: Resources/competencies needed for intervention area(s) are aligned to the perceived comparative or collaborative advantage	2
Element 4: Comparative or collaborative advantage is reflected in the resources (people, information, knowledge, physical resources, networks) that each partner commits (and is willing) to bring to the partnership	N/E
MI 6.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: AfDB's comparative advantage for partnerships is documented, although it could be clearer. The AfDB's approach to partnerships was rated Satisfactory by IDEV as part of the Evaluation of the AfDB's Partnerships. Several documents confirm AfDB's comparative advantage is documented. Among them, IDEV concluded that the Bank, through its approach, demonstrates strong potential to make the AfDB the partner of choice in Africa, considering the comparative advantages of the Bank and its unique position in development financing on the continent. In addition, partnership strategic orientations and comparative advantage are mentioned within the TYS: the Bank aims at becoming a 'catalyst, convener, and a connector' for development finance, a 'trusted adviser', a 'credible knowledge broker' to develop its role as an honest and credible knowledge broker and a 'voice for development in Africa'.	12, 13, 18, 118

The AfDB has also included partnerships among its reflection to update its future TYS. During the preparation process of the new TYS, an approach paper was prepared and discussed within the Inter-Departmental Working Group (including representative from FIRM) in May 2021, including a discussion of resources mobilization and partnerships. The paper has been submitted to the SVP for clearance and onward transmission to the senior leadership group for high-level guidance. The future TYS will include a dedicated section on partnerships.

The High 5s Agenda also encourages the AfDB to reach out to other partners to seek support for complementary interventions. In addition, the development of partnerships is at the heart of ADF's replenishment cycles, notably by strengthening links with other development actors including other MDBs, the UN system, AU, RECs and non-state actors as highlighted in the ADF-14 report.

However, the Bank faced several challenges related to the selectivity: IDEV 2021 Evaluation pointed lack of careful analysis by the SCP to support partnership initiatives, perception among staff that partnerships receive more attention and resources based on political considerations other than their real potential demonstrated results or reputational risks, and low durability and ownership of MoUs.

Element 2: While the Bank leverages its comparative advantages to define its partnership approach, more analysis could be undertaken to better identify and leverage its core strengths, according to IDEV. Results from the survey suggests that partners are satisfied regarding how the Bank leverages its comparative advantage in partnership. More than 90% borrower countries agree that AfDB's work with partners is based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific sectoral and/or thematic areas. (Figure 18)

FIGURE 18. **AfDB'S WORK WITH PARTNERS IS BASED ON A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHY IT IS BEST PLACED TO TARGET SPECIFIC SECTORAL AND/OR THEMATIC AREAS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

12, 13, 18, 118

Element 3: While the Bank's partnership approach is built on its perceived advantage, partnerships are undermined by inefficiencies related to staff resources, communication, coordination, and incentives. IDEV's 2021 evaluation rated the efficiency of the Bank's partnerships as unsatisfactory which justifies the score 2.

However, in response to this evaluation, Management agreed with the necessity to better allocate resources across the partnership ecosystem, including people, processes, and systems critical to ensure

the successful implementation of its goals. An ongoing effort is undertaken to redeploy resources from HQ to regional offices for resource mobilisation and partnerships. Four staff have been assigned to the regions (Southern Africa, East Africa, Nigeria, and North Africa) in 2022. Two more staff are in the process of being selected for the Central African Region and the West Africa Region. **Element 4: Comparative or collaborative advantage is reflected in the resources (people, information, knowledge, physical resources, networks) that each partner commits (and is willing) to bring to the partnership** Insufficient evidence.	12, 13, 18, 118
MI 6.2 Evidence confidence Due to insufficient evidence related to Element 4, notably the resources (people, information, knowledge, physical resources, networks) that each partner commits (and is willing) to bring to the partnership	**Medium confidence**

MI 6.3 Demonstrated commitment to furthering development partnerships for countries (i.e. support for South-South collaboration, triangular arrangements, and use of country systems)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.75**
Element 1: Clear statement on how the organisation will support principles of collaboration with countries on their development agenda (Nairobi Principles, 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda)	4
Element 2: Clear statement/guidelines for how the organisation will support development partnerships between countries	4
Element 3: Clear statement/guidelines for how the organisation will use country systems	4
Element 4: Internal structures and incentives supportive of collaboration/cooperation with countries, and use of country systems where appropriate	3
MI 6.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The operations manual emphasises principles of development effectiveness including country ownership principle. Country and regional programming are supposed to provide an opportunity to critically review and examine basic and economic development problems and prospects of a country/region. For greater development effectiveness and in the spirit of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, the Bank coordinates the programming process with development partners to ensure complementarity. All development efforts are carried out in line with country's development strategies and priorities, as well as Bank Group's strategy and comparative advantage, which are aligned on the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Partnership and collaboration are also integrated at the country level in the way the Bank translate global principles of collaboration in the country development agenda through engagement in the preparation of key documents. CSPs for instance provide an assessment of alignment of global frameworks with national priorities including the contribution of the different partners. **Element 2: The Bank supports partnerships between countries through its emphasis on regional integration, convening power, and partnerships with regional organisations.** The TYS 2013-2022 reaffirmed AfDB's mandate in promoting regional integration in Africa by identifying regional integration as one of the five core operational priorities over the next decade. The Bank has also defined a regional integration policy and strategy (RIPoS) 2014-2024 and produced a series of Regional Integration Strategy Papers (RISPs) to operationalise the RIPoS. The RIPoS is anchored on two pillars: supporting regional infrastructure development and enhancing industrialisation and trade. A cross cutting pillar	13, 14, 20, 49, 79, 108

completes this strategic framework: strengthening country and regional mechanisms and institutional capacities. The Strategic Framework for Regional Operations of the operation manual emphasises partnerships with regional organisations with the institutional capacity to develop and implement regional operations. The events organised by the Bank, such as the African Investment Forum, also present opportunities for stakeholders to collaborate.

The AfDB supports development partnerships between countries through other initiatives. For instance, the Bank has a collaboration with the UN South-South office (eg.: on events and knowledge) COVID-19. It also manages the South-South Cooperation Trust Fund and other trust funds (such as the India Trust Fund). In addition, it has an active role to promote regional integration and projects, including through the Africa Trade Fund, support to the AfCTA Secretariat (Protocol of Agreement signed in July 2022) and to regional projects such as interconnected transmission lines, resilient and climate infrastructure.

Results from the survey suggests that close to two thirds of respondents agreed at least to some extent that the Bank supports such cooperation. However, high rates of respondents answered "don't know/ no opinion" possibly due to a low awareness. (Figure 19)

FIGURE 19. **AfDB'S SEIZES OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES IN FURTHERING THEIR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIPS (E.G. SUPPORT TO REGIONAL ORGANISATION AND INITIATIVES)**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=109)

13, 14, 20, 49, 79, 108

Element 3: The AfDB includes through its Manual of Operation directives, guidelines on how to assess the relevance of the use of country systems. The results of the country fiduciary risk assessment have to inform the decisions determining how much reliance can be placed on the use of country systems. In addition, CSPs have to carry out an assessment of the strength of country systems for environmental, social and climate change policy.

Element 4: While some internal structures support collaboration/cooperation, the support to collaboration could be strengthened. At country level, CSP must provide an assessment of the strength of country systems for environmental, social and climate change policy. At project level, during project identification, a Country Fiduciary Risk Assessment must inform the decisions determining how much reliance can be placed on the use of country systems. The PCR should assess the extent to which projects have contributed to strengthen institutional capacities, including through the use of country systems. IDEV 's Synthesis Report on the Validation of PCRs includes a sustainability's sub-criteria on partnership which is an incentive to support collaboration/cooperation.

However, some room for improvements exists in terms of collaboration. The institutional and capacity component shows that 78% of partnership projects (50 out of 64) are highly satisfactory or satisfactory, but 21% of the projects (14 out of 64) were scored unsatisfactory. This score improved to 92% in 2021. In addition, the performance of ownership and sustainability of partnerships was highly satisfactory or satisfactory for 71% of the projects (45 out of 63) but 27% of the projects were unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory in 2019. The latest data communicated by IDEV shows the performance of ownership and sustainability of partnerships could some progress but this component could still be strengthened: 85% of partnership projects (51 out of 61) sampled by IDEV (2021) are highly satisfactory or satisfactory in this area. But 16% of the projects were unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory.	13, 14, 20, 49, 79, 108
MI 6.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify and address synergies with development partners, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation in relation to 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda implementation	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly identify possible synergies with development partners and leverage of resources/catalytic use of resources and results	3
Element 2: Strategies or designs clearly articulate responsibilities and scope of the partnership	N/E
Element 3: Strategies or designs are based on a clear assessment of external coherence	N/E
Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	3
MI 6.4 Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank identifies synergies and complementarities with development partners and other stakeholders (including private sector) systematically (or almost) through its strategic work (Ten-Year Strategy, High 5s, sectoral strategies and most of the time through CSPs/RISPs). The Non-Sovereign Operations Policy underlines that the Bank engagement in its NSOs should aim to maximise the catalytic impact of the Bank's limited resources, while seeking to promote inclusive growth ant the transition to « green growth » in African countries. The Strategic Framework for Regional Operations of the operation manual put emphasis on partnership with regional organisations that have the institutional capacity to development and implement regional operations; with bilateral and multilateral donors; and with private sector operators. The Climate Change and Green Growth Strategic Framework (2021) includes one pillar dedicated to establish, build, deepen, and grow partnerships that bring together comparative advantages. Scaling-up strategic partnerships to address regional drivers of fragility is one the strategic orientations of the new AfDB's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa (2022-26). Coordination of actors as a partnership to drive transformation is also considered as an enabler and key activity for agricultural transformation as part of the Feed Africa Strategy 2016-25. Bank's support to the water sector over the period 2005-16 relies on advocacy, partnerships, innovations and financing to improve sanitation in Africa, as well as innovative financing and partnerships including private sector participation and development partners to increase sustainable access to water supply, sanitation and hygiene services are included within the AfDB's Water Strategy 2021-25. In addition, several responses to COVID-91 also include the priority to build partnerships (Feed Africa Response to COVID-19, Macro-Economic Policy Responses for Building Resilient Economies, among others). **At country level**, we identify that the analysis related to synergies with development partners, or the division of labour is carried out most of the time through CSPs (Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo). This is done within a dedicated table "areas	10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 95, 99, 100, 118, 121 – 123, 132

of interventions by Development Partners and/or a section called "Aid Coordination Mechanisms, Bank Positioning and Comparative Advantage". However, the analysis is sometimes weak/ not sufficiently precise (e.g., CSP Rwanda, Senegal) or even absent (CSP 2017-21 Morocco). Due to these limits, the score is 3. **Element 2: Lack of evidence** (notably based on additional documents i.e., representative sample of MoU, not received due to confidentiality) **which justifies the score of N/E**. An extract of MoU section indicating how the implementation will be done was shared to the MOPAN evaluation team. It shows good practices with a section "implementation of cooperation activities" that defines the articulation in terms of responsibilities. However, the assessment can't conclude if it is systematised for several partnerships, nor if strategies clearly articulate scope of the partnership. Finally, for illustrative purposes, it worth mentioning that the AfDB did not renew over the period 2017-22 a MoU with a key partner involved in the African continent, such as the World Bank. It would be necessary to better articulate responsibilities and scope of this partnership with an overall view from both headquarters. **Element 3: Lack of sufficient evidence** (notably based on additional desktop review, i.e. Minutes of SCP meetings, not received due to confidentiality) **to provide a score which justifies the score of N/E**. Strategies or designs are not always based on a clear assessment of external coherence. Interviews with Bank staff as part of IDEV 2021 Evaluation showed that partnership initiatives were not always supported by careful analysis by the Standing Committee on Partnerships (SCP). There is a perception among staff that partnerships receive more attention and resources based on political considerations other than their real potential, demonstrated results or reputational risks for the Bank. Several were described as « top-down and lacked proper consultation with staff » and didn't consider sufficiently transaction costs, notably. **Element 4: Engaging with partners, from the public and private sector, is a way for the Bank to ensure financing leverage.** Several mechanisms have been developed to encourage private sector finance mobilisation and fund mobilisation from other partners, such as the Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility, tapping funds from global facilities, leveraging private sector investments through the African Investment Forum (see KPI 3.2.2.). The Bank supplies vastly more finance for infrastructure projects with private sector participation in Africa than any other multilateral development bank. (Center for Global Development, ADER 2022). At the country and project levels more could be done to maximize leveraging of resources. In particular, mobilizing counterpart funds from governments has traditionally been a source of delays and an area in need of more attention. At the project level, the potential for co-financing is still unmet.	10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 95, 99, 100, 118, 121 – 123, 132
MI 6.4 Evidence confidence Lack of sufficient evidence (e.g. minutes of SCP meetings, representative sample of MoU, not received due to confidentiality) which justifies the score of N.E.	**Medium confidence**

MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with relevant partners	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.67**
Element 1: Active engagement in joint exercises/mechanisms (planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation) to support external coherence	3
Element 2: Participating in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key development partners	3

Element 3: Identifying shared information or efficiency gaps with development partners and developing strategies to address them	2
MI 6.5: Analysis	**Evidence documents**

Element 1: Working together with other stakeholders through country platforms is an objective of ADF15 and part of a specific engagement to improve development effectiveness at country level. The Manual of Operations includes as part of the project development cycle the possibility of Joint Country Assessment Strategy. In practice, JCAS are no longer existing. The Bank sometimes assumes a leadership role regarding to donor coordination, for instance for the 24 regional operations reviewed by IDEV in Eastern Africa. The Bank is also overall active in joint exercises/mechanisms at country level as evidenced by desktop review and interviews with AfDB's regional and country staff (see more details in MI 6.8. Element 2).

Partners surveyed at the coordination level are overall rather positive regarding the engagement of the Bank in coordination mechanisms notably considering positive responses from borrower countries. To a small extent, some feedback are more reserved.

FIGURE 20. **AfDB IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COORDINATION MECHANISMS FOR PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING WITH BORROWING PARTNERS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS IN YOUR COUNTRY**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=61)

However, IDEV noted in Eastern Africa insufficient coordination between RECs and RMCs and between RECs and the Bank. The need of renewed regional frameworks for dialogue with RECs (notably CEMAC and ECCAS) and for greater ownership of RECs in implementing regional programmes in Central Africa was raised by IDEV's evaluation of the RIS paper for Eastern Africa.

Due to these limits, the score is 3.

6, 17, 116

Element 2: Participating in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key development partners seems an objective pursued in theory by the Bank at several levels but there is insufficient evidence to conclude it is systematised with different partners and in practice both from headquarters and in the field. This "substantial" implementation based on the evidence base justifies the score of 3 (according the MOPAN Methodology 3.1).

At headquarter level, it seems that this objective is pursued in theory based on good practices. The AfDB shared two documents with the MOPAN assessment team: a section dedicated to monitoring and evaluation arrangements of a concept note outline for new trust funds and initiatives; a section "Monitoring and Evaluations" of an extract of MoU section indicating how the implementation will be monitored. It highlights different components of a monitoring and reporting framework (annually

monitoring and reporting of a mutually annual work plan, annual achievements report, bi-annual coordination meetings and stock-taking meetings). **However, the assessment cannot conclude if it is systematised or "fully implemented" (i.e. Score of 4) for several partnerships** in theory (e.g. through incorporating systematically the section "monitoring and evaluation" within MoUs over the period 2017-22) and in practice (by implementing systematically the planned activities). The AfDB shared with the Assessment Team several examples of joint supervision that illustrates some practical cases of co-financed projects through joint supervision "Aide Memoires" (with JICA in Mauritius, with the EIB in Liberia, with other donors (AFD, KfW, WB related to an energy project). Where multiple DPs are engaged in budget support there is also usually a joint monitoring framework. Based on this evidence, we consider this is "substantially" proved. **In addition, the AfDB has deep dive exercise with some major partners such as Germany, but there are no deep dives with the World Bank and AFD.** The VP for Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery led in Germany in July 2019 a delegation comprising country managers and sectoral directors and managers representatives from several Complexes (PEVP, ECVP, PIPVP). However, the AfDB does not have this type of exercise with AFD, its first bilateral co-financier partner, neither the World Bank, unlike the deep dive implemented between the World Bank and AFD, which includes strategic and operational meetings to ensure a monitoring of their partnership. **At country level**, interviews with AfDB's regional and country staff provided several examples of an active role through sectoral working groups in several countries (e.g.: in the water sector in Rwanda, Morocco and Egypt, energy sector in Rwanda and Angola, road infrastructure and digitalisation in Tunisia). In addition, **at ADF level**, both ADF-14 and ADF15 replenishments include targets of joint assessments in fragility context (12 operations by 2019 for ADF14 and 8 by 2022 for ADF-15, it is planned to be increased under ADF16). According to feedback from the AfDB, these targets have been met in practice. In addition, joint activities implemented with development, humanitarian and/or security partners in transition states or hotspot regions are one indicator of the results measurement and reporting framework of the Bank Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa (2022-26) (March 2022). **Element 3: The Bank does not have an adequate partnership information system. Such system would provide information to partners on the resources mobilised, their utilisation, and their development impact.** According to IDEV's evaluation on partnerships, the Trust Funds Management System's (TFMS) functionalities were neither fully implemented nor integrated into the Bank systems. IDEV recommended establishing a shared platform of services for partnerships, with adequate human resources and harmonized tools, processes, and information systems. In addition, according to IDEV, the lack of specific KPIs for bilateral trust funds, thematic trust funds and co-financing (agreements) related to reporting and accountability limit the effectiveness of partnerships and a close monitoring of how the mobilised resources are used. It should be noted that since this evaluation started in 2019 and was published in 2021, several efforts have been undertaken or are ongoing. AfDB's Resource Mobilization and Partnerships Department (FIRM) has since been working on an archiving system called SANKOFA which should be helpful in contributing to reporting and hence accountability. FIRM has also developed internal micro site to provide some information on the Trust Funds (TFs) for internal use. In addition, FIRM has been working with AfDB's Development Bank IT Department (CHIS) since June 2022, to improve the functionalities of Trust Fund Management System. However, if previous-mentioned AfDB's Departments (FIRM/FIST/CHIS) are currently coordinating an assessment of options for establishing a shared services platform for partnerships, this platform is not set up to date, which justifies the score of 2.	6, 17, 116
MI 6.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/ implementation partners on an on-going basis	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Clear corporate statement on transparency of information is aligned to the International Aid Transparency Initiative	4
Element 2: Information is available on analysis, budgeting, management in line with the guidance provided by the International Aid Transparency Initiative	3
Element 3: Responses to partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are of good quality and responded to in a timely fashion	N/E
MI 6.6: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The AfDB is committed to transparency and openness in the conduct of its operations, and execution of its projects, and programmes, including partnerships. The Bank is a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) since April 2011. The commitment to transparency is anchored in AfDB's revised 2012 Disclosure and Access to Information (DAI) Policy. The Bank established a Records Management and Archives Policy in 2018 and produces a disclosure and access to information (DAI) annual report. The RMF includes a single KPI dedicated to measure the mobilisation of resources from public and private sector entities, including active mobilisation and co-financing. In July 2022, Chief Executive Gary Foster recognised AfDB's notable efforts to align with IATI during Publish What You Fund's 2022 Aid Transparency Index (which uses IATI): *"We congratulate the African Development Bank's sovereign portfolio for achieving 1st place in the 2022 Aid Transparency Index. For many years now the AfDB has engaged to understand the demands of the Index, and they have then re-engineered their approach to disclosure, accordingly, publishing more comprehensive, higher quality data. This has been made possible because the efforts of their technical staff are matched by commitment to aid transparency from the highest levels of the organisation."* **Element 2: The Bank is ranked first out of 50 global development institutions in the Global Transparency Index 2022 of the "Publish What You Fund" Global Campaign for Aid and Development Transparency. However, for the non-sovereign portfolio specifically, the AfDB ranks 12th. The ADF is ranked 7th in terms of transparency in the QuODA/CGD rankings of 2021.** The Bank is overall committed to empowering its external stakeholders, which translates into efforts to make information promptly available to external stakeholders, to help them understand, support and participate in the Bank's development interventions. However, the Bank does not yet have a fully operational information system which would provide partners and shareholders with detailed reporting on partnerships. In addition, partners survey presents mixed opinions, with civil society (through with small number of responses) and peer development organisations are more tentative than other stakeholder groups about whether the AfDB shares key information with them in line with IATI requirements, which suggest there are still areas for improvement in terms of communication information with partners. (Figure 21) **Element 3: The 2012 revised Policy on DAI relies on the principle that "any information in the Bank's possession should be accessible to the public unless such information is classed under the Information Disclosure List of Exceptions".** In 2020, the Bank proactively disclosed 3,795 documents related to its projects, operations, programmes, and policies on its website, in progression with the previous years (3,424 in 2019 and 2,231 in 2017). There are several access points to information, including the website, social media platforms, e-mails messages and a civil society organisations database. The Bank's website recorded 13,316,588 views/ visits. In 2020, the RMID Secretariat received and processed 454 requests for information through the online inquiry form, a 9% decrease from 2019, despite an increasing trajectory over the past years.	6, 136 – 137

FIGURE 21. **AfDB SHARES KEY INFORMATION (ANALYSIS, BUDGETING, MANAGEMENT, RESULTS) WITH PARTNERS IN LINE WITH IATI REQUIREMENTS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=116)

The assessment lacks evidence to assess the quality and responsiveness of responses to partner queries which justify the "N/E" score. The Assessment team didn't receive any document that would allow to assess the quality of responses to partner queries. It doesn't exist a document which precises the degree of responsiveness.	6, 136 – 137
MI 6.6: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.60**
Element 1: Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations i.e., Accountability to Affected Populations	4
Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	3
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed in the intervention	3
MI 6.7: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations are clearly explained in the Operations Manual and in the framework for the Independent Recourse Mechanism. They are described in the Operations Manual and they include: • The project identification should involve consultation with the intended beneficiaries of each operation, an analysis of the problems they face, and the identification of options to address these problems.	52 – 65, 88, 117, 138 – 139

- The Preparation process involves detailed studies, consultations with Borrower, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. The beneficiary Analysis involves a thorough investigation about the people who are likely to benefit from the project, what types of constraints they are facing and how the project can alleviate those constraints.

In 2021, the AfDB approved a new policy framework for the IRM aimed at strengthening accountability and providing more effective recourse to people affected by Bank-financed operation. The new operational rules and procedures approved by African Development Bank's board of directors also:

- Provides the IRM with the ability to initiate compliance review processes in certain circumstances without a formal complaint from affected communities.
- Increases complainants' participation in the complaint-handling process by allowing them the opportunity to comment on draft compliance review reports before they go to the board.
- Commits the IRM to pursue a culturally appropriate and gender responsive complaint process.
- Allows the IRM to consider a complaint's eligibility even in the case of parallel judicial or non-judicial proceedings.
- Empowers the Independent Recourse Mechanism to make recommendations to the Bank on issues related to redress and remedy when individuals and communities are adversely impacted as a result of Bank-financed operations, as well as ensure that agreements reached by parties in problem-solving activities are aligned to international norms

Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries. A DAI Staff Handbook has been drafted in February 2013 with the objective to implement the DAI Policy and guide staff/stakeholders on all issues related to information disclosure. Additionally, the IRM carries out communication and outreach activities staff throughout the year through webinars, online trainings and virtual fora to increase the awareness of these processes among staff.

52 – 65, 88, 117, 138 – 139

Element 3: The Bank, via the IRM conducts awareness raising outreach events on its independent accountability mechanism for CSOs and project affected peoples. IRM's external outreach activities in 2020 reached over 1000 external stakeholders including CSO, and PIUs through: webinars to familiarize CSO on the IRM's mandate and its complaints handling processes; participation in online trainings targeting PIUs; and, orientation sessions at the Civil Society Virtual Forum. The IRM also developed new communication tools including a video, an article for the AfDB website and an online complaint form.

IRM activities were adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic with an extensive use of virtual communication's platforms. IRM's internal outreach activities included an outreach and training session for staff of the Compliance and Safeguards department (reaching 27 people), an awareness-raising webinar for Bank staff (reaching 140 people) and IRM staff's participation in other outreach events organized by other Bank departments.

Element 4: Several tools exist to ensure the implementation of procedures for accountability for beneficiaries, including a new policy framework for the IRM and DAI policy. However, programming tools are not fully implemented at country level.

The DAI policy aims at strengthening accountability and effectiveness of the IRM and enhancing disclosure and transparency of information.

At country level, the sampled CSPs analyse for the most part issues related to the implementation of procedures for accountability and transparency, as observed in 7 of 12 reviewed CSPs (Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal) through a dedicated section ("Accountability, Integrity and Transparency"). However, in some cases, the analysis is low or absent

(Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria). In addition, the implementation of these tools could be strengthened: according to the partner survey. Indeed, more than 30% of civil society partners (1 respondent out of 3) and 20% of donors (2 respondents out of 7) surveyed disagreed that the AfDB engaged civil society and project affected people in their country and addressed grievances raised.	
Element 5: The Bank's Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures provide guidance on the specific procedures that the Bank and its borrowers or clients should follow to ensure that Bank's operations meet the requirements of the Operational Safeguards at each stage of the Bank's project cycle. As noted by IDEV's 2019 ISS evaluation, guidance, and procedures for addressing the Bank's ISS architecture are on par with international best practice and E&S work before project approval is strong. However, the application of ESAP has been more limited for co-financed operations. Rules lack clarity regarding the synchronization of safeguards requirements between different MDBs, and the number of staff limits SNSC capacity. The safeguard policy is currently being updated.	52 – 65, 88, 117, 138 – 139
MI 6.7: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: Participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments	4
Element 2: Participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments	3
Element 3: Use of surveys or other methods to understand how partners are experiencing working together on implementing mutually agreed commitments.	2
MI 6.8: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Participation in joint performance reviews of interventions is satisfactory. Operations manual mentions the possibility of performing Joint Country Assessment Strategy as part of the project development cycle. Both ADF-14 and ADF-15 defined targets for joint assessments in fragility context (12 operations by 2019 for ADF-14 and 8 by 2022 for ADF-15). More than 90% of the borrower countries and peer development organisations surveyed agree to some extent that the AfDB jointly monitors progress on shared goals in their country with local and regional partners. Finally, CSP, CSP MTR and CSP completion reports are carried out through a participatory approach with the clients. (Figure 22)	12, 15, 52, 79 – 118

FIGURE 22. **AfDB JOINTLY MONITORS PROGRESS ON SHARED GOALS IN YOUR COUNTRY WITH LOCAL AND REGIONAL PARTNERS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=57)

Element 2: By and large, the Bank has been active at international, regional and in-country in terms of dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments, as evidenced by different lines of evidence:

- An active role at international level: the Bank is/was part of several initiatives in terms of dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments such as G20, G7, UNGA, Paris Club, Finance in Common, Paris Peace Forum, COP, African Union Summits, ECOWAS, SADC, ACP, TICAD, EU-African Union Summits, Global Food Security Summit, Africa Adaptation Summit, etc.
- Recent evaluations of AfDB's Country Strategies and Programmes (e.g.: Benin, Uganda, Rwanda) considered satisfactory the harmonization of operations with other donors.
- Survey respondents of this MOPAN assessment are overall positive, notably peer development organisation respondents agreeing at least to some extent that the AfDB coordinates its activities with partners to ensure coherence and avoid fragmentation/duplication at country level. In addition, as previously mentioned, respondents are positive regarding the AfDB's work with partners based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific sectoral and/or thematic areas. (Figure 23)

FIGURE 23. **AfDB COORDINATES ITS ACTIVITIES WITH PARTNERS TO ENSURE COHERENCE AND AVOID FRAGMENTATION/DUPLICATION AT COUNTRY LEVEL**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=109)

12, 15, 52, 79 – 118

- Interviews with AfDB's regional and country staff provided several examples of an active role at field level. It is observed at sector level through a selective approach (e.g.: in the water sector in Rwanda, Morocco and Egypt, energy sector in Rwanda and Angola, road infrastructure and digitalisation in Tunisia). In addition, in some countries, the Bank is co-leading the general group of coordination between technical and financial partners (e.g.: Morocco, Vice-president of the G-15 in Senegal).

Overall, the decentralisation process through regional hubs and country offices has contributed to strengthening collaboration with technical and financial partners where possible (e.g.: the opening of a country office in Benin).

Despite being generally active in partner coordination, some internal and external factors – common to other donors or others that are specific to the AfDB – limit the potential of the AfDB. Participation depends on the policy of each country towards development partner coordination. A balanced approach is sometimes needed due to limited internal local capacity. In addition, according to IDEV 2021 evaluation of AfDB's partnerships, the Bank has limitations in assuming some leadership roles; staff reported that the Bank sometimes declined leadership and coordination roles, due to the Bank's culture of focusing primarily on the lending programme and board approvals (see page 32 of this

evaluation). It is relevant to mix this finding considering often there is competition for leaderships roles and in some cases the Bank has had to delay their leadership roles. Some responses of MOPAN Survey regarding AfDB's areas for improvement echoes these challenges ("AfDB does not lift its responsibility for coordination/ financiers at the country level"; "coordination with co-financiers"; collaboration with international partners"). **Despite being generally active in partner coordination, some internal and external factors – common to other donors or others that are specific to the AfDB – limit the potential of the AfDB.** Participation depends on the policy of each country towards development partner coordination. A balanced approach is sometimes needed due to limited internal local capacity. In addition, according to IDEV 2021 evaluation of AfDB's partnerships, the Bank has limitations in assuming some leadership roles; staff reported that the Bank sometimes declined leadership and coordination roles, due to the Bank's culture of focusing primarily on the lending programme and board approvals (see page 32 of this evaluation). It is relevant to mix this finding considering often there is competition for leaderships roles and in some cases the Bank has had to delay their leadership roles. Some responses of MOPAN Survey regarding AfDB's areas for improvement echoes these challenges ("AfDB does not lift its responsibility for coordination/ financiers at the country level"; "coordination with co-financiers"; collaboration with international partners"). **Element 3: The Bank regularly uses other methods to gather feedback from its partners, than surveys.** At country level, the Bank involves partners at all stages of CSP (design, mid-term review, completion report), including the design, implementation and report, as well as to inform the next stage of the cycle. At ADB level, it reaches out to donors through annual meetings and at ADF level replenishment meetings and mid-term review discussions allow to agree identify specific common areas of interest, mutual commitments and/or adjustments. Surveys are conducted after Business Opportunity Seminars to evaluate the satisfaction of partners but there is no evidence to conclude it is a preferred tool to gather feedback from other partners. Indeed, the assessment doesn't have sufficient evidence to conclude the organisation uses in a systematic way methods to understand how peer development partners are experiencing working together on implementing mutually agreed commitments. A systematic follow-up of the implementation of MoU with major development partners is a good practice that can facilitate this understanding. For instance, the World Bank and AFD have implemented a regular deep dive, including strategic and operational meetings to ensure a monitoring of their partnership. It would be probably welcome for the AfDB with some major development partners considering its active role to strengthen links with development partners (for instance recently with EBRD, EIB).	12, 15, 52, 79 – 118
MI 6.8 Evidence confidence Due to insufficient evidence related to Element 3 to conclude that the organisation uses in a systematic way methods to understand how peer development partners are experiencing working together on implementing mutually agreed commitments	**Medium confidence**

MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support policy dialogue and/or advocacy	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organization's role in knowledge production	4
Element 2: Knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action	2

Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy, where relevant, at country, regional, or global level	3
Element 4: Knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners	N/E
Element 5: Knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners	3
Element 6: Knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners	3
MI 6.9: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Becoming a 'credible knowledge broker' is one of the objectives mentioned in the TYS. The Bank is a key player in generating and disseminating knowledge about development issues in Africa. It undertakes economic and sector work, by producing diagnostic studies and high-level analytical reports, and by generating statistical products and services. On 27 April 2022, the Bank's boards of directors approved a new Knowledge Management Strategy for the period 2022-31 (KMS 2022-31). The objective of KMS 2022-2031 is to leverage knowledge to strengthen development effectiveness in Regional Member Countries, both at country and regional levels. As underlined by the ADER, its knowledge work makes projects and interventions more effective, informs policy dialogue, and helps regional member countries identify and address their development challenges. In 2020, the AfDB produced 250 new economic and social (ESW) work products, exceeding the target of 170. As part of its knowledge and capacity development work, the Bank launched in 2020 a Global Community of Practice on policy responses to COVID-19, to help African countries respond to the pandemic in 2020 and beyond. The G-CoP has become a platform for helping the governments with Implementable policies on emerging issues that have significant impact on Africa's' development. In 2021, the Bank launched its African Development Bank Group Capacity Development Strategy (CDS 2021-25) with three key pillars: improving the capacity for project design and implementation in African countries; strengthening institutional capacity for economic policy management (public financial management and macro-economic management in African countries); and enhancing institutional capacity for effective knowledge brokerage and policy dialogue in African countries. The strategy should be included in the evidence list as it addresses the MOPAN 2018 assessment on Bank's work of addressing capacity constraints and is designed to address the Bank's GCI-VII and the ADF-15 commitments on capacity development. To this effect the Bank established the African Public Finance Management Academy and the Virtual Capacity Development Academy to ensure broader reach and cost effectiveness in institutional Capacity strengthening across the member States. Evidence from the Bank Eminent lecture series and the Bank global community of practice seminar series including reports should also be referenced https://vcda.afdb.org/en/reports. In 2019, the Bank also provided technical and financial support to 11 RMCs, to help them develop national statistical systems. In addition, the recent ICAI review of UK support to the AfDB report confirmed the AfDB is still an important knowledge broker for the African continent. This report highlighted the importance of providing adequate staffing for economic governance and knowledge management, as well as the depth and range of policy advice and leadership provided by the Bank on a range of issues – notably infrastructure – and the Bank's economic and policy capacity, illustrated for instance through the African Economic Outlook, integrating some of the Bank's own analysis and analysis by African economists. **Element 2: The partner survey suggests that knowledge products are useful to partners.** There is close to 80% minimum of each category of partner at least somewhat agreeing to some extent that knowledge products are useful for their work (all categories combined, the average is 87% of	44, 122 – 140

respondents who at least somewhat agree with that sentence). According to this criterion, knowledge partners are the most satisfied, followed by borrower countries and peer development organisations. Board members and donors are the least positive in terms of their satisfaction with the usefulness of knowledge products. However, it is important to be cautious when interpreting this data as a small number of Board members and donors responded to the MOPAN survey and they are not a targeted audience of knowledge products. Dedicated information about knowledge and knowledge products are on the AfDB website. (Figure 24)

FIGURE 24. **AfDB'S KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS ARE USEFUL FOR MY WORK**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

44, 122 – 140

The usefulness of the knowledge products does not extend to these being extensively quoted by governments and the AfDB. Based on a desktop review of 11 national development plans of the countries sampled (see line 52 of Annex B, except the NDP of Egypt not available online). AfDB's knowledge products are only mentioned in these reports in one case (Nigeria). They are not mentioned as part of the macroeconomic and development challenges, neither appear in the bibliographies where they exist (IMF and the World Bank and their knowledge products or data are more cited. In addition, AfDBs ESW's products are little mentioned as part of 7 of 12 sampled CSP (Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal). These CSP mentioned regularly other sources such as IMF, World Bank, UNDP but don't mention an AfDB's flagship report such the African Economic Outlook. Good practices have been identified from other CSPs. The AfDB's CSP in Morocco present in Annex 7 a list of ESW including from AfDB that were used to inform the elaboration of the CSP. Regarding CSP's from Ethiopia (2023-2027) and Kenya (2019-2023), it is mentioned that ESW inform the design and implementation of AfDB's activities.

In 2023, IDEV will carry out an evaluation of the AfDB's economic and sector work which will provide updated findings on the quality and impact of ESWs. The previous review of the AfDB's ESW 2005-2010 concluded that the use of ESW products at different levels was poor. Supporting managers and staff to use knowledge across the Bank's business value chain routinely is one for the priority emphasised by the KMS 2022-2031. This strategy put also emphasis on efforts to develop to ensure that relevant knowledge and lessons learned from experiences are adequately captures and used in the design of operations.

Element 3: The Bank's knowledge products contribute to policy dialogue at the global level, according to the partner survey. More than 70% of partners of each category agreed to some extent that the knowledge products provide high quality inputs to the global (Africa-related) policy dialogue. There are however fewer to strongly agree with this statement, with the most positive being knowledge partners (more than 20%), and the least positive being civil society and donors (less than 10%). (Figure 25)

FIGURE 25. **AfDB'S PROVIDES HIGH QUALITY INPUTS TO THE GLOBAL (AFRICA-RELATED) POLICY DIALOGUE**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

44, 122 – 140

Element 4: Knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners. Insufficient evidence to appreciate the timeliness of knowledge products generated as perceived by partners.

Knowledge products are published in a regular way. For instance, the annual *African Economic Outlook* is a flagship product that analyses Africa's economic performance and outlook and is typically disseminated in the beginning of the reference year.

Element 5: The Bank has demonstrated its ability to be a credible knowledge broker for the African continent with several flagship projects, such as previously mentioned the African Economic Outlook. Regarding content, feedback from partners on the mix of technical advice, financing, and knowledge provided to address key development challenges in their countries was rather positive.

Through the global community of practice, policy dialogue series has attracted more than 5000 experts from governments, and local and global experts to synthesise developmental knowledge on the challenges facing Africa. The knowledge products are peer reviewed and disseminated to policy makers. (Figure 26)

However, the uneven quality assurance process for knowledge work is a challenge for the Bank (according to the draft 2022-31 knowledge management strategy which is public; the board approved the strategy on 27 April 2022). Strengthening the quality of the Bank's knowledge work by developing a quality assurance framework for knowledge documents and emphasizing quality over quantity is a guiding principle considered in the new strategy.

FIGURE 26. **AfDB PROVIDES AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF TECHNICAL ADVICE, FINANCING, KNOWLEDGE TO ADDRESS KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN YOUR COUNTRY**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=64)

Element 6: The knowledge products produced by the Bank are relatively easy to use, as reported by the partners surveyed. Among the different categories of partners, knowledge partners are the most satisfied, with more than 100% of them agreeing to some extent that the knowledge products are easy to use. board members and donors were slightly more critical: 70% agreed to some extent with the statement and more than 10% disagreed to some extent.

44, 122 – 140

FIGURE 27. **AfDB'S KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS ARE PROVIDED IN A FORMAT THAT MAKES THEM EASY TO USE**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=122)

MI 6.9: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus explicitly geared towards function	KPI score
Satisfactory	3.18

The Bank is aware that, ultimately, it is the quality of operations that determines its capacity to achieve development objectives and that results should be the main yardstick by which to measure its performance. It has thus worked hard these past few years to shift from its traditional incentive structure skewed towards new lending to one making implementation results more central to its development efforts. The recent drive for RBM was informed by a series of evaluations carried out by IDEV covering Quality at Entry (2018), Quality at Supervision and Exit (2018), Quality Assurance Across the Project Cycle (2018), and Self-evaluation System and Procedures (2019). Overall, one key finding is that the tools and processes required for an RBM approach are in place, consistent with and equally good as those of comparator institutions. The articulation between self-evaluation, validation, and independent evaluations is similar, and the system produces corporate results data that are used to report to the board and to the public. The main weaknesses have to do with applying established procedures, standards, and norms, rather than the requirements of the procedures as such.

The Bank's self-evaluation system is critical for tracking and reporting results and is partly dependent on the quality of IPR and PCR data. The main issues identified by IDEV evaluations include (i) low compliance with established procedures and requirements; (ii) limited resources and insufficient focus of accountability systems for M&E during supervision, and (iii) a positive bias in assessing performance leading to a high disconnect with IDEV-validated data. PCR quality (2019) is deemed satisfactory by IDEV and is improving but with a score of 2.8 (scale 1-4) there is room for improvement. Staff see IPR/ASR and PCR/XSR instruments often as administrative requirements rather than decision-making or learning tools Since the IDEV evaluations, the Bank has made a notable effort to review and re-engineer its business processes for performance management. Under the integrated quality assurance plan (or quality plan), the Bank has implemented a series of measures to improve operational quality and development impact. Some of these are already generating visible improvements: the roll out of the RRS for on-line reporting; the inclusion of quality related KPIs since 2019; the resumption of the annual portfolio performance review; the new enhanced RR, and the replacement of the old results-based logical frameworks with new results tools for all operations. The results from having revised IPR and PCR templates and new ratings methodology will take more time. Finally, the delivery of the operations academy is well advanced, while the launch of a staff awards system for implementing and turning around projects for greater development results is being scheduled for 2023. Also, a new Sovereign Operations restructuring policy was approved by the Board in November 2022. The overdue updating of the Operation Manual (2014) is still pending, and subject to setting up technical investment committees for quality enhancement.

Key corporate documents including the TYS, the High 5s agenda, and the ADF-15, show that the Bank has an explicit commitment to develop an organisation-wide focus on results, but some targets are unrealistic. For instance, the introduction of stretch targets for signature and first disbursement lead time has led to flagging implementation delays for more operations, which also become eligible for cancellation. Also, the weak links between the indicators collected by operations and the RMF make aggregation difficult. New operational directives on results planning and monitoring were adopted in 2021 to address this issue and strengthen the combination of a solid project baseline, a performing M&E system, and a realistic results framework that supports the project's Theory of Change to improve data flows from project to country to corporate. Other reporting processes (Annual Portfolio Performance Review, Dashboards) are also available. The RMF is currently being updated following IDEV's mid-term evaluation to increase its relevance and alignment with operations. Also, the quality of RMF data has improved since 2021 having adopted IDEV-validated data rather than self-evaluated PCR data to report on some key indicators such as achievement of project outcomes. However, since IDEV validates up to a maximum of 65 PCRs and 25 XSR per year, there is a possibility that in years with many more such documents, the representativity of the validated ratings will be lower and there will be less opportunities to report validated data in the RMF.

The logical framework is the centrepiece of a well-designed project. Its quality has varied and its use in engaging with counterparts and in measuring success has not been consistent. The main issue has been at the outcome level. PCR analysis shows that while the Bank was often successful in delivering outputs as planned – such as how many kilometres of roads have been built – it continued to face challenges in measuring and reporting on outcomes and the wider impact of its activities, including jobs created and economic growth. The system has been overhauled in 2021 in tandem with SAP upgrades, and causal links between output and outcomes should now become stronger, though there is a long-time lag before the improvements will be visible in PCRs. The quality of M&E systems is already improving according to PCR synthesis reports; however, they remain one of the weakest aspects of project implementation. M&E systems are not used enough as project management tools to correct project trajectories as necessary. The Bank has introduced new impact measurement tools such as the joint impact model and the enhanced use of satellite imagery to better assess the development impact of its operations. In addition, the Bank's statistics department has stepped up its support for effective M&E systems in the Bank and in RMCs to improve the quality of the data used to assess project outcomes and impact.

The recent approval of the Sovereign Operations Restructuring Policy on November 2022 provides an opportunity to create an incentive for a more pro-active approach to restructuring projects and CSPs/RISPs. There is a tendency to avoid addressing issues through formal restructuring at MTR or CSP updates because transaction costs are considered too high. This results in the retention of appraisal targets that are no longer in line with the project reality and may eventually be evaluated negatively. CPPRs generally focus on implementation issues and are only marginally relevant in rectifying the consequences of weak project design and in addressing constraints to achieving the project or portfolio development objectives. CPPRs could also play a stronger role in informing the design of CSPs since they are presented jointly. Incentives would need to change to avoid the perception that giving low scores to your own project may affect staff performance negatively.

For NSOs, important reforms have been introduced in the last couple of years to address the limitations pointed to by IDEV evaluations in identifying development indicators and measuring tools of progress towards development objectives during implementation, and improving data and compliance in PSR, ASR, and XSR reporting. Indeed, M&E arrangements and coverage of key issues during supervision were difficult to analyse for lack of information and limited availability of ASRs. The Quality of Supervision evaluation (IDEV 2018) indicated that it was problematic to provide evidence to support the project development rationale and causality between project interventions and impact. NSO clients are by nature more concerned about financial returns than development objectives and the stronger focus on project bankability may remove incentives from providing the right level of attention to project development impacts. The NSO consolidated portfolio management and monitoring report focuses mainly on financial risk assessment, value addition to the Bank's income, and return on investments, but in the 2019 APPR there is a section on impact and results as well. Also, the 2021 operational directives provide new guidance for addressing the discrepancies between ADOA and results indicators tracked during implementation. The integrated quality action plan for NSOs (2019), combined with a new PSD strategy (2022) has implemented a series of measures to address these issues. These include revising the XSR tool and rating methodology; elaborating new operational guidelines for results-based log frames with relevant outcome and output indicators; revamping the NSO results framework with harmonized development indicators as per the ADOA framework; revising the PCN and PAR templates for each of the main NSO instrument types. In addition, the recruitment of a dedicated officer in 2021 will support the tracking of NSO development results. As recommended by the IDEV-PSD strategy evaluation (2020), it will also help in the identification of evaluation tools and metrics for the assessment of development outcomes and additionality, including the role played by policy dialogue and technical assistance.

The operations delivery dashboard (covering the whole portfolio) is available as well as a specific NSO dashboard with the distribution of the active portfolio geographically, by financial instrument, by sector, and with KPIs such as NPLs, and the WARR. The dashboard assesses performance through the value addition to the Bank's income and return on investments, arrears, and non-performing assets, risk profile, and annual supervision status (based on PSRs undertaken during the year). The NSO project "watch list" is another tool for raising issues on the basis of portfolio status under recovery/loss, rehabilitation, and active monitoring based primarily on financial criteria but also on the overall country operating environment as determined by that country's SO status. To be noted that there is no structured corporate reporting system through the RMF on NSO performance (though this is now being worked on).

MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.50**
Element 1: Corporate commitment to a result culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	3
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	4
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and developing indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	4
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	3
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	3
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and method	4
MI 7.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The Bank is aware that it is the quality of operations that determines its capacity to achieve development results and that results should be the main yardstick to measure its performance. The RMF is the highest-level reporting tool. It helps the Bank track progress in achieving the results as they are described in its corporate strategies such as the TYS, the High 5s, and the DBDM. It tracks performance at four levels in the ADER, level 1: tracking Africa's development progress; level 2: measuring the impact of Bank-funded operations; levels 3 tracking the quality and effectiveness of the Bank's portfolio of operations; and level 4 tracking the Bank's organizational efficiency by monitoring decentralization, financial performance, resource mobilisation, and staff engagement. The RMF produces a comprehensive picture of the Bank's development effectiveness. A study by Management reveals that the RMF has a more comprehensive approach to a Theory of Change than other peer organisations. IDEV mid-term review (2021), found that the RMF contributes to some extent to decision-making, but the causal linkage is less in evidence in a way that follows a plan. It is observed that the RMF is helping to promote learning, but not to the extent that lessons are used in future operations. Numerous references in document and interviews refer to an "approval culture" and a "compliance focus" rooted in the completion of mandatory reports, indicating a focus on short-term approaches that limit the attention for learning. Nevertheless, other reporting processes (Annual Portfolio Performance Review, Dashboards) are aimed at the internal audience. **Element 2: Over the last couple of years, the Bank has been putting in place a considerable effort to shift from an incentive structure traditionally skewed towards new lending to one that makes implementation results more central to its development efforts.** One of the key findings of IDEV evaluation of self-evaluation systems (2019) is that requirements for the use of an RBM approach are in place and most of the tools and processes are consistent with, and as good as, those of comparator institutions. The main weaknesses identified at the time had to do with the application of the established procedures, standards and norms, rather than the requirements themselves. Among the main issues identified are: (i) the low compliance with established procedures and requirements; (ii) limited resources for M&E during supervision; iii) the quality of IPR and PCR data; and (iv) a positive bias in assessing performance. To address these issues, the Bank decided to overhaul the system and adopted and implemented a Quality Action Plan for both sovereign and non-sovereign operations setting the stage for institutionalizing "best practices". The Bank has also issued new operational instructions in 2021 which reforms the Bank's results planning and monitoring approach in SOs and NSOs. These reforms entail a set of new tools to be applied to all Bank operations at PCN, PAR and supervision. Improvements in this area are substantial and have started to show results (see KPI 9).	60, 79, 87, 101, 102,103, 104,107, 108, 109, 115, 124,125, 126

For SOs: the roll out of the RRS which allows teams to report on-line; the revision of the IPR and PCR templates together with a new ratings methodology; the finalization of 2019 KPIs and the cascading of top-level targets down to line managers and task managers; the resumption of the Annual Portfolio Performance Review; the revision of the results based logical frameworks and update of the information note; and the revamping of the quality assurance page of the Operations Delivery Dashboard. Still pending are the updating of the Operations Manual (2014) through a compendium of existing operational instructions, guidance etc., which is now ready and subject to the establishment of the Technical Investment Committees for quality enhancement; the revision of CPPR guidelines and the restructuring policy to facilitate restructuring rather than cancellations; the launch of a staff awards system to recognise staff for delivering /implementing/turning-around projects/portfoos for greater development results to be launched in 2023; the roll out of the Operations Academy. For NSOs: the revision of the XSR tool and rating methodology; the elaboration of new operational guidelines for RBLFs with relevant outcome and output indicators; the revamping of the NSO results framework with harmonised development indicators as per the ADOA framework; the revision of the PCN and PAR templates for each of the main NSO instrument types; the recruitment of a dedicated quality officer for the tracking of development results, and the identification of evaluation tools and metrics that can measure the impact of TA projects. Five Quality Results and Monitoring Officers (QRMO) have also been recruited for the RDBDUs to support quality at entry, implementation and exit for both sovereign and non-sovereign operations. The QRMOs provide advisory services, conduct RRs and build capacity through training, clinics, one-on-one support knowledge work, etc.	
Element 3: The guidance for the definition of indicators and targets is in place. The main guidance provided to staff goes back to the Operations Manual of 2014, which is about to be replaced by a revised version. Some indicators may be derived from sectoral strategies, some are specific to the project context, and others may have been cascaded down from the corporate level. A major step in improving the identification of indicators and their relevance was made by the Operational Directives on strengthening results planning and monitoring in 2021 which makes it mandatory for all projects (SOs and NSOs) to ensure a higher level of articulation between the analysis of the Theory of Change, the results frameworks, a monitoring plan, and risk analysis. This also encourages the use of RMF and ADOA indicators as standard. For NSOs, the ADOA framework provides a useful reference for the determination of ex-ante indicators and targets. However, in the past, these indicators were not used for monitoring purposes during implementation and exit or for setting results targets. This has now changed as part of the 2019 NSOs Quality Action Plan and the 2021 Operations Directive which require more continuity in the use of realistic indicators through the projects' results frameworks and monitoring plan, including ADOA indicators, as reflected in the NSO legal agreement.	60, 79, 87, 101, 102,103, 104,107, 108, 109, 115, 124,125, 126
Element 4: The tools and methods to measure results are available and give the Bank the ability to measure and manage its performance. At the RMF level, the number of KPIs has been observed by IDEV to be higher than comparator agencies and that it allows to measure the implementation of the Bank's corporate priorities effectively. However, some targets are set at aspirational levels, even more so in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and they may hinder a proper analysis of the organisation strengths and weaknesses. Weak links between the indicators collected by operations and RMF make aggregation difficult. Operational directives on results planning and monitoring of 2021 have addressed this issue as they pursue effective M&E systems and the use of RMF indicators in project results frameworks to improve data flows from project to country and from country to corporate. The RMF framework is currently being reviewed.	

<u>For SOs</u>: project results information is reported twice a year during supervision in implementation progress reports; at mid-term (MTRs) and at closing (PCR). Compliance with IPRs and MTRs can improve, as well as their capacity to raise issues in a timely fashion and take corrective actions or restructuring. Compliance with timely production of PCR has improved with 82% of PCR completed in time in 2021 (“timely” is meant to be within 6 months – it can be longer in comparator institutions). <u>For NSOs</u>: information is collected at supervision (PSRs), annually (ASRs), and at completion (XSR). Compliance can improve as well as the consistency in the use of evaluation criteria and rating systems from one tool to the other. This is now being improved and the NSOs supervision guidelines have been updated. <u>For CSPs and RISPs</u>, a completion report is presented to the board. The methodology and articulation between CSPs and CPPRs are being reviewed so that CPPR guidelines are more geared towards outcomes and can better contribute to the achievement of the CSP results process. The quality of CSPs/CPPRs is impacted by the quality of IPRs since ratings permeate from one tool to the other. A new methodology for CSP completion is also being developed. **Element 5: The historical bias towards lending targets rather than implementation results is still visible when assessing the balance between resources allocated for design versus supervision.** Several reports and interviews have pointed to insufficient resources as being one of the causes of the weaknesses of the Bank’s M&E system but also of the difficulty to staff the supervision teams with all the skills required. There has been an insufficient number of M&E specialists and results management staff in the Bank, especially in view of the recent reforms carried out and the need to raise the performance bar. This is being corrected through recent recruitment and field postings. Five officers have been recruited to focus on advisory, review and training on M&E. Staff capacity to address M&E systems and issues is also improving. While the issue of resources, to ensure that staff has the means to carry out its mandate in line with higher standards and commitments is important, equally critical is the adoption of incentives that reward pro-activity, corrective actions, and the search for results. **Element 6: As part of the Quality Action Plan, Management is implementing an Operations Academy to ensure that all operations staff have similarly strong foundations in Bank processing, rules, standards and tools.** A “Gateway” training is mandatory for all operations staff. This is complemented by a system of accreditation for specific groups of staff in key operational roles. The design of the Operations Academy is based on online learning and draws from the Bank’s own experiences in training as well as the successful experience of peer institutions. The new approach to operational training aims to achieve three mutually reinforcing objectives: i) enable a more structured and consistent approach to training for operations staff, equipping them with the knowledge they need to deliver consistent quality in accordance with Bank procedures and tools, ii) support the development of a culture of quality and results from the first months a staff member joins the institution, and iii) support clear career pathways, and thus promote staff motivation and engagement, through accreditation tailored to specific job categories, equally accessible no matter the staff’s geographic location. In addition to the Operations Academy, the Bank has delivered 43 instructor-led training cycles on M&E issues in 2022 (24 internal and 19 for RMCs). The Bank is also implementing institutional capacity and fiduciary clinics at the country level for RMC/PIU staff, including M&E (the latter has become standard since 2020). Finally, a new Sovereign Operations restructuring policy was approved by the Board in November 2022.	60, 79, 87, 101, 102,103, 104,107, 108, 109, 115, 124,125, 126
MI 7.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.40**
Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks	4
Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project to country and corporate level	3
Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies	3
Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly	4
Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and note areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results	3
MI 7.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Corporate strategies, including sectoral or thematic strategies, include results frameworks. Corporate results frameworks are also used to guide the discussion at the country level through CSPs/RISPs results frameworks as well as at project level. Eventually all results frameworks feed into the RMF which represents the ultimate reporting framework that draws together the complexity of development challenges and the multi-dimensional results of the Bank's programming. **Element 2: Linkages between the different layers of logical frameworks have been challenging but they have been strengthened by the adoption of specific guidance and mandatory measures in April 2021 for the more consistent use of corporate indicators at the project level.** This includes new templates for results frameworks which provide greater articulation between the Theory of Change, results frameworks, risk management and monitoring systems. This provides more consistency in the choice of indicators used at the different levels and facilitate aggregation for the RMF or for the country level through the CSP and CPPR tools. There is a great deal of interdependence of the results monitoring tools and results frameworks being used at different levels, starting from the IPRs ratings which permeate in the CPPRs/CSPs as well as in the PCRs, which then cascade all the way to the RMF. Also, the CPPRs aggregate findings and information from the IPRs, which had been found to need improvement. In line with IDEV recommendations, management is refocusing the CPPR on the analysis of portfolio problems and corporate level monitoring tools, with a view to problem-solving and promoting progress towards country's development results. **Element 3: The main performance reporting tool led to inform the board are the annual ADER report (see 7.1-E1) and the Annual Portfolio Performance Review (APPR) which was reintroduced in 2019.** There is a strong demand for accountability from the board. In the ADER, development outcomes are mostly tracked at level 2 indicators through the High 5s and cross-cutting themes, and operational effectiveness is mostly tracked at level 3 indicators and includes: i) percentage of operations that are completed satisfactorily, ii) quality and speed of implementations, iii) portfolio performance and iv) advisory services. Admittedly, many of the targets were set at unrealistic levels and while they are still used for benchmarking the results of the year under review, the 2025 targets are not shown any more since the ADER of 2020. The APPR produces valuable data on the status of the portfolio, but the last report was of 2019 which run counter the idea of having annual reports. The validated ratings of PCRs and XSRs are also shared with the board through synthesis reports on a bi-annual basis. Until 2019, PCR data was used to report on project effectiveness which suffer of a significant disconnect with IDEV data, but the ADER has corrected that since. Management also informs the board on a regular basis or through mid-term reviews on progress achieved for the CCI VII and the ADF 15 commitments. With respect to NSO performance (level 3), there are no specific KPIs being reported in the RMF/ADER, but the board receives the APPR, the XSRs Synthesis Report, the Credit Ratings Report and is appraised about the management of NPLs.	60, 79, 87, 101, 102,103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

Element 4: The TYS 2013-22 is up for renewal in 2023 and the scope of some of the High 5s (Quality of Life) is also being re-examined as part of the GCI-VII commitment to exert higher selectivity. Sectoral and other strategies are updated on a regular basis such as for gender, climate, water, fragility, and private sector, for which new strategies were produced during the last 3 years. Many of the strategic documents are informed by preliminary evaluations by IDEV. **Element 5: The ADER show progress over time as well as deviations between planned and actual results.** The Bank's performance on each KPI is discussed in the ADER and is summarised in a scorecard that uses three colours "traffic light" system to indicate whether the Bank did better or worse than the baseline or stayed in place. The scorecard shows results for all four levels of the RMF. The targets show a baseline for 2015 and a current target for the year under review. IDEV mid-term review of the RMF noted, however, that there is scant evidence that lessons are extracted and learnt to improve performance in the future and that there is a feedback loop from the RMF/ADER back to operations that would signal areas of particular concern at the aggregate level that need addressing at the project/country level. Beyond the annual reports, the performance and the quality of the active portfolio is continuously assessed in the Portfolio Flashlight, introduced in 2015 as a fully-automated performance tracking system in real-time, covering the full spectrum of the project life cycle. It incorporates both objective measures of performance as well as performance ratings issued by task managers during supervision, using two main parameters: Implementation Progress (IP) and Progress towards Development Objectives (DO). These indicators include measures of quality at entry, efficiency and speed of delivery, implementation progress, the likelihood of achieving development objectives, and performance at project closure. Performance against these criteria is using a composite indicator to flag operations facing startup bottlenecks, implementation challenges or closing delays. The portfolio flashlight is a management tool and is not public.	60, 79, 87, 101, 102,103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126
MI 7.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.3: Results targets set on a foundation of sound evidence and logic	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	2
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to expected results to enable the measurement of the degree of goal achievement	3
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new Interventions	4
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	3
Element 5: Results targets are set through a process that includes consultation with beneficiaries	3
MI 7.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: At the corporate level, by setting time-bound and quantified targets for all the indicators that the Bank tracks, the desired level of impact and service delivery has been established, however, targets have often been set at unrealistic levels. IDEV mid-term evaluation of the RMF (2021) found that the process of selecting indicators and targets did not sufficiently consider the need to match aspirations with the available resources. This is inherent in the limitations associated with the approved sector strategies, as the RMF took some targets from country and sector strategies that were aspirational rather than achievable. The mid-term review of the RMF notes that there is room for improvement in the alignment between the corporate results framework and the Bank's country,	40, 54, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

sector, and project-level results frameworks. Also, the introduction of stretch targets in the presidential directive of 02/2015 for signature and 1st disbursement lead time proved too ambitious and has led to the escalation of operations flagged for performance delays and those eligible for cancellation. The COVID-19 crisis made the situation even more challenging at least for 2020 and 2021. While alignment of the corporate results framework and the Bank's country, sector, and project-level results frameworks has been challenging, more recent initiatives demonstrate improvement in this area. Notably, there is new guidance in place on the identification of SMART indicators (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) and their consistent use through appraisal, legal documents and monitoring plans. This can help strengthen the causal links between output and outcomes. While output measurement tends to be quantitative and relatively objective to measure, outcomes can be more qualitative and therefore more subjective. Also, sometimes the outcome indicators contain elements of complexity which are not supported by the M&E systems. In the case of NSOs, important reforms have been introduced in the last couple of years to address the limitations raised by IDEV evaluations in terms of providing more clarity in identifying development indicators and measuring tools of the progress towards DOs during implementation and improving data and compliance in reporting in PSR, ASR and XSR. Also, discrepancies between development results' indicators assessed at origination and those tracked during implementation, have been addressed. **Element 2: the RMF mid-term evaluation by IDEV noted that the RMF largely satisfies the characteristics of a good corporate results framework, as it encompasses an implicit logic model and results matrix with baseline, targets, assumptions/risks, and results tracking and reporting, as well as the inclusion of cross-cutting issues.** By and large IDEV's mid-term review notes that the indicators chosen at the corporate level are relevant. The main challenge is their measurability especially for indicators at project level which are not always consistent with the corporate ones, and which makes aggregation challenging. As part of the revision of the Results Based Logical Framework (RBLF), Management is strengthening guidance on the importance of using core corporate indicators where possible and enhance the quality at entry review for RBLFs, including making sure that the right indicators are in place to track progress and assess impact. However, if the target is not set at a realistic level, it may feed the perception of lower performance. Improvements were introduced to raise the quality of logical frameworks so that they can be used more consistently to engage with counterparts and to measure success, especially at outcome level. One of the objectives of the revamped RR, in place for the last year, is to support operational teams in improving the design of operations and enhancing how their logic is captured in the project log-frames, so that they can better define and differentiate between output and outcome indicators. The NSO consolidated portfolio management and monitoring report is mainly focused on financial risk assessment, value addition to the Bank's income, and return on investments, but in the 2019 APPR there is a section on impact and results as well. **Element 3: Compliance with baseline requirements has been met at almost 100% these last couple of years.** The Quality Retrospective Report of 2018 was reporting that 30% of the projects had missing baselines. Under revamped quality at entry procedures, new interventions ought to develop a baseline which is now enforced as part of due diligence. Of the sample of 12 PAR examined, all the projects included a results framework incorporating a baseline. **Element 4: To ensure that the RMF remains relevant to the Bank's top priorities, the Bank has committed to review the RMF every three years.** This is on-going and should allow the Bank to take recent commitments and priorities into account, along three principles: aligning indicators and definitions with other Bank reporting processes, set by various Complexes; keeping the RMF relevant;	40, 54, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

and ensuring that the targets are still ambitious and realistic. The revised RMF should also take into consideration lessons and recommendations from the IDEV's RMF mid-term review in 2021. The tools available for project supervision in principle allow for review and adjustment of results targets on a regular basis depending on project performance, country evolving circumstances, and proactiveness to follow up on identified issues. Adjustments to results targets are less frequent if they are associated with project restructuring. Maintaining outdated targets has the consequence that future evaluations by IDEV should continue to look at appraisal target as the objective and therefore carry the risk that the project is considered under-performing. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the targets and results frameworks of on-going projects and CSPs have been impacted considering lockdowns and difficult implementation at the country level. There has not been a systematic attempt to correct the targets and expected results accordingly, also because the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on individual projects and country strategies has not been assessed. This may create, however, methodological issues when the performance of these interventions is evaluated at PCR time, if the COVID-19 effects are not factored in. **Element 5: Results targets are set in consultation with country partners.** The new guidance provided in the 2021 operational directives recommends consultations with stakeholders as an important avenue for reaching consensus and ownership. The objective is to set in place an indicator and target system which builds on a sound country and project logic with objectives and indicators aligned with national priorities and which have been defined through consultation processes in the country. The extent of participation and representation in these consultation processes varies, but the alignment matrix in a CSP typically draws from indicators and targets of the countries NDPs. Consultation processes on sector strategies are less systematic as they normally cover the whole continent. While the participation tries to be inclusive of the main stakeholders (government, peer organisations, private sector, civil society), the presence of end-beneficiaries in the definition of targets could not be evidenced. Interviews noted that the participation of end-beneficiary in the definition of results target could present important technical and logistical challenges for the consultation to be representative. This aspect is common among IFIs.	40, 54, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126
MI 7.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high-quality, useful performance data in response to strategic priorities	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.75**
Element 1: The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced	3
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome levels of the results chain	2
Element 3: Reporting processes ensure data is available for key corporate reporting and planning, including for internal change processes	3
Element 4: A system for ensuring data quality exists	3
MI 7.4. Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Overall the corporate M&E system has been adequately resourced but less so at the project implementation level and is now catching up. The RMF identified in its design the need to be supported by departmental incentives that are aligned with the Bank's corporate priorities. Therefore, the corporate level M&E depends to a large extent on the incentives for Bank staff to support a more comprehensive understanding and use of the RMF. There is evidence showing that M&E systems are covered by the RR at design stage including the contribution of sector specialists. There is less evidence	40, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

on the functionality of the monitoring systems during implementation. At the project level IDEV SESP evaluation (2020) points to several weaknesses of the M&E systems including under-resourcing. The IDEV recommendation to review staffing levels for M&E and quality assurance activities was followed by the hiring in 2020 of 5 results and monitoring officer positions to support strengthen monitoring and evaluation practices, including providing expert advice to task teams, support compliance with standards and effective implementation of revised tools. These positions were established in the regional offices. Also, an Implementation manager position was established in each region in 2019 to support portfolio level monitoring and support. They work in close coordination with the CPOs. Also new Operational Directives were put in place in 2021 to upgrade monitoring systems and their articulation with results frameworks and how they can better feed into the RMF. Results have started to materialize. **This aspect of the business process, however, is not entirely under the Bank's control and while task managers are committed to improve the M&E systems of their projects, more measures are often required to encourage adequate use by borrowers.** The limited capacity of borrowers to make adequate use of M&E systems constrains the use of the full information by the TMs when preparing IPRs. Resources could therefore be allocated for technical assistance to PIUs in an effort to support their contribution to effective M&E systems. In this regard, the Bank's statistics department works to support effective M&E systems in the Bank and in RMCs to improve data quality that is used in assessment of outcomes and impact of Bank projects. Regarding dissemination, ECST facilitates access to statistical data through the African Information Highway that contains socio-economic data for RMCs. An example is the Somalia CSP which includes focus on supporting the government with M&E and the Bank statistical department offering capacity building to national statistics offices.	
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome levels of the results chain, however reporting on outcomes remains challenging. Most of the proactive measures that can be taken to improve the likelihood of the project achieving the expected results should be derived from observations coming from the results frameworks and the monitoring arrangements. IPRs contain a section on progress towards achieving output and outcome targets as well as a section providing the justification for the DO ratings. The IPRs also report on risks to development outcomes. The Operation Directives on Results Planning and Monitoring (2021) brings clarity to the issue of better articulating results frameworks with the underlying assumptions (Theory of Change) and the monitoring plans (now mandatory). It also recommends that staff should use RMF indicators whenever appropriate to ensure proper progress monitoring, consolidating and reporting. It is expected that all output and outcome indicators require a baseline, a target and a timeline. It also recommends that outcomes, outputs and associated indicators should be realistic and based on solid analysis along the principle of SMART criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). In the case of NSOs, the Directives also address the issue of integrating ADOA indicators in the monitoring system. **In addition, since not all outcomes information can be generated through the aggregation of portfolio data, impact data is also generated directly by IDEV independent evaluations of projects, CSPs/RISPs, of by specific studies carried out by Management (deep dives).** Also, new impact assessment methods are promoted such as the Joint Impact Model that uses social accounting matrices and input-output models for a fuller analysis of the indirect, induced and enabling effects of employment. The Bank is also promoting enhanced use of satellite imagery to better assess the development impact of its operations. Despite recent progress, the causal link between inputs, outputs and outcomes in the logical frameworks is of variable quality especially when it comes to an effective measurement metric for outcomes. PCR reviews (2018 and 2019 Synthesis reports) note that progress reporting of outputs was generally fair, ,	40, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

however the M&E of outcomes was weaker. Ninety-two percent of projects achieved a satisfactory or better output performance, but the percentage was lower for outcome performance at 72%, which lowered overall development effectiveness. Output performance (rated 2.8) scored better than outcome performance (at 2.5). Some outcomes were too broad and not specifically linked to the project. When outcomes are defined too broadly, it is highly challenging to identify meaningful and measurable indicators and credibly conclude whether the project achieved its stated goals. In the TSF evaluation (2022), IDEV found that two-thirds of the Pillar III projects assessed had satisfactory ratings for effectiveness, but this was mainly the result of achieving planned output targets, with limited evidence of progress against outcomes and impacts. The evaluation concludes that there is limited evidence clearly demonstrating the achievement of outcomes and impacts. Monitoring systems remain among the lowest-ranked indicators in the PCRENs, for reasons of delay in reporting and lack of information on whether outcomes have been achieved or not. The system has been overhauled in 2021 in tandem with SAP upgrades, and causal links between output and outcomes should now become stronger, though there is a long-time lag before the improvements will be visible in PCRs. **Element 3: Over the past few years, the Bank has made marked progress in results measurement and reporting and ensured that data is available for key corporate reporting and planning.** The structure of the RMF provides for a congruent and solid monitoring and reporting system at the corporate level. Its alignment with the High 5s facilitates planning and change processes while striving for consistency with the CSPs/RISPs and sectoral strategies with respect to the indicators. As mentioned above, the system is increasingly aligning corporate with project and country indicators and improving the monitoring and reporting systems. At managerial level the Executive Dashboard (and quarterly portfolio flash reports) is a powerful reporting and accountability mechanism to ensure compliance, early warning, anticipates slippages, and promotes proactivity on corrective action and internal change process. A weakness of the RMF reporting system is that the portfolio ratings do not reflect the performance of the non-sovereign operations, since they are not included. There is no structured and specific corporate reporting system through the RMF on NSOs performance. **Element 4: A system for ensuring data quality exists but the underlying monitoring systems can improve. Overall IPR quality was at 69% in 2021.** The RRS was made fully mandatory in 2021 which should help aggregation and analysis and address the main shortcomings of the previous system in terms of completeness and calculation of ratings which is now done automatically for some criteria, hence avoiding human error. The IDEV RMF evaluation finds that the Bank identified the RRS as a potentially effective reporting tool, linked with quality results data, although its implementation was delayed. The improvement of the AfDB's information system is expected to enhance RMF effectiveness and efficiency. Supervision missions play an important role in the data verification process as task Teams receive reports from implementing agencies which need to be reviewed and processed to feed into the supervision tools (IPRs, Aide Memoires, BTOs). IDEV validation is also about data quality (rating credibility), so the fact that validated data is used to feed into the ADER is important, especially given the existing disconnect with PCR data. While the structure of the reporting system and data quality verification is sound, Monitoring systems at the project level are often still viewed as externally imposed and meant for reporting to outside parties rather than being a central element within the project performance monitoring systems. M&E systems are not used enough as a project management tool to correct project trajectories as necessary. Staff see IPR/ASR and PCR/XSR instruments often as administrative requirements rather than as decision-making or learning tools.	40, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126
MI 7.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making	Score
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.25**
Element 1: Planning documents are clearly based on performance data	3
Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data	3
Element 3: At corporate level, Management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate	4
Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country levels	3
MI 7.5: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Planning documents such as CSPs/RISPs, sector strategies and appraisal reports are informed by performance data. Every PAR and CSP has to explain how lessons from the past have been considered in the design of new operations. Performance data from completed and ongoing Bank operations in the relevant sector(s) should be presented with a clear demonstration of how these lessons informed the design. Performance data can be identified in country portfolio reviews, evaluations, project completion reports and knowledge products or drawn from other development partners in the country or in the relevant sectors. In the new PAR format, a section on "Experience and Lessons Reflected in Project Design" should explain how the project design has incorporated the lessons from analytical work/studies, ongoing and completed operations, and international best practices; and in particular, how the past performance, results and outcomes of projects in the country (as reflected by the PCRs, independent evaluation reports, country portfolio reviews or other sources) has addressed past deficiencies in the proposed project. **However, there is room to enhance the use of performance data for planning documents such as the CSPs.** For instance, the link between portfolio performance review (CPPRs), the Country Performance Improvement Plan (CPIP), and the CSPs/RISPs could be strengthened as noted by IDEV in the review of the implementation of CPPRs. The CPPR objectives aimed at ensuring achievement of CSPs and providing inputs for future CSPs were not addressed in more than 75% of the CPPRs reviewed. In addition, the CPPRs/CPIPs were not able to adapt the portfolio to changing economic circumstances. The intended contribution of the CPPRs/CPIPs was mostly to address project implementation issues. The Bank's Board has approved in November 2022 a new Sovereign Operations restructuring policy which should help strengthen the portfolio review process and make it more instrumental for solving problems and taking corrective action. **Element 2: An effective system for assessing and reporting on performance is in place with a number of tools meant to serve the purpose of performance management, accountability, and learning; but their usage for the purpose of facilitating adjustments can improve.** IPRs, MTRs and PCRs (and their equivalent for the private sector) collect performance data so that it can be used for corrections and continuous advancement. As identified by several IDEV reports, a couple of issues stand in the way: i) for instance, of the 52 projects in the quality of supervision evaluation sample that were required to carry out an MTR, only 19 (37%) were available; ii) there is a tendency to avoid addressing issues through formal project restructuring because the transaction costs are considered to be too high. Not introducing corrective measures leads to the retention of appraisal targets that are no longer in line with the project reality; iii) there is a tendency is to avoid being critical of your own project since there is a perception that poor project performance will reflect on the staff performance. This is also reflected by relatively high disconnects between self-evaluation and validated data until recently; and iv) under-reporting issues can also impinge on IPRs quality and their capacity to inform and initiate	40, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126

corrective action, which in turn impacts the quality of PCRs, CPPRs and the learning process. Similarly, the CPPRs/CPIPs succeeded in aggregating findings and information from the IPRs but have not been systematically used as an effective tool to influence adjustments to the CSPs that they are presented with. Management took action to address the reported issues notably through the implementation of the quality assurance plan in 2019. Deficiencies in project supervision such as inadequate frequency, team composition and follow up on issues, have been addressed through enhanced use of dashboard tools, introduction of the RRS in 2021, and the revision of the IPR and PCR templates. Overall, measures taken (including the recent approval of the SOs Restructuring Policy) are strengthening accountability mechanisms and the incentive structure in place for the effective use of performance data. **Element 3: Reporting tools such as dashboards, the RMF and the APPRs, have proven to be powerful accountability mechanisms that improve the reliability of information, and the efficiency of reporting at the corporate level.** Providing real-time information through online platforms and compliance data to line managers is enhancing accountability and transparency, and facilitate automatizing the reporting of results, the timely escalation of issues to Senior Management and allows for adjustments and resolution of issues as appropriate. SESP tools are relatively interconnected and the whole chain is as strong as the weakest link, starting with M&E systems and followed by the IPRs, which feed directly into other products such as the PCRs, the CPPRs, the CSPs and RISPS, and all the way to the RMF. A new system for IPR monitoring through the RRS should be introduced in 2023 with the aim to further strengthen corporate review of performance data and facilitate adjustments as needed. **The operations delivery dashboard (covering the whole portfolio) is available as well as a specific NSO dashboard with the distribution of the active portfolio geographically, by financial instrument, by sector, and with KPIs such as the non-performing loans (NPL), and the weighted average risk ratings (WARR).** The dashboard assesses performance through the value addition to the Bank's income and return on investments, arrears and non-performing assets, the risk profile, and annual supervision status (based on PSRs undertaken during the year). The NSO project "watch list" is an additional tool to raise issues according to the status of the portfolio under recovery/loss; rehabilitation; and active monitoring. The watch list is mostly based on financial criteria but also on the overall country operating environment as determined by the status of sovereign operations in that country. **Element 4: By and large the system in place permits performance data to inform the policy dialogue at the global, regional, and country levels. The RMF/ADER as well as the consultation processes of the CGI VII and the ADF15 replenishment include a number of objectives and commitments that are being monitored largely through performance data and permit dialogue with partners.** Also, the APPR is a powerful tool to inform the dialogue on portfolio performance, but no new APPRs were produced since 2019 when it was re-introduced. At the regional and country level, CSPs/CPPRs and RISPs are the main vehicles to translate performance data into actual planning and programming and to inform partnerships at various levels. As the incentive structure is moving away from the traditional emphasis on lending towards implementation support and results, the effort should shift towards generating performance data at supervision and not just design which is then reported in ADERs and APPRs. The main strength of the CPPR is to provide a framework for dialogue on implementation issues with the government and project management units. The understanding remains that IPRs and PCRs will continue to be the main tools for the identification of issues and their quality will influence the strength of the whole system. Finally, performance data is used for IDEV evaluation work, which is critical for accountability and learning purposes. Overall, this element is rated 3 because while the system is in place to support dialogue with development partners, improving the underlying data quality issue raised before should permit to fully take advantage of it.	40, 60, 79, 87, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 124, 125, 126
MI 7.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	**3.58**

The AfDB includes an independent evaluation function, through IDEV, whose mandate is defined by the evaluation policy. The last version was approved by the board of directors in 2016 and amended in 2019. Independence is first among its guiding principles and includes four dimensions:

1. Organizational independence: IDEV reports to the board of directors and is outside the functions that it evaluates
2. Behavioural independence: the evaluator general designing IDEV's work program and budget proposals is appointed and removed by the board
3. Freedom from outside influence and pressure
4. Avoidance of conflicts of interest

IDEV's work programmes and budget proposals are designed independently by the evaluator general and approved by the board. Management provides suggestions for IDEV's work programmes. While the 2019 *Independent Peer Review* found that IDEV performed well in terms of independence, there are potential risks – having management allocate budgets, having the president and HR make final decisions on staffing, including dismissing the previous evaluator general.

The independent evaluation policy provides clear definitions of evaluation, its roles, the responsibilities of IDEV, of management and of the board. Policy implementation is detailed in IDEV's three-year work programme. It distinguishes between independent evaluation functions and self-assessments, which IDEV's work can help improve. IDEV has produced an evaluation manual to detail good practices and help ensure high quality across evaluations. IDEV is also part of the evaluation cooperation group and refers to its standards and practice notes, which are benchmarks for evaluation best practices.

The committee of operations and development effectiveness monitors the implementation of management's recommendations, on behalf of the board. IDEV's evaluations include a detailed management response with points of agreement and disagreement, and an action plan offering detailed actions that management commits to implement with a timetable. A management record action system (MARS) was implemented in 2015; it displays the rate of implemented recommendations in a timely manner or with delays. A report based on the implementation metrics tracked by MARS was published yearly in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In the 2021 report, there was a 95% alignment between implemented actions plans and recommendations. However, the cumulative percentage of "highly and substantially implemented" action plans was much lower (due to delays in implementation) though it improved from 26% in 2019 to 41% in 2020 and 43.5% in 2021.

IDEV produces a wide range of evaluations that cover the Bank's interventions including policies, strategies, frameworks, processes, and operations, as well as PCR/XSR validations. They are submitted directly to the board. IDEV follows the Bank Group's disclosure and access to information policy, which means that most reports are publicly available on its web site. However, some intermediary documents have only restricted access.

At the Bank-wide level, these include corporate, thematic and sector evaluations. At the regional and country level, these include strategy evaluations and strategy paper completion report validation; at the project level, they include project performance evaluation reports, some project impact evaluations and cluster project evaluations, as well as a biennial synthesis report on the validation of PCRs and XSRs. IDEV's publicly available three-year work programme sets out its work on evaluations and the associated budget. Since 2017, IDEV has produced: i) 10 project cluster evaluations, ii) 3 country-level impact evaluations, iii) 16 country/regional strategy evaluations, iv) 13 sector/thematic evaluations, v) 14 corporate evaluations, vi) 3 evaluation synthesis reports, and vii) 14 others, including an annual MARS report. In November 2022, a corporate evaluation was delivered in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Under its agreed work programme, IDEV has moved away from full stand-alone PCR validation towards validating a maximum number of PCRs (65) and XSRs (25) in a given year. There is a possibility that in years with many more such documents the representativity of the validated ratings will be lower and there will be less opportunity to report quality data in the RMF, since the disconnect with self-reported ratings remains high. The synthesis reports now cover a two-year cycle. Field validation has remained relatively limited at around 20%-25% mostly for budgetary reasons.

IDEV improved the quality of its evaluations under the 2013-17 strategy. It has established quality assurance instruments: internal peer review and external peer review. The evaluation reference group (ERG) which comprise selected Bank staff from the relevant complexes/Departments, reviews and comments on the evaluation process and outputs (inception report; evaluation reports), and provides a sounding platform for rapid feedback to ensure relevance and buy-in. IDEV evaluation reports follow best practices and international standards with respect to methodological approaches and rigor of analysis. Evaluations use a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, to collect secondary data (literature and systematic reviews for portfolios) and primary data (surveys and qualitative methods), as well as case studies, benchmarking, and mapping. The QuODA report on aid quality ranks the Bank second overall but nineteenth on evaluation.

The new project readiness criteria at design stage integrate formal requirements to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions are taken into consideration. However, the Institutional capacity to learn from evaluations and self-evaluations and actually apply lessons for better results still needs improvement. IDEV notes in its Synthesis report how some key issues tend to be recurrent project after project despite a comprehensive analysis and description of the lessons learned. The learning dimension of self-evaluations is limited, according to IDEV's evaluation of the self-evaluation system. The learning dimension of PCRs is weak as the focus on ratings and accountability requirements may overshadow learning considerations. Typically, staff usually give PCRs lower priority and there are not enough learning events where people are willing to learn from success and failure. Similarly, for NSOs, learning capacity is limited by several factors: the low level of compliance and hence of reporting; the required level of confidentiality and hence lower disclosure, and the lesser emphasis on achieving development results compared to financial performance.

Addressing implementation issues in a timely fashion is one of the main contributions to portfolio performance and the achievement of results expected from the self-evaluation system, but it struggles to meet expectations. The IDEV SESP evaluation noted the limited use of IPRs and their ratings to address issues and take corrective action. The 2019 integrated quality action plan is now being implemented with several far-reaching measures (KPI 7). The recently introduced results reporting system helps put int place a repository of knowledge that staff regular mine and share. Other sources of knowledge – impact evaluations, thematic reviews and sharing events. – complement this. IPR delivery compliance is monitored online using the RRS and the delivery dashboard, which aim to increase transparency and accountability, and help prioritise action when the data shows that the country or sector has late IPRs.

MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists	Score
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.60**
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions (operational and financial independence)	3
Element 2: The head of evaluation reports directly to the governing body of the organisation (structural independence)	3
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	4
Element 4: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making for the subject of evaluation	4
Element 5: Evaluators are able to conduct their work during the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated (behavioural independence)	4
MI 8.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: Independence is one of the guiding principles of IDEV, which represents the independent evaluation function of the AfDB. It includes four dimensions, as stated in the Independent Evaluation Policy: • Organizational independence, as IDEV reports to the board and is located outside the functions that it has to evaluate (analysed in this Element).	129

- Behavioural independence, as the Evaluator General, who designs the work programme and budget proposals for IDEV is appointed and removed by the board only (analysed in Element 2)
- Freedom from outside influence and pressure
- Avoidance of conflicts of interest.

As emphasized by IDEV's Independent Evaluation Policy, this does not mean that IDEV is autonomous as it is subjected to the same rules, regulations and standards as the rest of the Bank, in terms of human resources, financial management, travel and ethical standards. IDEV's work programmes and budget proposals are designed independently by the Evaluator General and approved by the board, and Management only provides suggestions for IDEV's work programs. While the 2019 Independent Peer Review concluded that IDEV performed well in terms of independence, it found several potential risks regarding operational and financial independence including the budget process, which can provide Management with an opportunity to adjust allocations to IDEV; the staffing for which the president and HR department make final decisions; and the absence of systems to track conflicts of interest.

Two of these three risks have been or are being addressed:

- Regarding budget allocation, the Independent Evaluation Policy provides that the Committee of Operations and Development Effectiveness (CODE) endorses and recommends to the board of directors for approval, IDEV's work programme and the associated budget, and that the IDEV budget is ring-fenced. A proposal for the Budget process for units reporting to the board, which proposes a methodology based on this provision to ensure that these units maintain their independence during the budget allocation process, has been presented to the board.
- Regarding the absence of systems to track conflict of interest, this has since been addressed: a conflict-of-interest form for all evaluation staff and consultants has been developed and rolled out 129
(see Annex 4, IDEV 2019 Annual Report).

Element 2: IDEV is structurally independent. The evaluator general reports directly to the board. This is in in line with ECG guidelines for best practices which recommends that the EG is located organizationally outside the line and staff management function, and is independent of the IFI's operational, policy, and strategy departments and related decision making. Management is involved in reviewing IDEV's work as a way to increase relevance and buy-in, through the ERG for consultations on evaluation findings and recommendations, special initiatives for the harmonization of reporting norms, and learning events, but there is no clearance required before IDEV delivers its reports to the board. There are, however, potential limits to the independence of the Evaluator General.

- The HR department and the president have decision authority over staffing, which can impact staffing decisions.
- The dismissal of the Evaluator General by the president in 2020, on the grounds of general staff regulations has highlighted differences in interpretation between the board and Management regarding the structural independence of IDEV. According to the Bank's Independent evaluation policy, the Evaluator General is "protected from Management pressure and influence because the board of directors leads his/her selection, appointment, and removal". The case, brought by the former Evaluator General, has been reviewed by the administrative tribunal. The judgment rendered by the tribunal on 08/07/2022 concluded that the applicant's employment was not terminated because of gross misconduct or insubordination, but abandonment of post, for which the board of directors' decision is not a requirement.

Element 3: IDEV's work programme, which covers a three-year period, is independently designed by the Evaluator General and approved by the board. The process is mainly demand-driven and

includes a broad consultation, with internal meetings and surveys to external stakeholders, as a way to increase the alignment of IDEV's work programme on topics of interest for the Bank. IDEV's work programme also includes topics which IDEV has identified as important, although they may not have been raised during the consultation process. **Element 4: Evaluation reports are submitted directly to the board.** The Disclosure and Access to Information Policy may imply restricted access for some evaluation products. Final approach papers, evaluation reports and other final documents are disclosed to the public. Before sending evaluations to the board, IDEV engages with the ERG to gather views and sensitize Management on upcoming findings and recommendations. The final report is sent to Management to allow for its response, and the implementation of the recommendations by Management is monitored through the CODE, on behalf of the board. **Element 5: Evaluators are able to conduct their work during the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated.** Behavioural independence is one of the dimensions of independence guaranteed by the independent evaluation policy. Interviews have confirmed this point.	129
MI 8.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**4.00**
Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure the coverage, quality, and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations	4
Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralised evaluations	4
Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organization's planning and budgeting cycle is available	4
Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the MO's interventions, reflecting key priorities	4
Element 5: Evidence demonstrates that the evaluation policy is being implemented at country-level	4
MI 8.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: The independent evaluation policy provides clear definitions of evaluation, its roles, the responsibilities of IDEV, of Management and of the board. It distinguishes between independent evaluation functions, self-assessments and validation. The 2019 Evaluation Handbook provides guidelines to ensure the quality and rigor of evaluations. The implementation of the policy is detailed in IDEV's three-year work programme. By and large the principle follows best practices as recommended by the ECG. **Element 2: The 2019 evaluation manual provides detailed and tailored guidelines to support the implementation of each type of evaluations conducted by IDEV:** PCR validations, XSR validations, project performance evaluation, cluster evaluations, impact evaluations, country/regional integration strategies and programme evaluations, sector and thematic evaluations, corporate evaluations, evaluations of NSOs, and evaluation synthesis. Apart from this manual, IDEV is also part of the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) and refers to their standards and practice notes, which represent benchmarks for evaluation best practices.	127, 129 – 142

Element 3: IDEV's publicly available three-year work programme sets out its programme for evaluations and the associated budget. The Bank's budget document (2021-23) features the budget allocated to the board and units reporting to them, including IDEV and it reflects the approved work programme.

Element 4: IDEV balances key priorities with its diversified operations coverage. Over the last 5 years, since 2017, IDEV has produced: i) 10 Project Cluster Evaluations, ii) 3 country-level impact evaluations, iii) 16 country/regional strategy evaluations, iv) 13 sector/thematic evaluations, v) 14 corporate evaluations, vi) 3 evaluation synthesis reports, and vii) 14 others, including an annual MARS report. It also produces annual synthesis reports on the validation of PCRs, and periodic synthesis reports on XSRs. A specific evaluation on COVID-19 has been delivered in November 2022, and this aspect is included in ongoing evaluations. (Figure 28)

FIGURE 28. **EVALUATIONS PRODUCED BY IDEV (2017-22)**

Source: IDEV, *Management Action Record System Status of Adoption of Independent Development Evaluation's Recommendations, 2021*

IDEV's three objectives are learning, accountability, and promoting an evaluation culture. In the AfDB Independent Evaluation Strategy, IDEV shows to what extent each evaluation type covers each of these objectives. The mix planned for 2019-2021 is detailed in IDEV's work programme. The work programme for 2022-2024 was approved by the board in December 2021.

An evaluation of the Bank's crisis response support to RMCs in the face of COVID-19 was completed at the end of 2012. Several lesson notes were produced to guide the Bank's work around COVID-19: "Lessons from the Bank's Response to the 2014–2016 Ebola Crisis", "Findings and Lessons from AfDB Crisis Response Budget Support Operations", and "Evaluation Matters: Evaluation in the Time of Corona".

Element 5: Evidence supports the assessment that evaluation policy is being implemented at the country level. IDEV produces country strategy evaluations, mid-term CSP evaluations, country strategy paper completion reports, validations of PCRs and XSR, project impact valuations. Since 2017, it has produced 16 evaluations regarding country and regional strategies and 3 country-level impact evaluations. These efforts follow the same standards and norms as defined in its evaluation policy.

127, 129 – 142

MI 8.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.3: Systems applied to ensure the quality of evaluations	Score
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**4.00**
Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented	4
Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data collection, analysis, and interpretation	4
Element 3: Evaluation reports present the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations in a complete and balanced way	4
Element 4: The methodology presented incudes the methodological limitations and concerns	4
Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including self-assessments (PCR and XSRs)	4
MI 8.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: IDEV has increased the quality of its evaluations under the 2013-17 Strategy and since, through the establishment of quality assurance instruments: internal peer review, external peer review, reference groups, as well as an Evaluation Manual, which provides guidelines on all the evaluation types conducted by IDEV. Consultations with Management and staff are conducted to ensure relevance and buy-in. According to the peer review, IDEV has increased consultations with Management for its work programme and for sharing views on a number of evaluations, as an input into further strengthening the quality of evaluations, while maintaining its independence. **Element 2: Evaluations use a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, to collect secondary data (literature and systematic reviews for portfolios) and primary data (surveys and qualitative methods), as well as case studies, benchmarking, and mapping.** The Evaluation manual enhances the transparency and consistency of the methods used. **Element 3: IDEV evaluation reports follow best practices and international standards with respect to methodological approaches and rigor of analysis.** IDEV follows OECD DAC evaluation criteria and is a member of the Evaluation Coordination Group which gathers peer international organisations and meets on a regular basis to define standards and norms for independent evaluations in the development arena. IDEV reports are evidence-based and present findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The evaluation reference group (ERG) which comprise selected Bank staff from the relevant complexes/ Departments/Units, reviews and comments on the evaluation process and outputs (inception report; evaluation reports) and provides a platform for rapid feedback especially on the evaluation plan (including design and methods) and emerging evaluation findings. In focusing on the Bank's priority areas, IDEV's evaluations have proven timely and influential, by identifying what works well and areas for improvement, and providing clear guidance for new policies and strategies. The influence of IDEV evaluations went well beyond the Bank to reach national stakeholders in RMCs. **Element 4: Evaluations systematically present the methodology used and the main limitations and concerns.** This often covers the quality of data, representativeness of samples, availability of evidence, statistical issues. Mitigation measures that have been taken are also included when relevant. **Element 5: The quality of evaluations is ensured by clear processes.** The processes used to ensure quality for independent evaluations are internal peer review, external peer review, and reference groups, which can include country teams or sector experts as required. The evaluation manual complements these quality assurance processes by describing good practices and providing standards for the different types of evaluations carried out by IDEV. A clear process exists to ensure the quality of	124, 127, 129

PCRs and XSRs through a process of validation of the ratings that are self-attributed by staff. These reports are presented to the board through so called synthesis reports on a biannual basis. The quality of PCRs is also rated during the validation process. Additionally, processes to ensure the quality of RMF indicators have improved. Until 2020, some of the key performance indicators in the RMF such as: "operations that achieved planned development outcomes and completed operations delivering sustainable outcomes" were fed by PCR ratings many of which experienced a substantial disconnect with validated PCREN ratings. This is because the validation exercise has traditionally suffered of backlogs and could not be prepared in time to feed into the ADER, as best practices would recommend. This has been corrected in 2021, but IDEV now validates a maximum number of 65 PCRs and 25 XSRs in a given year, which may impact the level of confidence in years where the number of submitted PCRs/XSRs is much larger. It also reduces the opportunity to report validated data in the RMF.	124, 127, 129
MI 8.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.20**
Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions	4
Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into the design of new interventions	3
Element 3: Lessons from past interventions inform new interventions	3
Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learned to new interventions	3
Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public	3
MI 8.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: There is a requirement, at the country and project levels, to take into account lessons learnt from previous interventions. Evaluations, lessons, recommendations and ratings related to past interventions are accessible on IDEV's website and through the comprehensive Evaluations Results Database (EVRD). At the design stage, projects must demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account, in the PAR dedicated section, according to new projects readiness criteria. CSPs have an obligation to show how lessons from the previous CSP period have been incorporated. The RR of both CSPs and SOs specifically look at this through a criterion on "*Ensuring the effectiveness of solution by integrating lessons learnt*". Mid-term reviews of CSPs, which are accompanied by the Country Portfolio Performance Report (CPPR) also provide an important reflection time to learn lessons for incorporation in the design of new operations. Finally, CSP completion reports contribute to this effort to inform the new CSP and focus on lessons learnt. A PPT presentation to the board on key issues is also presented. **Element 2: The Bank requires to document how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the preparation of new interventions/strategies but would benefit from further strengthening the learning dimension in practice through clear feedback loops.** IDEV's high level evaluations are contributing to capturing lessons and generating knowledge that enable new strategic orientations for both SOs and NSOs. Lessons learned in implementation however have the potential to better inform corporate-level change initiatives and change course on existing initiatives. As observed in the 2021 RMF mid-term review, the RMF is helping to promote learning, but not to the extent that lessons are used in future operations. It is aimed mainly at an external stakeholder audience, rather	105, 124, 127, 129

than at the internal management process to improve performance and achieve better results. Independent evaluations, PCRs and XSRs include a section dedicated to recommendations and learning. While PCRs/XSRs are typically considered good vehicles for providing lessons to be incorporated in future operations, learning through PCRs is happening sporadically, according to IDEV's 2020 Evaluation of AfDB's Self-Evaluation Systems and Processes. The recent re-introduction of the Annual Portfolio Performance Review could provide a powerful tool for addressing some of the most persistent implementation issues and offer new avenues to discuss solutions. In the case of NSOs, while XSRs capture lessons learned which are then filed in the NSO portal for the teams to consult, there is no pro-active and systematic feedback loops on how these lessons were incorporated or used for solutions to be found based on an assessment of achievements in reaching development outcomes and profitability. **Element 3: While a system is in place for ensuring that lessons from past interventions inform new interventions, their operationalization can be challenging, as was also found by IDEV in their evaluation of the self-evaluation systems and processes (2020), and the Synthesis report (2021).** There is a section in PARs on "Bank Group experience lessons reflected in project design". The learning dimension is rather strong for strategy papers (CSPs/RISPs or sectoral strategies), which are reviewed by the board and benefit from a discussion focused on their narratives rather than on the ratings. In the case of PCRs/XSRs, accountability requirements may overshadow learning considerations. There is also room to improve the use of CPPRs to inform future CSPs, as mentioned in KPI 7.5. In the case of NSOs, a couple of factors limit the learning capacity: i) the low level of compliance and hence of reporting, ii) the required level of confidentiality and hence lower disclosure. and iii) the lesser emphasis provided to assessing the achievement of development results compared to financial performance, as mentioned in IDEV's Evaluation of LOCs and of Private Sector Development Strategy.	
Element 4: With lessons being focused upon more than before, incentives are improving for learning and the reflection of lessons in new project designs, though some hurdles remain. Documents reviewed and interviews refer to an "approval culture" and a "compliance focus" rooted in the completion of mandatory reports, which may shift the attention from learning to accountability. Several elements may hinder learning opportunities: self-evaluation document, such as PCRs, could be more evidence-based, more consistent regarding quality, and more prioritized by staff among their various tasks. As noted in IDEV Synthesis report (2021), the fact that projects face recurrent issues (such as poor quality of M&E, weak cost-benefit analysis, disbursement delays, low capacity of PIUs) suggests that learning could be improved, or that other obstacles prevent effective improvements on these fronts. In addressing these issues Management should update the operation Manual (2014) including recommendations made on learning. To address SESP products, including their learning role, in both the sovereign and non-sovereign operations, online training course were organized and completed of the main SO SESPs like the IPRs and the PCRs and were launched on the Bank's Learning Management System – SAP Success factors. SESP Knowledge sharing workshops held for staff including on PCRs were held in July 2020, and courses are held quarterly since the beginning of 2022. The recently introduced RRS has put in place a repository of knowledge that could be an important source of learning to be supplied and used by staff. Also, templates for IPRs and PCRs/XSRs were overhauled to reinforce their learning role. The launch of a staff awards system to recognise staff for delivering development results is to be launched in 2023 and the implementation of the Operations Academy is well advanced, contributing to instil learning incentives. As part of its learning Series, IDEV contributes through knowledge products and briefs to make lessons learned more usable and evidence based. For instance, over the last two years IDEV has produced: Lessons from the Bank's response to the 2014-16 Ebola crisis; Lessons from AfDB Crisis Response Budget Support Operations; fostering	105, 124, 127, 129

climate resilience and a just energy transition; Integrated solutions for sustainable development impact; lessons on water and agriculture; and Key Lessons from Evaluations to inform the design of the African Emergency Food Production Facility. IDEV organized eight (virtual) knowledge events to capitalize on the findings, lessons, and recommendations from various evaluations, including the AfDB Development Evaluation Week, that was entirely virtual. Overall, recent progress on this front have been substantial enough to justify a 3 rating. **Element 5: Strictly speaking, the Bank does not monitor or publish information on the number/ share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches. This also seems to be the case of other peer institutions.** However, as already mentioned in previous elements, it is mandatory for PARs to include a specific section on how lessons learned were incorporated in the design of new operations. The section is part of the PAR template. The review of the sample of 12 PARs confirms that this is largely the case. Also, PARs are public. Implicitly it can be argued that 100% of PARs draw on lessons from experience of previous projects. At the same time, however, IDEV has raised the point in its Synthesis report (2021) that there is a recurrence of similar issues reported as "lessons learned" that tend to come back project after project and that the Bank is struggling to incorporate effectively. Overall and on the substance, the element can be considered to be met (3 rating) with some observations.	
MI 8.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.00**
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	4
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	3
Element 3: A process for addressing poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	2
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	3
MI 8.5: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: A systems exists to identify poorly performing interventions. The Bank uses the operations delivery dashboard to flag projects with potential performance issues. Monthly operations status meetings are held to monitor the quality of the portfolio The role of the team members and the processes are clearly set out in the operations manual, which is being updated. For sovereign operations, this process is made of the following steps: • At the preparation phase, for the project concept note, the quality review tools used are the peer review, RR, and country team review • At the appraisal phase, for the project appraisal report, the same quality review tools are used. Readiness criteria have been revamped and a stronger process is in place for reviewing results frameworks, cross-cutting issues, fiduciary and implementation requirements. • At the implementation phase, through the operations delivery dashboard, desk supervision, virtual or field supervision missions (normally twice a year) including the production of IPRs and mid-term reviews, and at the country level through country portfolio performance reviews (CPPRs) and country performance improvement plans. • At the completion phase, with the project completion report and its validation by IDEV	125, 126, 129

For both SOs and NSOs, the operations delivery dashboard, gathers some of the key data to monitor the performance of key indicators and introduces automatically red flags for indicators departing from targets. The system is a strong tool for accountability and for identifying poorly performing interventions. For NSOs, the process comprises the following steps: • At the preparation phase, for the project concept note. The quality review tools used are the ADOA, summary credit note, and a review from the departmental management team/deal clearance committee • At the appraisal phase, with the project appraisal report. The same quality review tools are used. • At the implementation phase, through reporting of investee companies, reviews of client reports, lender's technical advisor's reporting, and supervision mission for private sector operations. • At the completion phase, with the extended supervision report and its validation by IDEV **Element 2: Reporting processes are in place to identify and track the performance of interventions both for SO and NSOs. The Bank uses the operations delivery dashboard to flag projects with potential performance issues. Monthly operations status meetings are held to monitor the quality of the portfolio.** IPRs are one of the tools used to assess the project performance during implementation as they have to rate each of the indicators contemplated by the format and derived from the results framework. A tendency to avoid low scores (as reflected in the disconnects) has been reported, which impairs IPR's capacity to identify and track problem projects. IPRs are complemented by other tools based on objective data, notably the MTRs, but compliance remains an area of improvement. The quality of reporting has much improved with the introduction of the Quality Action Plan and the Operational Directives for strengthening results planning and monitoring which have strengthened accountability mechanisms and on-line tracking, combined with the new RRS system which is going to be online in 2023. Poor performing projects are flagged and special measures taken such as being on a watch list, enhanced supervision, red flags leading to higher level of scrutiny by Management. Specific tools exist to raise issues about NSO projects such as the NSO dashboard and the NSO project watch list. For NSOs, the ASR format has also recently been revised. Both credit risk and risks to development outcomes are assessed. The ADOA framework has also been revamped to increase alignment with results frameworks indicators. **Element 3: Addressing issues in a timely manner remains a challenge.** Once issues have been identified, mid-term reviews and increased supervision should then be considered to perform adjustments to the project. While projects flagged as problematic are more likely to be subject to more frequent supervision, mid-term reviews are not used to systematically address the problems and restructure the project, if needed. Restructuring is not common as transaction costs in dealing with the government and with the internal requirements are seen as too high. On this point Management is revising the guidelines for project restructuring in light of the Board approval of the sovereign operations restructuring policy at the end 2022, implementation should start in 2023. On NSOs, recommendations of supervision missions are often not sufficiently actionable and vaguely described. There is little evidence that a process for addressing poor performance is being used so as to improve compliance and provide relevant data with respect to the achievement of DOs that could be used to trigger corrective action as needed. **Element 4: The responsibilities to take action are clear and delineated in various documents, guidelines and directives.** Task managers are responsible for project supervision, with support from other team members that include staff from the field offices. Public sector projects have instituted a new Implementation Management Team in each Region, charged with providing support for effective	125, 126, 129

project management and completion through results-oriented oversight, portfolio performance in collaboration with Country Managers, disbursement, legal, procurement and other service functions. The Implementation support division is well placed to enhance the credibility of IPRs and CSPs-MTRs by providing comments on the implementation results and anticipating portfolio implementation issues. However, there is some overlap of responsibilities with sector divisions. At managerial level the Bank has placed stronger emphasis on the use of performance data and greater engagement of the manager in the discussion of project issues for quality assurance with the task managers, especially since the introduction of results measurement guidelines and relevant KPIs in 2020 for greater accountability. Compliance monitoring, post approval, alongside a stronger review pre-approval can be used to collect data on the extent to which the tools are being correctly applied. Results of such compliance reviews can be used both for accountability purposes, and for recognition.	125, 126, 129
MI 8.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**4.00**
Element 1: Evaluation reports include a Management response (or has one attached or associated with it)	4
Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and/ or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities	4
Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed	4
Element 4: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public	4
MI 8.6: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: IDEV's evaluations include a detailed Management response, presented alongside the evaluation report. **Element 2: Management responses include the points of agreement and disagreement, and an action plan with detailed actions that Management commits to implement and the assignment of responsibilities.** **Element 3: A timeline for implementation is included in the section dedicated to Management response in evaluation reports**, with the degree of prioritization of the action to be implemented: short term, medium term, or long term. **Element 4: A public report is published annually, the MARS report, which tracks whether recommendations have been implemented, to what extent they have been implemented and with what delays, as reflected in Figure 29.** The report concluded that the alignment of action plans has significantly improved from 84% rated high in 2019 to 95% in 2021. The cumulative percentage of "highly and substantially implemented" action plans also increased, from 26% in 2019 to 43.5% in 2021, but the level is still insufficient. The average implementation delay has declined from 624 days in 2019 to 305 days in 2021. However, overall levels of adoption remain low due primarily to lack of timelines and lack of implementation. Differences in the level of implementation are mainly related to differences in the speed of implementation rather than to partial implementation. (Figure 29).	64,105, 125,126, 129

FIGURE 29. **LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLANS IN 2021**



Source: IDEV, *Management Action Record System Status of Adoption of Independent Development Evaluation's Recommendations, 2021*

(Figure 29 above)	64,105, 125,126, 129
MI 8.6: Evidence confidence	**High Confidence**

MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.25**
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use	4
Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists	4
Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed	3
Element 4: Evidence is available that lessons learned, and best practices are being applied	2
MI 8.7: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use. Independent evaluations and Management responses are publicly available on IDEV's website. The Evaluation Results Database is a centralized data management system of evaluation results that enables rapid recall and manipulation of data such as lessons, recommendations, findings and ratings produced during the self and independent evaluation exercises of bank's projects. The business and strategic goals of this database is to produce high quality and useful evaluative information in order to account for the Bank's investments and to improve the effectiveness of the Bank's policies, processes and operations. The system stores evaluative lessons, recommendations and findings in real time hence help promoting Monitoring & Evaluation capacity building. All evaluation recommendations and the action plans undertaken to implement them are contained in the MARS system which is updated quarterly. However, it has been noted in the Independent Peer Report (2019), that there was little awareness about this database among staff and other stakeholders. Since then, a Bank-wide sensitization campaign on the EVRD took place. IDEV presented the EVRD to all new staff and consultants as part of the Bank's new Staff Induction Programme, run multiple times per year by CHHR and used it to make country- and region-specific presentations during the institutional capacity and fiduciary clinic workshops organized by the African Development Institute in 2021 in Benin, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and Chad. **Element 2: IDEV has a clear dissemination strategy associated with several dissemination tools:** a database for lessons learned, learning events and webinars, a quarterly magazine, and training on evaluation specifically. IDEV implements a Learning Series which features specific knowledge products, briefs and lessons learned. IDEV's communication is well adapted to COVID-19, with the organisation of webinars and online training.	105, 124, 129

Element 3: Dissemination mechanisms to partners and stakeholders outside the organisation is mostly done through the website. According to the survey on stakeholder perception about quality of evaluations carried out by IDEV in the 2018 assessment of their strategy, the presentation and accessibility of evaluations was rated as highly satisfactory (35%) or satisfactory (54%) by the vast majority of respondents. Beyond accessibility, however, there is little evidence of the extent by which dissemination mechanisms are actually employed and events proactively organized jointly by IDEV, the Bank, partners and peers as a way to coalesce around common development issues and steer policy dialogue. **Element 4: Some evidence is available that lessons learned, and best practices are being applied but not in a systematic and fully effective way.** IDEV has a knowledge management and learning work plans division to support the application of lessons learned and best practices. IDEV published in 2021 its magazine on Development Evaluation (*Evaluation matters*) dedicated to this topic (Learning from Successes and Failures in Evaluation). Using/promoting innovative ways (including artificial intelligence, Big Data, etc) to unlock evaluation lessons is an area of interest in which IDEV could continue to play a role in the landscape of International Organisation's evaluative functions. Formal requirements to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account are embedded in the new project readiness criteria at design stage and in the PAR templates. However, the capacity of the institution to learn from evaluations and self-evaluations has potential for improvement. The learning dimension of self-evaluations is limited, according to IDEV's evaluation of the self-evaluation system as the learning dimension gets overshadowed by the discussion on ratings. Typically, PCRs/XSRs are given lower priority by staff and there are not enough learning events where people are willing to learn from success and from failure. Also, as noted in IDEV Synthesis report (2021), some issues are often recurrent and reported in project after project which points to the weak use of this knowledge as a way to find solutions.	105, 124, 129
8.7: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

RESULTS

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results are achieved in an efficient manner.

KPI 9: Development objectives are achieved and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals	KPI score
Satisfactory	**3.00**

This section summarises SOs and NSOs results separately. SOs results are covered in KPI 9 (effectiveness), 10 (relevance), 11 (efficiency), and 12 (sustainability). NSOs results are entirely covered under KPI 9 for all evaluation dimensions specific to this type of operations.

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 and 2021 requires a different lens through which to look at results data. Variations could have been caused by the pandemic's ripple effect on the RMCs socioeconomic situation and how the Bank has been operating these last 3 years. The "interference" of COVID-19 on results expectations has not been incorporated in this assessment as IDEV's evaluation of the Bank's response to COVID-19 has just been delivered in November 2022 (outside of the reviewing period). To be noted that the ADER reporting methodology on effectiveness has been changing these last years.

Sovereign Operations

Overall, SO results are considered satisfactory with an upward positive trend. There has also been a significant turn-around in project performance since 2018 when the performance of 61% of SOs recorded a satisfactory or better in achieving their development outcomes compared to 81% in 2021.

Effectiveness is the most important indicator to gauge potential impact. While the measurement of outcomes vs outputs could still be improved, a 30% improvement in three years reflects a significant turn-around, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The disconnect of the effectiveness criterion between the ratings of PCRs and PCRENs has been an area of concern at 23% until 2020 (improving to 10% in 2021), with the disconnect of outcomes indicators far higher than for outputs. However, since 2021, the RMF reports the validated data.

There has been significant progress in achieving outcomes both in CSPs and in project work on cross-cutting themes of gender and climate change but less so for fragility and governance:

The Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa initiative launched in 2017, and the "50 million African Women Speak" project aims to empower female entrepreneurs and bridge the gender gap in access to finance. The Bank also continued to promote knowledge and awareness, striving to incorporate gender aspects into policy and project work (87% of projects included a gender-informed design in 2021 – (ADER 2022)).

On climate, the Bank surpassed the target by channelling 41% of the value of approved projects to climate finance and exceeding the adaptation-mitigation parity target by reaching 67% in adaptation finance. Despite the disruption caused by COVID-19, by end of December 2020, 88% of the 125 approved in 2020 (and 92% in 2021) addressed CC and GG in some way in their design (ADER, Green Growth Annual Report).

Overall, the Bank's support has produced concrete results on fragility, but not enough to significantly change the situation of transition states. Despite efforts to deliver more tailored programmes, including through the TSF and the CRFA tool, projects in transition states performed less well than projects in non-fragile ADF countries, mirroring the performance and challenges of these countries. The TSF evaluation found TSF to be highly relevant and responsive to the unique needs of these countries but too limited in scope and in effective targeting. While effectiveness shows a mixed performance, efficiency is better than in non-TSF projects during design and start-up but worse on timeliness at completion.

Over the last decade, many African nations have made important progress in improving governance. Thirty-six countries that are home to 61% of the continent's population having risen on the Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance (level 2) (ADER 2021). The index also shows that three of every four African citizens live in a country where public governance improved over the past decade (ADER 2020). However, Africa's aggregate score has not improved over the past five years and transition states average significantly lower. Bank operations achieved the greatest progress in the quality of budgetary and financial management, transparency and accountability, procurement systems, and the competitive environment (ADER reports). Evidence is not always available about the achievement of governance outcomes, or the effectiveness of country and project level analysis tools on governance.

Non-sovereign Operations

The IDEV evaluation of the private sector development strategy (2020) notes that the effectiveness of NSOs varies depending on the sector supported. Financial sector NSOs had uncertain effectiveness for private sector beneficiaries, particularly SMEs; infrastructure NSOs and PPPs had satisfactory effectiveness, but limited additionality; and industrial NSOs had to balance the tension between market development impact and financial sustainability.

Overall, NSOs results are considered satisfactory, but the trends are more uncertain than for SOs. The XSR synthesis report of 2014-19 (IDEV 2021), validated 46 of the 73 XSRs conducted from 2015-19. The 2018-20 results follow a negative trend, particularly for "Quality of Bank's Work" (which measures the quality of the administration and supervision of the interventions), and "Additionality" (which measures what Bank financing brings over and above commercial financiers). Despite the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the 2021 results were assessed as fully positive with 100% of transactions rated as successful or better for all the main criteria. However, the small number of XSRs submitted for validation (9 projects) in 2021 suggest that it may be necessary to further probe the representativeness of 2021 results.

The NSO portfolio has been growing and its composition has been changing. Over the last five years, the Bank's NSO portfolio exposure (outstanding balance) decreased overall by 12% and currently stands at UA 3.95 bn, down from UA 4.49 bn in 2017. The NSO outstanding balance grew by 20% from 2017 to 2019 followed by a sharp decline in 2020 and 2021 (29%) as NSO operations were suspended because priority went to support SOs. As a result, NSO lending performance has fallen short of annual target by over 20% in the last two years. NSOs approval is picking up again in 2021. As of December 2021, the NSO portfolio exposure comprises a total of 223 instruments including 77 investment loans, 37 LOCs, 65 equity funds, 44 direct equity investments, and 14 guarantees. Real sector operations have overtaken the financial sector at 55% vs 38% of the portfolio. The transformation impact of SME finance has been recognised, while for LOCs, it has been a challenge to find a balance between risk and profitability in client FIs on the one hand and providing financial services to underserved but riskier market segments on the other. Guarantees are gaining momentum, with a two-fold increase in the portfolio over the period. There is evidence of AfDB support for impactful and pioneering PPP operations, however, IDEV noted in its PSD strategy evaluation (2020) that linkages between SOs and NSOs are rare and that there is a lack of clearly designated institutional responsibilities for ensuring linkages within the Bank. This has been addressed through the adoption of a new PPP framework.

The relevance of the NSO portfolio has significantly improved in the last 5 years but its performance has been worsening during the last couple of years and needs close monitoring. The Bank has developed several tools to do so: i) the "watch list" for monitoring and mitigating deterioration in asset quality currently represents 19.7% of the outstanding portfolio; ii) the NPL indicator increased 2.7-fold from 2018 (5.7%) to 2022 (15.7%), reflecting changes in financial reporting standards on loan provisions, the default of a few large exposures and a shrinking NSO loan book, and iii) the WARR went from 3.8 in 2017 to 4.4 in 2021. It measures the level of risk of the portfolio, which exposes the Bank to higher credit risks, more NPLs, higher loan loss provisions and lower net financial returns. The COVID-19 pandemic clearly contributed to the deterioration of the NSO portfolio performance and has similarly impacted all IFIs.

MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their objectives, and results (analysing differential results across target groups, and changes in national development policies and programs or system reforms)	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: The organisation achieves all or almost all intended significant development, normative and/or humanitarian objectives at the output and outcome level. Results are differentiated across target groups.	
3. Satisfactory: The organisation either achieves at least a majority of stated output and outcome objectives (more than 50% if stated) or the most important of stated output and outcome objectives is achieved	
2. Unsatisfactory: Half or less than half of stated output and outcome level objectives is achieved	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Less than half of stated output and outcome objectives has been achieved, including one or more very important output and/or outcome level objectives	
MI 9.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
The COVID-19 pandemic during 2020 and 2021 requires to look at results data with a different perspective as variations could have been caused by the ripple effect of the pandemic both in terms of the impact on the socioeconomic situation of the RMCs and on the way the Bank has been operating these last 3 years. The "interference" caused by COVID-19 on results expectations and targets has not been incorporated in this assessment as IDEV's evaluation of the Bank's response to COVID-19 has just been delivered in November 2022 (outside of the reviewing period). **For the purpose of measuring achievement of results, independent assessments and validated data has been used to the extent possible.** Therefore, this assessment has used IDEV data as much as available, mostly coming from evaluations, the 2019 Synthesis Report with validated data for PCRs that closed in 2017 (88), 2018 (66), 2019 (66), 2020 (61), and up-to-date validated figures for the main performance dimensions in 2020 (61) and 2021 (65). For the sake of providing a comprehensive view, this report also presents self-generated data and analysis offered by Management mostly from the ADER 2022 and the Annual Portfolio Performance Report (2019).	40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114

Sovereign Operations (SOs)

Overall, SOs results are considered satisfactory within an upward positive trend. A significant turn-around in project performance has occurred since 2018. At the end of 2019, the sovereign portfolio of the Bank Group was composed of 1 243 loans, grants and guarantees representing a total value of UA 30bn, a 42% increase from 2015. This trend has been primarily driven by the continent's efforts to scale up public investment in infrastructure development. The average size of sovereign projects has grown by over 20% during the last five years and currently stands at UA 35 million, up from 28 million in 2015. This positive trend reflects increased access by traditional ADF countries to ADB loans — typically of larger size — through graduation or as a result of the revised credit policy.

Effectiveness: in 2021, 81% of the projects recorded a satisfactory or better performance on the extent by which they have achieved their development outcomes. There has been a marked inflection point in 2018 with a significant improvement of project effectiveness. Effectiveness is the most important indicator to gauge potential impact and although there is still room for improvement with respect to the measurement of outcomes vs outputs, a 30% improvement in three years is a sign of a significant turn-around, particularly in view of the COVID-19 difficult circumstances in 2020 and 2021. To be noted that while the ADER reporting methodology on effectiveness has been changing these last years, IDEV does not use the average of sub-criteria to calculate the overall rating but relies on its own judgement criteria. Consequently, this can create coherence issues between the overall rating and the sub-ratings (see figures below).

FIGURE 30. **EFFECTIVENESS: PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**



40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114

The disconnect of the effectiveness criterion, as measured by the development objective (DO), between the ratings of PCRs and PCRENs, has been high at 23% until recently (IDEV Synthesis report 2021) but improving to 10% in 2021 (IDEV communication).

FIGURE 31. **% OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Effectiveness	58%	66%	61%	69%	80%	81%
Outcomes	63%	56%	53%	70%	79%	83%
Outputs	81%	83%	73%	90%	93%	90%
Development Objectives	55%	64%	62%	71%	80%	83%

Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-21) or 2021

Non-sovereign Operations (NSOs)

Overall, NSOs results are considered satisfactory, but the trend from 2018-20 is negative. The 2021 figure is positive but needs further review and analysis. The Synthesis Report on the Validation of 2014-19 Expanded Supervision Reports (XSRs) (IDEV 2021), validated 46 of the 73 XSRs that were conducted during the years 2015–2019. The MOPAN assessment also benefitted from validated data for 2020 and 2021. The negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is applicable to 2020 and 2021 data. The 2018-20 results follow a negative trend, particularly with respect to the "Quality of Bank's Work" (which measures the quality of the administration and supervision of the interventions), and "Additionality" (which measures what the Bank financing brings over and above commercial financiers). However, the 2021 results were assessed to be remarkably positive with 100% of the transactions rated as successful or better for the four main criteria. However, the small number of XSRs submitted for validation (9 projects) in 2021 may cast some doubts about the likelihood of a change in the trend. (Figure 32)

FIGURE 32. **% OF XSRS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED)**



Source: IDEV (2022), Synthesis report on the validation of 2020-2021 Project Completion Reports and Expanded Supervision Reports; IDEV (2019), Synthesis Report on the Validation of 2014-2019 Expanded Supervision Reports

40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114

The Development Outcome has been slightly declining during the 2018-20 period to reach 86% in 2020. The 2021 blip will need to be probed with a more robust pool of projects. It measures the extent to which the project has contributed to fulfilling the Bank's mandate of economic and social development in RMC.

The Bank's Investment Profitability rating was at 86% in 2020 slightly down from 2018 (89%). Overall Investment Profitability Ratings had a relatively high disconnect between Management and IDEV ratings (9%). Most of the unsatisfactory projects are old.

The Bank's Work Quality rating was satisfactory for 71% of XSRs issued in 2020, compared to 80% of XSRs issued in 2018. The Bank's Supervision and Administration performance has seen improvements over the last decade; however, some shortcomings were noted in the Synthesis Report such as: there was no use of standardized formats/templates for reporting; where Project Supervision Reports were available, they were mostly very brief, and did not contain updated project results data; and most supervision reports focused on implementation, not on outcomes.

The Bank's Additionality came down from 100% in 2018 to 86% in 2020. The Bank's financial additionality was mostly present in the form of better currency matching (foreign exchange lending), longer maturities as well as grace periods. The nonfinancial additionality consisted mostly of TA packages to improve the institution's risk management, credit analysis capacity, environmental, social and/ or governance practices. Notwithstanding the positive ratings, most XSRs did not contain adequate reporting on the outcomes of the TA packages, or how the systems that the TA intended the borrower to establish have been functioning.

Efficiency. NSOs are not rated according to efficiency; the investment performance, which refers to the profitability of investments, is the financial measure which can be considered as closest to the efficiency of public sector operations, although it does not account for the non-financial benefits of the projects (unlike cost benefit analysis for public sector operations) or for their timeliness. The Investment Profitability was rated positively by IDEV for 67.4% of the projects. Most projects rated negatively are however old projects approved in the 1990s or in the 2000s, which don't reflect the current standards of the Bank's investment. A 9% disconnect between IDEV ratings and those of Management was observed.

Sustainability. The overall sustainability of NSOs is not part of XSRs' criteria as such and therefore IDEV doesn't rate it. Instead, it focuses on the economic sustainability and fulfilment of project business objectives: 76% of the XSRs examined by IDEV in their 2014-19 XSRs Synthesis Report received positive ratings.

Overall, the operations reviewed resulted in a satisfactory or better development outcome, meeting or exceeding specified financial, economic, environmental, and social performance benchmarks and standards, and contributed to the creation, sustainability, and growth of private enterprises. The effects of the interventions created positive outcomes outside the businesses financed which influenced the local economy around these enterprises via the creation of positive externalities, improvement of infrastructure, the provision of cheaper and higher quality goods and/or services, and/or the internalization of new technology. As noted in IDEV evaluation of the Private Sector Development Strategy, the effectiveness of NSOs varied depending on the sector supported; financial sector NSOs had uncertain effectiveness for private sector beneficiaries, particularly SMEs; infrastructure NSOs and PPPs had satisfactory effectiveness, but limited additionality; and industrial NSOs had to balance the tension between market development impact and financial sustainability.

40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114

Overall, the NSO portfolio has been growing and its composition has been changing. However, over the last five years, the Bank's NSO portfolio exposure (outstanding balance) decreased by 12% and currently stands at UA 3.95 bn, down from 4.49 bn in 2017. As of December 2021, the NSO portfolio exposure comprises a total of 223 instruments made up of 77 investment loans, 37 LOCs, 65 equity funds, and 44 direct equity investments, and 14 guarantees. The NSO outstanding balance grew by 20% from 2017 to 2019 and was followed by a sharp decline in 2020 and 2021 (29%) as NSO operations were suspended as a consequence of the priority given to support sovereign operations. As a result, NSO lending performance has fallen short of annual target by over 20% in the last two years. NSOs approval is picking up again in 2021. The resources initially set aside to fighting the COVID-19 crisis through the CRF to protect the Bank's existing portfolio of non-sovereign projects did not materialize.

NSOs were highly exposed to the financial sector until 2019, representing up to 49% of the portfolio but the trend has changed since then with the real sector representing 55% in 2021 and finance 38% (PINS Communication). The real sector projects have a high transformational impact as they contribute to increasing the socio-economic infrastructure in Africa and achieve high development outcomes. However, they also carry higher transaction costs. For LOCs, it has been a challenge to find a balance between achieving risk and profitability in client FIs on the one hand and providing financial services to underserved but riskier market segments on the other hand. Guarantees are gaining momentum, with a portfolio increase of two-fold over the period. There is evidence of impactful PPP operations and case-study countries in IDEV evaluations, however, their scarcity was observed (PSD strategy evaluation 2020) as well as the lack of clearly designated institutional responsibilities for ensuring linkages within the Bank. (Figure 33)

FIGURE 33. **SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF NSO INVESTMENTS**



Source: AfDB

In addition to its traditional lending interventions, the Bank's financial sector has undertaken several initiatives to increase access to quality, reliable, and affordable financial services focused on underserved groups. These initiatives include the Africa Digital Financial Inclusion Facility (ADFI) a structured blended finance vehicle for digital services; the Boost Africa Program which supports youth entrepreneurs by providing funding at the earliest and riskiest stage of the entrepreneurial value chain; and the social Impact Investment Program for Africa, an impact fund supporting social business in highly impactful sectors. Also, the Bank is capitalizing on the Investor Engagement workstream of the AIF, which is identifying and curating a database of institutional investors, both domestic and global, in collaboration with institutional partners, to mobilise private investments, create co-investment vehicles, and leveraging existing risk mitigation instruments. 40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114

The relevance of the NSO portfolio has significantly improved in the last 5 years but its performance needs close monitoring. While the number of watch-listed projects increased by 26% from 38 in 2017 to 48 in 2021, the outstanding exposure of watch-listed projects increased by 5% from UA 1.1 Bn in 2017 to UA 1.2 Bn in 2021, representing 19.7% of the outstanding portfolio (PINS Communication). The increase in the number of watch-listed projects was mainly attributed to the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the manufacturing, mining, transport, tourism, and agribusiness sectors. The portfolio management teams closely monitor these projects with a view to mitigating deterioration in asset quality including taking corrective actions that will assist the projects to recover and meet the Bank's financial obligations.

The Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratio of the NSO portfolio was at 15.8% according to the Capital Adequacy Report of March 2022 up from 5.7% in 2018, reflecting changes in financial reporting standards on loan provisions, the default of few large exposures as well as the shrinking of the NSO loan book. The COVID-19 pandemic was also a factor in this increase. In 2021, the top 5 NSO NPL projects jointly accounted for 87% of the NPLs and are mainly legacy projects (projects committed before the CRC was set up in 2012). Peer DFIs in Africa have experienced similar trends.

The WARR of the NSO loan portfolio increased from 3.8 in 2017 to 4.4 in 2021; an indicator that NSOs have increased their financing of high risk rated projects and are working more collaboratively with Sponsors having low financial capacity. Financing of high risk rated projects exposes the Bank to higher credit risks, increased NPLs, increased loan loss provisions and decreased net financial returns. (Figure 34)

FIGURE 34. **FIVE-YEAR EVOLUTION OF THE WARR**  *Source*: AfDB **Signature delays.** As at 31 December 2019, UA 1.1bn of NSO approved transactions was unsigned – excluding guarantees – 37% of which was eligible for cancellation. The volume of unsigned NSO transactions reflects the inherent challenges of the Bank's NSO business model whereas deal negotiations are concluded and financial close achieved several months or years after board approval. By taking an early investment decision to crowd in other co-financiers, the Bank is often tying up capital for a long period of time. Moderate improvement has been achieved on signature delays in 2019 with an average time of 10 months from approval, compared to 11 months in 2015.	40 – 101, 104, 107, 108, 109 – 111, 113 – 114
MI 9.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and women's empowerment	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Interventions achieve all or nearly all of their stated gender equality objectives	
3. Satisfactory: Interventions achieve a majority (more than 50%) of their stated gender objectives	
2. Unsatisfactory: Interventions either lack gender equality objectives or achieve less than half of their stated gender equality objectives. (Note: where a programme or activity is clearly gender-focused (maternal health programming for example) achievement of more than half its stated objectives warrants a rating of satisfactory	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Interventions are unlikely to contribute to gender equality or may in fact lead to increases in gender inequalities	
MI 9.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Interventions are assessed as satisfactory as they have achieved a majority of their stated gender objectives. Gender grew in prominence across the Bank's operations over the reviewing period. In 2020 the Bank's board approved the gender strategy 2021-25. Guided by the principle "Investing in Africa's women to accelerate inclusive growth," the strategy aims to reduce gender inequality and empower women to participate in their own right across the High 5s. It plans to do this by enhancing women's access to finance, markets, skills, and infrastructure, and by supporting the design and implementation of gender-responsive policies.	6 – 13, 16, 27, 29, 30 – 32, 54, 80 – 101, 102 – 141

The main results-related findings are:

The biggest difference for GM at the Bank has been brought through gender-informed CSPs with a preceding CGP also due to the increased role of gender experts in CSP processes. However, little evidence was found that the Bank leveraged its position of a convener and trusted partner to tackle policy-related gender developmental challenges such as women's land rights issues, although included in the gender strategy.

The Bank's business processes on gender integration have benefitted from RRs for the Gender Equity Dimension and the gender marker system (GSM). Entry points and M&E mechanisms for gender marking in the project cycle and business processes have been unevenly formal and effective. Gender-related indicators tend to focus on outputs, and not outcomes. Furthermore, measuring progress in each of the three gender pillars has not been systematic.

Additional financial resources for gender obtained through special initiatives and leveraging internal and external partnerships were used skilfully to address the perceived inadequacy of financial and human resources for comprehensive GM.

DBDM processes facilitated bringing gender-related knowledge and expertise closer to operations and diversified funding for gender interventions by regions and sectors.

The evidence of results with actual or high potential for a catalytic effect on the Bank's GM efforts concerns: the Bank's progress towards EDGE Certification, joint products with UN Women, financial commitments for the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa(AFAWA) and the Global Gender Summit (the last two emphasizing the convening role of the Bank).

Gender staffing was increased by 11 positions from 2018 to June 2022, however, meeting gender parity is still a challenge in the Bank with the share of management staff who are women at 26%.

6 – 13, 16, 27, 29, 30 – 32, 54, 80 – 101, 102 – 141

To mobilise more financing for operations that promote gender equality, the Bank approved several important initiatives in 2020. The first is the Gender Equality Trust Fund, the largest trust fund for gender in Africa. The second is the Guarantee for Growth programme, an innovative guarantee mechanism that aims to de-risk investments in woman-led SMEs. This comes to further help bridge the gender gap in access to finance notably through the AFAWA initiative—launched in 2017, and the "50 million African Women Speak" project. In addition, in 2020 the Bank approved a number of milestone projects focused on women's economic empowerment, including a $14 million project in Sudan to accelerate women's entrepreneurship by strengthening women's capacity, their access to financial services, and their knowledge of ecosystems; and a $20 million project in partnership with the Green Climate Fund to increase access to financing for woman-led/woman-owned MSMEs in agriculture in Ghana. Finally, the Bank continued its work to promote gender knowledge and awareness during 2020. It published 11 CGPs and ten reports on gender-responsive, climate-resilient solutions.

In 2021, 87% of new operations had a gender-informed design, which is also the target level and comfortably above the baseline of 75% in 2015. 100% of SOs were categorised using the GMS, which measures the extent to which gender equality measures are mainstreamed across operations and shows an increasing proportion of projects supporting gender equality. A review of the PAR for 12 projects was carried out to assess the extent of incorporation of the gender agenda. All projects addressed gender issues to various extents; some were more descriptive in terms of the women situation in the project context, while others were more proactive in proposing actual measures and women targeting for inclusion and prevention. Nine of 12 projects included women-specific indicators in the results framework, mostly in terms of number of beneficiaries or women enterprises, jobs created, or budget reserved for women action. Four projects addressed the risk of gender-based violence and SEA.

The disaggregation of gender data has been improving in recent years but remains subject to the performance of projects' monitoring systems. The Gender Strategy Results Framework provides the list of indicators to be disaggregated and monitored in the ADER report with the data from completion reports showing the proportion of women who benefited from the Bank's operations. While an effort is being made to obtain disaggregated data from project supervision reports and PCRs, such data is not collected systematically for all the 15 indicators requiring gender reporting. This was partly because the gender indicator was not planned for originally and was not in the old results framework. In that respect, projects' M&E systems have historically been weak in terms of gender data collection and PCRs/XSRs don't report specifically on gender which makes the feeding of the RMF more difficult. However, they do monitor M&E design including for gender. The score is at a low 2.6 (scale 1-4) with 64% of the projects reviewed reported as satisfactory or better in the 2019 Synthesis report, which is the latest available data. However, important changes were introduced in 2021 through the Operational Instructions on Strengthening Results Planning and Monitoring.	6 – 13, 16, 27, 29, 30 – 32, 54, 80 – 101, 102 – 141
MI 9.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/tackle the effects of climate change	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to achieve environmental sustainability and contribute to tackle the effects of climate change. These plans are implemented successfully and the results are environmentally sustainable and contribute to tackling the effects of climate change	
3. Satisfactory: Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to ensure environmental sustainability and help tackle climate change. Activities are implemented successfully and the results are environmentally sustainable and contribute to tackling the effects of climate change	
2. Unsatisfactory: EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote environmental sustainability and help tackle the effects of climate change. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results are not environmentally sustainable. AND/OR The intervention includes planned activities or project	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote environmental sustainability and help tackle climate change. In addition, changes resulting from interventions are not environmentally sustainable/do not contribute to tackling climate change.	
MI 9.3: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
The Bank designed and implemented interventions on GG and CC satisfactorily and their results have contributed to environmental sustainability. Overall, the Bank has demonstrated its commitment and leadership in pushing the climate agenda forward and is viewed as a key actor for supporting CC policies and interventions across the region. The Bank continued its efforts to mainstream climate change into its work. The Bank surpassed the target in this area by channelling 41% of the value of approved projects to climate finance and exceeding the adaptation-mitigation parity target by reaching 67% in adaptation finance. Despite the important adjustments made by the Bank in response to COVID-19, 92% of the projects approved in 2021 addressed CC and GG in their design, and 100% of CSPs/RISPs. The Bank mobilised about $ 409 million from external climate funds and launched new initiatives, including a commitment towards the $25 billion African Adaptation Acceleration Program in	2, 16, 22, 23 – 24, 25 – 26, 54, 101 – 134

partnership with the GCA and the $ 20 billion Desert-to-power initiative, while committing $6.5 billion in support to the Great Green Wall by 2025, among others. In line with its commitments, the Bank was selected to host the regional Africa office of the Global Center on Adaptation. With this new partnership, the Bank is leading Africa's efforts to accelerate the delivery of adaptation action across the continent while helping mobilise funds and bridge the financing gap for climate adaptation in Africa. GG-CC mainstreaming considerations have been introduced systematically during project design. PARs provide, in a dedicated section, agreed climate change measures. In 2018, 82% of new projects were designed to enhance resilience/adaptation and reduce climate impacts/GHG emissions; this has increased to 92% in 2021. The Bank has gained a track record in mainstreaming GG-CC in some RMCs by working in the key relevant sectors, where the Bank has comparative advantage. However, the Bank could do more to facilitate coordinated cross-sectoral action for effective GG-CC mainstreaming. While 11 out of 12 PARs reviewed used the climate safeguard system to categorize projects and address climate issues through a dedicated section, few show evidence of specific climate outputs in results frameworks. Also, evidence that there is an on-going dialogue on CC between the project team and the government on mitigating climate risks in the PARs vary. Eight out of 12 projects indicate alignment with NDCs. Also, performance on climate action is not monitored in PCRs. The assessment of the main performance criteria by IDEV evaluation (2021) shows a generally positive picture for relevance and effectiveness but mixed for efficiency and sustainability: Relevance: Two-thirds of the projects scored 'medium' or 'high' on alignment with the Bank's and national policies and beneficiaries' needs in terms of GG-CC. The relevance of project objectives and targets was also satisfactory overall. Effectiveness: The effectiveness of the projects in achieving their intended GG-CC mainstreaming results (outputs and outcomes) could not be assessed in almost half of the projects due to a lack of data and of the remainder, about three quarter was satisfactory. Efficiency: Most projects did not report on the efficiency of timely delivery and budget execution specifically for the aspects related to GG and CC. Overall efficiency was evaluated as satisfactory for budget use. Almost half the projects found and applied solutions to major challenges that significantly impacted implementation, while timely delivery was unsatisfactory for most projects. Sustainability: Most projects (16 of the 20) had an exit strategy and incorporated some sustainability measures, though few projects (3 of the 20) considered GG-CC factors or institutional or financial factors in sustainability plans that were credible and likely to be effective in the long term. The sustainability of the projects was unsatisfactory overall. In conclusion, the Bank did well in mainstreaming GG-CC in its policies, strategies and operations during design. As strategies and frameworks have been updated and revised periodically, there is a clear progression in acknowledging and explicitly mentioning GG-CC as one of the important cross-cutting issues to be addressed. Tangible results have been generated from 2015 on-wards, but the potential of the Bank's capacity to foster changes in this area is not fully exploited. The translation of this priority area in results frameworks and especially for what efficiency and sustainability are concerned, would enhance Bank's results in this area. Renewed attention was devoted to this theme by the ADF-16 including through the creation of a new climate action window.	2, 16, 22, 23 – 24, 25 – 26, 54, 101 – 134
MI 9.3: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped countries addressing fragility.	Score
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to address fragility situations and reach those most at risk of being left behind. These plans are implemented successfully and the results have helped improve fragility demonstrating results for the most vulnerable groups.	
3. Satisfactory: Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to mitigate fragility. These activities are implemented successfully and the results have reduced fragility.	
2. Unsatisfactory: EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to address fragility or demonstrate their reach to vulnerable groups. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results will not reduce fragility, AND/OR The intervention includes planned activities or project design criteria intended to reduce fragility but these have not been implemented and/or have not been successful	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to address fragility. In addition, changes resulting from interventions do not reduce fragility. Interventions do not focus on reaching vulnerable groups.	
MI 9.4: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to mitigate fragility. By and large these activities are implemented successfully, but achieving results is challenged by the difficult local conditions. To support its RMCs, the Bank is pursuing a holistic, whole-of-society approach towards fostering resilience that reflects on its institutional mandate and comparative advantages. The approach includes a focus on knowledge generation, policy dialogue, advocacy, and catalytic investments, for example via the Bank's TSF, that reinforces actors' capacity to prevent and mitigate the root causes and drivers of fragility, including for the most vulnerable people, such as displaced people and their hosting communities; by preventing grievances and marginalisation; and by empowering women and youth. **A fragility lens is being applied to all SOs and the Bank is increasingly considering prevention measures as a core tenet guiding its interventions while selectively engaging on building resilience and focusing more on the role of the private sector.** In early 2020, the Bank concluded the rollout of the 2019 CRFA exercise. CRFA profiles were prepared for all 54 countries and 5 regions. A profile entails a brief qualitative diagnostic of entry points for building resilience based on the CRFA scores. These profiles established tailored and evidence-based baselines that reinforced the quality of full-fledged fragility assessments. They also provided relevant operational recommendations that informed the application of the fragility lens in the Bank's programming. Aware that it is critical to work differently in fragile contexts, the Bank has been applying the fragility lens in the design and implementation of projects in transition states. Of the 12 PARs examined, 6 have addressed fragility through a dedicated section. Between 2018 and 2020, IDEV produced 88 evaluation notes of Project Completion Reports (PCRs) covering all the transition states' operations. 82% of the evaluated PCRs were rated Satisfactory but this percentage decreases to 74% if we consider PCRs of TSF financed projects only. While the Bank has promoted the upstream fragility-related knowledge work and capacity development, more needs to be done to identify key entry points for interventions at the country and regional level. The discussion of ADF-15 and the recommendations of the IDEV evaluation renewed the emphasis on the need to scale-up the implementation of the Bank's fragility agenda.	14, 36, 54 – 101

In 2020, the TSF supported regional economic communities and individual countries through additional funding that was particularly needed in transition states receiving limited resources from the Bank's PBA. The TSF has been used to mitigate the negative impacts of COVID-19, strengthening capacities to consolidate peace, building community and household resilience, and supporting key national and transboundary infrastructure as well as investments in human capital. The TSF portfolio as at 31 December 2020 comprised 140 operations with a total financing of UA 1.2 billion. A total of 54 projects totalling UA 471.9 million were approved, mostly (32 projects or UA 425.1 million) for national and regional operations to support countries in their state-building efforts. An important milestone was the completion of the arrear's clearance by Somalia to the Bank through a UA 89 million grant of the TSF. The Bank's annual report of the TSF reports that the Bank was able to effectively deliver at least 80% of the expected results in two-thirds of the reported output indicators. The Bank tripled the expected impact when it concerns providing financial services to individual owner-operators and MSMEs and doubled the impact when it concerns improving power distribution lines in transition states. Job creation remains a big challenge, especially in a fragility context, as the Bank was able to deliver only half of the expected results. **The TSF was found to be a highly relevant instrument that has provided operational flexibility and enhanced the level and rapidity of the support provided by the Bank to countries and regions in fragile situations, but more should be done (IDEV TSF Evaluation 2022).** IDEV's evaluation noted significant challenges in the design and implementation of the facility that have affected its effectiveness, coherence, efficiency, and sustainability. Performance often varied across the three pillars of support. Pillar I provides supplemental resources for national, regional and private sector operations to support countries in their state-building efforts; Pillar II targets arrears-clearance to enable eligible countries normalize relations with the international community and access debt relief; and Pillar III provides support to critical capacity building interventions and technical assistance that cannot be adequately addressed through traditional projects and instruments. Pillar II operations enjoyed the highest level of effectiveness, less so for Pillar I and III. Efficiency is better than in non-TSF projects during design and start-up but worse in terms of timeliness at completion. As an instrument, the TSF's sustainability was found to be satisfactory, although there is room for improvement in terms of ownership and leverage of external funding. Pillar I and Pillar III operations demonstrated a good level of 'coherence' when working in synergy and complementarity. At the operational level the performance among the pillars is mixed, to some extent reflecting a higher level of challenges and complexity in addressing the root causes of fragility. **More on results, the Bank's support has produced concrete results, but not enough to significantly change the situation of transition states** (Evaluation of the AfDB Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa 2014-19). The Bank has achieved tangible results in state-building and institutional stability; however, these results fall short of set targets and resources deployed. The outcomes have not been enough to produce an overall positive impact on social inclusion and equity in these countries. A comparative analysis on the basis of Project Completion Reports (2014-19) shows that overall, projects in transition states performed worse than projects in non-fragile ADF countries in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, mirroring the performance and challenges of these countries. Only the relevance criterion shows better performance in transition states projects. Resource-wise, Bank's support is relatively modest compared to the challenges encountered in these countries. Also, some of the targets appear to have been set at too ambitious levels given the local circumstances and have affected the final project effectiveness ratings.	14, 36, 54 – 101

Efficiency: in the four countries studied by the evaluation, the Bank's performance in terms of compliance with schedules was deemed unsatisfactory overall with 40% of the 10 commitments assessed out of the Strategy's 11 being fully completed by the end of 2019. At the operational level, budget support operations were implemented rapidly (Chad and Liberia), but most infrastructure projects and emergency assistance operations suffered implementation delays. **Sustainability:** The sustainability of outcomes in the four countries was deemed unsatisfactory despite generally satisfactory technical compliance and some good examples of ownership. Sustainability remains a priority concern in transition states. The high mobility of qualified staff and lack of political will were the main reasons. In the case of infrastructure, despite good achievements, the sustainability of infrastructure is imperilled by weak institutional capacity, and limited resources for maintenance. **The Bank has established several partnerships at the international and regional levels** with the objectives of (i) playing a leading role in discussions on fragility in Africa and (ii) strengthening regional responses in its focus areas of intervention and beyond, particularly on political and security issues. Interlocutors from other institutions have acknowledged the Bank's growing leadership on fragility issues. The coordination momentum between partners varied, based on the economic and political context of the countries in relation to the partners' interests. At country level, the situation varies from one country to another. A number of factors have helped or hindered the Bank's performance in producing results, the most important of which are: Favourable factors: (i) the Bank's experience in infrastructure; (ii) the Bank's status as a partner of choice; (iii) the integrated approach which ensured strong projects synergy etc.; Unfavourable factors: (i) the difficult economic, political and security contexts or selectivity; and (ii) modest budget allocations relative to the huge needs of transition states.	14, 36, 54 – 101
MI 9.4: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve governance situation at country level	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. These plans are implemented successfully, and the results have helped promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue.	
3. Satisfactory: Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. These activities are implemented successfully, and the results have promoted or ensured any other cross-cutting issue.	
2. Unsatisfactory: EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results will not promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue, AND/OR Intervention include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue, but these have not been implemented and/or been successful	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. In addition, changes resulting from interventions do not promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue.	

MI 9.5: Analysis	Evidence documents
Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to improve governance. By and large these activities are implemented successfully, but progress is uneven. Over the last decade, many African nations have made important progress in improving governance with 36 countries home to 61% of the continent's population having risen on the Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance (level 2) (ADER 2021). The index also shows that three of every four African citizens live in a country where public governance improved over the past decade (ADER 2020). At the continental level, however, Africa's aggregate score has not improved over the past five years with transition states averaging significantly lower. In terms of Bank's operations (level 2) compared to targets and baselines, the areas of most progress have been the quality of budgetary and financial management, transparency and accountability in public sector, procurement systems, and the competitive environment (ADER reports). All these KPIs are well above the targets. **Through its new strategy for Economic Governance in Africa 2021-25 (SEGA) and action plan, the Bank emphasizes the importance of incorporating a governance analysis in the Bank's documents/ interventions.** It prioritises strengthening public financial management, promoting transparency and accountability in public service delivery, stimulating government effectiveness, building business-enabling environments, fighting corruption, and enhancing the institutional frameworks required to manage the economy efficiently at the national and sub-national levels. This means, among other things, that every CSP includes a country diagnostic and that a CPIA is done for every country. Every project has an FM and procurement assessment to ensure good governance in project management, and a Country Fiduciary Risk Assessment is carried out. Governance mainstreaming in Bank's interventions is promoted, but it is not clear at this stage how systematic this integration is. Of the 12 PARs examined, 8 have specifically addressed governance in dedicated sections to various extents. **Debt management has been particularly critical for the Bank during the COVID-19 pandemic.** Because of the impact that COVID-19 had on growth, the debt situation of RMC worsened. By the end of 2021, no fewer than 20 regional member countries were at high risk of debt distress or were experiencing actual debt distress. Even though the Debt Service Suspension Initiative helped some of these countries reduce the risks of full default, the pandemic exacerbated debt vulnerabilities. Debt challenges have been growing for some time, in part because of poor governance and weak institutional capacity in the countries. The importance of the Bank's work on governance has been heightened during this period. **Policy dialogue and advisory services are other tools which rely on an analysis of governance issues.** IDEV evaluation of PBOs (2012-17), which are "par excellence" a policy dialogue tool, found that the Bank was not fully utilizing its comparative advantage – and "African Voice", to ensure PBO results via policy dialogue. Only three of the ten in-depth country assessments found satisfactory frameworks for policy dialogue in the targeted sectors. The gaps that emerged in relation to policy dialogue included lack of clarity on who was responsible; limited capacity to engage; and lack of structured planning or reporting for related efforts. A new tool, the "Policy Reform Dialogue Matrix" was rolled out after the evaluation.	14, 16, 101 – 54
MI 9.5: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, as the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate	**KPI score**
Highly satisfactory	**4.00**
The Bank's interventions are very relevant to the needs and priorities of borrowing countries and beneficiaries. Performance in this area is the strongest in comparison to efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. The relevance of objectives and design is strong according to IDEV's validation of PCR's: 98% of the projects are rated satisfactory or better with an average score of 3.66 for 2021. The relevance of development objectives (score of 3.83) increased over 2016. There is no disconnect between PCRs and PCRENs on relevance. Relevance of interventions is also judged positively through the survey which shows that borrowing countries agree 100% on the following: the Bank's work responds to the needs of beneficiaries is aligned with development needs, is informed by analysis of situations, is based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific thematic areas, and provides an appropriate mix of technical, financing, and knowledge to address key development challenges. The ADF was ranked second by the QuODA as one of the most effective multilateral banks, at least with respect to prioritization and ownership, 2 of the 4 criteria related to this KPI, including the alignment sub-criterion.	
MI 10.1: Intervention objectives and design assessed as responding to beneficiaries', global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities (inclusiveness, equality and Leave No One Behind), and continuing to do so where circumstances change	**Score**
MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
MI score	**4.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Systematic methods are applied in intervention design (including needs assessment for humanitarian relief operations) to identify target group needs and priorities, including consultation with target groups, and intervention design explicitly responds to the identified needs and priorities.	
3. Satisfactory: Interventions are designed to take into account the needs of the target group as identified through a situation or problem analysis (including needs assessment for relief operations) and the resulting activities are designed to meet the needs of the target group.	
2. Unsatisfactory: No systematic analysis of target group needs, and priorities took place during intervention design, or some evident mismatch exists between the intervention's activities and outputs and the needs and priorities of the target groups.	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Substantial elements of the intervention's activities and outputs were unsuited to the needs and priorities of the target group.	
MI 10.1: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of borrowing countries and beneficiaries, as the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate. The relevance of objectives and design is strong. IDEV's PCR's validated data points to a very strong performance in this area, consistently over the years, with 98% of the projects rated satisfactory or better and a score of 3.66 for 2021 (ie. Highly satisfactory) including strong increases in comparison with the performance of 2016 which was respectively of 81% and 3.13. The component which performs the best is the relevance of development objectives which scored as highly satisfactory (3.83 in 2021, 98% of projects rated satisfactory or better in 2020 and 100% in 2021), and in a continuous progress (3.57 and 96% in 2016). The other component related to design is below but registered good progress in comparison of 2016 despite a decrease in 2021 (86% in 2021, in comparison with 92% in 2020 and 66% in 2016, score of 3.17 in 2021 in comparison of 2.69 in 2016) (Figure 35).	104, 107, 108

FIGURE 35. **RELEVANCE DATA – PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**



Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-21)

Relevance of interventions is also judged positively through the survey which shows that borrowing countries agree 100% on the following: the Bank's work responds to the needs of beneficiaries is aligned with development needs (Figure 36), is informed by analysis of situations, is based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific thematic areas, and provides an appropriate mix of technical, financing and knowledge to address key development challenges. Responses are also strong across the board (90% and above) on whether the Bank has been able to adapt its operating model in response to COVID-19 to ensure operational continuity. A small number of donors are more reserved despite an overall positive feedback. 104, 107, 108

FIGURE 36. **AfDB WORK RESPONDS TO THE NEEDS OF BENEFICIARIES, INCLUDING THE MOST VULNERABLE POPULATIONS**



Source: Results of the 2022 MOPAN external partner survey (n=125)

In addition to this good performance, the ADF has been ranked second by the 2021 QuODA as one of the most effective multilateral banks, at least with respect to 2 of the 4 criteria used: i) prioritization (how well allocations are targeted); and ii) ownership (how well providers work with and through partner countries and use national systems), including the alignment sub-criteria.

According to IDEV, some potential improvements exist with respect to the opportunity to define better causal logics and identification of unintended effects in project results frameworks. It should be however noted that Theory of Changes are mandatory from 2021 which contributes to strengthen the articulation between causal linkages. In addition, IDEV highlighted other areas for improvements in the design phase such as a trend of PCRs to be over-optimistic on the quality of project design (notably in key areas such as setting measurable performance indicators), estimating realistic project costs and calculating an accurate project duration. The most common complaint related to the relevance of project design was a lack of engineering designs sufficient to determine costs to a reasonable degree of accuracy (see KPI 11).	104, 107, 108

FIGURE 37. **RELEVANCE: PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Relevance	81%	94%	98%	97%	98%	98%
Project objectives	96%	97%	100%	98%	98%	100%
Design	66%	70%	74%	78%	91%	86%
Score	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**
Relevance	3.13	3.3	3.39	3.68	3.72	3.66
Project objectives	3.57	3.7	3.73	3.8	3.82	3.83
Design	2.69	2.8	2.86	2.95	3.18	3.17

MI 10.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently	**KPI score**
Unsatisfactory	**2.50**

The efficiency criteria is structured around resource/cost efficiency of interventions, the timeliness of implementation, and the achievement of results. The efficiency criterion is rated satisfactory by IDEV and has registered a slightly positive trend from 2017 to 2020 (65% to 77% of projects rated satisfactory or better) but performance reversed in 2021 (73%) most likely as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The timeliness criteria is rated unsatisfactory.

Completing projects on time remains one of the most persistent issues in the Bank delivery model. The score has been generally low during the 2016-2020 period (between 2.25 and 2.45) but increased to 2.52 in 2021. The percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better is also low and fluctuated between 36% and 45% in the 2016-2021 period. In addition, the percentage of projects facing implementation challenges and delays (30%) in 2021 is higher than the target for the year (21%) and the baseline (29%) (ADER 2022). The APPR (2019) notes that by the time a project reaches its expected five-year-life term, the average disbursement rate achieved is below 46% due to initial delays, Major contributing factors to these start-up delays include incomplete design at entry including the preparation of preliminary and detailed design studies, preparation of bidding documents, compensation, resettlement and concession arrangements, mobilising counterpart funding, recruiting project teams, and unrealistic planning schedules. Very common for infrastructure projects, these delays often result in disbursement being initiated only 3 years after loan approval.

Value for money indicators show mixed performance. They would require further probing, notably on costs associated with projects. These decreased in 2020 due to travel restrictions and smart working, but increased in 2021, although the restrictions were still in place.

MI 11.1: Interventions/activities assessed as resource-/cost-efficient	Score
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Interventions are designed to include activities and inputs that produce outputs in the most cost/resource efficient manner available at the time	
3. Satisfactory: Results delivered when compared to the cost of activities and inputs are appropriate even when the programme design process did not directly consider alternative delivery methods and associated costs	
2. Unsatisfactory: Interventions have no credible, reliable information on the costs of activities and inputs and therefore no data is available on cost/resource efficiency	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Credible information is provided which indicates that interventions are not cost/resource efficient	

MI 11.1: Analysis	Evidence documents
The efficiency criteria is composed of four sub-criteria: i) timeliness (analysed in MI 11.2), ii) resource use efficiency, iii) cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and iv) implementation progress. **The overall efficiency criteria is rated satisfactory or better in the 2016-2021** period with an up-ward trend until 2020 (77% of projects rated satisfactory or better) which was reversed in 2021 (73%) as the likely consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The three sub-criteria's score analysed through this MI are also rated satisfactory and increased since 2016, including resource use efficiency (3.35 in 2021), cost-benefit analysis (3.07) and implementation (3.02) While in 2020 the Bank used alternative delivery methods through the CRF and more cost-efficient budget support operations, the Bank's sovereign portfolio was impacted in 2021 by the reduced demand for COVID-related fast disbursing operations, limited ability to mobilise implementation teams, procure goods and services and supervise projects with an impact on cost-efficiency.	104, 107, 108

FIGURE 38. **EFFICIENCY DATA – PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**



Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-21)

FIGURE 39. **PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Efficiency	74%	65%	65%	73%	77%	73%
Resource use efficiency	84%	84%	71%	86%	94%	88%
Cost-benefit analysis	83%	44%	63%	83%	87%	80%
Implementation	70%	65%	66%	65%	86%	84%

Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-20) and data indicated by IDEV for 2021

***Ex-ante*, cost-effectiveness analysis is planned to be performed during the design phase.** The Operations Manual plans several checklists to ensure that project costs estimation and return are performed ex-ante. Some methodological challenges persist linked to limited evidence in the PCRs on how the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) calculations were undertaken or what assumptions were used.

Some methodological challenges persist linked to limited evidence in the PCRs on how the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) calculations were undertaken or what assumptions were used. In both 2016 and 2018, the PCRENs were critical of the PCRs' CBA results because evaluators assessed that the CBA was "often poorly undertaken or at least poorly documented". This limited evidence may be an explanation of the high number of non-responses ("NA", "UTS" and "blank" rate – 46 out of 61 projects in 2020) based on the MOPAN review of IDEV's database. This partly explains the disconnect but it can also be the case that PCREN evaluators more readily accepted PCR results due to often limited evidence in the PCRs on how the CBA calculations were undertaken or what assumptions were used. Overall, room for improvement remains according to IDEV due to the fact that design weaknesses tend to result in cost increases. The percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better decreased in 2021 (80%) in comparison with the level of 2020 (87%) However, among positive developments, it is worth mentioning that the RR includes now criteria on cost-benefit analysis, in response to past IDEV finding. 104, 107, 108

***Ex post*, the resource use efficiency sub-criterion is still rated as satisfactory and is on a positive trend to date in comparison with the level of 2016**

- **The score improved to 3.35 in 2021** with a significant increase compared to 2018 (2.9) and 2016 (3.05).
- **The percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better increased with a level of 88% in 2021**, in comparison of 84% in 2016.

Value for money indicators

- **The cost of preparing a project** was UA 109 400 in 2021. This cost exceeds the target for 2021 (UA 81 000). It is also higher than the levels of 2016 (UA 78000) and of the baseline (UA85 600).
- **The cost of supporting project implementation was** UA 24 300 in 2021 (ie. 34 039 USD). It also exceeds the target for 2021 (UA 19 000). It is also higher than the levels of 2016 (UA 22 000) and of the baseline (UA 20 000).

For both indicators, lower levels were noted in 2020 (respectively UA 84 000 and UA 18 000) partly attributable to COVID-19 travel restrictions, lockdowns, reduction of lending volume and cost reductions associated with new ways of working. The fact that this trend reversed in 2021 needs further probing since lockdowns and travel restrictions were still in place. Overall, considering that this is an area of improvement, the rationale for further reducing costs on design and supervision in line with targets, would merit re-examination.

Administrative costs and work environment cost per seat met in 2021 their targets and are below their baseline of 2015 but have increased since 2016. (Figure 40)	104, 107, 108

FIGURE 40. **VALUE FOR MONEY INDICATORS**

UA thousands	Baseline (2015)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Target 2021
Cost of preparing a project	86	78	89	128	93	84	109	81
Cost of supporting project implementation	20	22	20	28	21	18	24	19
Administrative costs per UA 1 million disbursed	99	72	70	91	101	65	91	92
Work environment cost per seat	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.5	3.95	3.4	3.2	3

Source: ADER reports

MI 11.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time	**Score**
MI rating	**Unsatisfactory**
MI score	**2.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: All or nearly all the objectives of interventions are achieved on time or, in the case of humanitarian programming, a legitimate explanation exists for delays in achieving some outputs/outcomes	
3. Satisfactory: More than half of the intended objectives of interventions are achieved on time, and this level is appropriate to the context that existed during implementation.	
2. Unsatisfactory: Less than half of the intended objectives are achieved on time but interventions have been adjusted to take account of the difficulties encountered and can be expected to improve the pace of achievement in the future.	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Less than half of stated objectives of interventions are achieved on time, and no credible plan or legitimate explanation is identified that would suggest significant improvement in achieving objectives on time.	
MI 11.2: Analysis	**Evidence documents**
Completing projects on time remains one of the most persistent issues in the Bank delivery model. The score has been generally low during the 2016-2020 period (between 2.25 and 2.45) but increased to 2.52 in 2021 (Figure 41). However, this is the lowest of all scores. The percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better is also low at 45% but improving.	104,107,108

FIGURE 41. **TIMELINESS INDICATORS**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Score	2.45	2.5	2.35	2.25	2.38	2.52
Percentage of projects rated satisfactory or better	45	40	38	36	39	45

Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-20) and synthesis report on (2016-20) PCR validation

ADER's indicators confirm this trend: • **When assessing first disbursement and signature delays against targets, red flags are raised by the system, and as a consequence 29% of portfolio in 2021 has become eligible for cancellation which is higher than the target for 2021 (18%) and the baseline (25%).** This is mainly because of the PD which set the bar for first disbursement at an ambitious level (6 months). This situation negatively impacts the efficient allocation and disbursement of resources. Among recent positive development, presidential directive 02/2015 has now been adjusted to reflect more realistic disbursement timelines. • **The time from concept note to first disbursements in 2021** (27.4 months) **is much higher in comparison of the target for 2021** (15 months), and the baseline of 2015 (21.9 months). • **30% of projects faced implementation challenges and delays in 2021 (probably partly due to COVID-19 impacts) which is higher than the target for the year (21%) and the baseline (29%).** It worth mentioning some improvements were noted before the COVID-19 crisis with lowest levels (23% in 2018, 27% in 2019%). The APPR notes that as a result of initial delays, by the time the project reaches its expected life term of five years, the average disbursement rate achieved is below 46%. While part of these delays results from disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, more structural causes are also at stake. A major contributing factor to start-up delays is incomplete design at entry, including preparation of preliminary and detailed design studies, preparation of bidding documents, compensation, resettlement and concession arrangements, mobilisation of counterpart funding as well as recruitment of project teams. As a result of these delays, which are very common for infrastructure projects, disbursement is often initiated only 3 years after loan approval (Figure 42).	104,107,108

FIGURE 42. **ADER INDICATORS**

	Baseline (2015)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Target 2021
Time to concept note to first disbursement (months)	22	20	19	21	22	16	27	15
Operations eligible for cancellation (%)	25	31	29	27	30	30	29	17
Projects facing implementation challenges and delays (%)	29	29	36	23	27	33	30	21

Source: ADER reports

MI 11.2: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 12: Results are sustainable	**KPI score**
Satisfactory	**3.00**
The sustainability criteria comprise four sub-criteria: i) financial, ii) institutional, iii) ownership, and iv) environmental and social. IDEV rated the overall sustainability as satisfactory or better for 88% of projects in 2021 and 86% in 2020. The overall sustainability score rose from 2.63 in 2016 to 3.08 in 2021. **Overall, sustainability is seen to be likely but there is room for improvement. According to IDEV Synthesis report (2021)**, it is not infrequent to find that previous projects have addressed very similar, if not the same issues, and concluded that it was unlikely that the operation was sustainable. And yet, a few years later, a follow-up project confronts substantially the same issues. Protracting the redress of sustainability issues also points to the limited incorporation of lessons learned. IPRs/PCRs may tend to be optimistic about whether the project can continue independently into the future. **Financial sustainability of completed projects has been a source of concern with only about 60% of the projects assessed as satisfactory or better until 2020 (though improving to 88% in 2021, score of 3.10).** The overall sustainability rating is also associated with the second biggest disconnect between PCRs and PCRENs of 17% (Synthesis report 2021), revealing over-optimistic staff expectations for project sustainability after completion. The environmental and social sub-criteria also decreased from 82% in 2020 to 76% in 2021 (score of 2.76).	
MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing, or likely to continue after intervention completion (Where applicable, reference to building institutional or community capacity and/or strengthening enabling environment for development, in support of 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda)	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**3.00**
4. Highly satisfactory: Evaluations assess as likely that the intervention will result in continued benefits for the target group after completion. For humanitarian relief operations, the strategic and operational measures to link relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and, eventually, development are credible. Moreover, they are likely to succeed in securing continuing benefits for the target group. Sustainability may be supported by building institutional capacity and/or strengthening the enabling environment for development.	
3. Satisfactory: Evaluations assess as likely that the intervention will result in continued benefits for the target group after completion. For humanitarian relief operations, strategic and operational measures link relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction.	
2. Unsatisfactory: Evaluations assess as a low probability that the intervention will result in continued benefits for the target group after completion. For humanitarian relief operations, efforts to link the relief phase to rehabilitation, reconstruction and, eventually, to development are inadequate. (In some circumstances such linkage may not be possible due to the context of the emergency. If this is stated in the evaluation, a rating of satisfactory is appropriate).	
1. Highly unsatisfactory: Evaluations find a very low probability that the programme programme/project will result in continued intended benefits for the target group after project completion. For humanitarian relief operations, evaluations find no strategic or operational measures to link relief, to rehabilitation, reconstruction and, eventually, to development.	

MI 12.1: Analysis	Evidence documents
The sustainability criteria is composed of four sub-criteria: i) financial, ii) institutional, iii) ownership, and iv) environmental and social. IDEV rated the overall sustainability rating as satisfactory or better for 92% of projects in 2021 and 86% in 2020. The overall score of sustainability enjoyed a positive trend in recent years, increasing from 2.63 in 2016 to 3.08 in 2021. **However, financial sustainability of completed projects has been a source of concern with only 46% to 61% of the projects assessed as satisfactory or better during the 2016-2020 period** (though improving to 88% in 2021, score of 3.10). The overall sustainability rating is also associated with the second biggest disconnect between PCRs and PCRENs of 17% in 2020, revealing over-optimistic staff expectations for project sustainability after completion. The environmental and social sub-criteria also decreased from 82% in 2020 to 76% in 2021 (score of 2.76). (Figure 43 and Figure 44)	101, 107, 108

FIGURE 43. **SUSTAINABILITY DATA- PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**



Source: Database shared by IDEV (2016-21)

FIGURE 44. **PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS RATED SATISFACTORY OR BETTER (VALIDATED DATA)**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Sustainability	**64%**	**75%**	**65%**	**78%**	**86%**	**92%**
Financial	52%	46%	52%	61%	59%	88%
Institutional and capacity	68%	78%	69%	78%	81%	92%
Ownership and partnership	74%	83%	75%	72%	81%	84%
Environmental and social	67%	88%	74%	76%	82%	76%
Score	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**
Sustainability	**2.63**	**2.80**	**2.65**	**2.83**	**3.00**	**3.08**
Financial	2.45	2.80	2.55	2.60	2.72	3.10
Institutional and capacity	2.70	3.00	2.68	2.86	2.91	3.08
Ownership and partnership	2.78		2.77	2.83	2.96	3.03
Environmental and social	2.70	2.90	2.80	2.80	3.06	2.76

Source: Synthesis Report on the Validation of the PCRs (2016-2021)

IDEV Synthesis report notes that the prospect of sustainability in each of the four sub-criteria was satisfactory, even if performance on some of them (financial) needs improvement. Overall, sustainability is seen to be likely but room for improvement is highlighted, as it is not infrequent to find that previous projects have addressed very similar, if not the same, issues, and have concluded the unlikely sustainability of the operation. And yet, a few years later, a follow-up project is required to address again substantially the same issues. Each PCR may be optimistic that the project can continue independently into the future. However, the PCR may have been less optimistic on this point if it had taken into account the fact that more or less the same project has already been undertaken in the past, maybe more than once, and that previous evaluations had concluded that previous project results were unlikely to be sustainable.	101, 107, 108
MI 12.1: Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

ANNEX B: EVIDENCE LIST

No.	Reference
1	MOPAN (2016), African Development Bank Institutional Assessment Report
2	AfDB (2016), Update on the Decentralization Action Plan in line with the DBDM
3	IOD Park UK (2019), Independent Evaluation of the Implementation of the Development and Business Delivery Model of AfDB, AfDB
4	AfDB (2018), Delegation of Authority Matrix
5	AfDB (2016), A proposal to redesign the bank's development and business delivery model
6	AfDB (2018 to 2022), Annual Report
7	AfDB (2018 to 2022), Financial Report
8	AfDB (2020), Long term financial sustainability framework
9	AfDB (n.d.), Country Resources allocation
10	ADF (2016), ADF Replenishment meetings: Financial Frameworks
11	ADF (2016), ADF Replenishment meetings: Resource allocation frameworks
12	ADF (2017), ADF-14 Replenishment Report
13	AfDB (2015), AfDB's Strategy for 2013–2022
14	AfDB (2019), Midterm review of the Ten-year strategy
15	AfDB (2021), ADF 15 Mid-term review
16	AfDB (2013), The High 5s
17	ADF (2020), Deputies Report on the AFD-15
18	ADF (2021), ADF-15 Replenishment Report
19	ADF (2022), ADF-16, Investing in Africa's women to accelerate inclusive growth AfDB
20	UNDP (2017), Africa Policy Brief on Strengthening Strategic Alignment for Africa
21	ADF (2022), ADF-16 Accelerating Climate Action and promoting Green Growth in ADF countries AfDB
22	AfDB (2021), Ten-year climate change and green growth strategy
23	AfDB (2021), Climate change and green growth policy
24	AfDB (2016), Climate Change Action Plan 2016-2020
25	AfDB (2021), Evaluation of Mainstreaming Green Growth and Climate Change into the AfDB's interventions
26	AfDB (2020), Climate change and green growth report 2020
27	AfDB (2021), The African Development Bank Group Gender Strategy 2021-2025
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No.	Reference
29	AfDB (2022), Country gender profiles
30	AfDB (n.d.), Gender marker system
31	AfDB (2018), Mid-term review of the Gender Strategy
32	AfDB (2020), Evaluation synthesis of Gender Mainstreaming at the AfDB
33	AfDB (2014), Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa – the AfDB Group Strategy 2014-2019
34	ADF (2022), Addressing Fragility in the Performance-based allocation system – Technical note
35	AfDB (2022), The Bank Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa (2022-2026)
36	AfDB (2021), Strategy for economic governance in Africa (2021-2025) AfDB
37	AfDB (2016), Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan (2014-2018) AfDB
38	AfDB (2020), Proposal for extension and completion review – Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan (2014-2018) AfDB
39	AfDB (2020), AfDB's People Strategy 2021-2025
40	AfDB (2021), Private Sector Development Strategy (2021-2025)
41	AfDB (2016), Policy on non-sovereign operations
42	AfDB (2015), AfDB's Knowledge Management Strategy for 2015-2020
43	AfDB (2020), Knowledge Management Strategy 2015-2020 Completion Report
44	AfDB (2022), AfDB's Knowledge Management Strategy for 2022-2031
45	AfDB (2015-2016), Bank Group Policy on Results Based Financing
46	AfDB (2020), Feed Africa Response to COVID19
47	AfDB (2014), Bank Group Regional Integration Policy and Strategy (RIPoS) 2014–2023
48	AfDB (2018), Regional Integration Strategic Framework (RISF) 2018-2025
49	AfDB (2018), Proposal for Revised Country and Regional Strategy Paper (CSP & RISP)
50	AfDB (2022), African Development Bank Group Capacity Development Strategy 2021-2025
51	AfDB (2021), The African Development Bank Group Trust Fund Policy
52	AfDB (n.d.), Country Strategy Papers (sample of 12 countries: Congo, Egypt, Angola, Kenya, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cameroon
53	AfDB (n.d.), Country Portfolio Performance Review (sample of 12 countries: Congo, Egypt, Angola, Kenya, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cameroon)
54	AfDB (n.d.), PAR (sample: Tunisia, Morocco, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Uganda, DRC, South Sudan, Kenya, Eswatini, Botswana, Multinational/Madagascar)
55	AfDB (2020), Cameroon COVID-19 Crisis Response Budget Support Programme (PABRC)

No.	Reference
56	AfDB (2019), Cameroon, Joint 2015-2020 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Mid-term Review and Country Portfolio Performance Review Report
57	IDEV (2019), Angola, Evaluation of the African Development Bank Strategy and Program in Angola 2011-2020
58	IDEV (2019), IDEV validation of the West Africa RISP
59	AfDB (2021), Readiness Review (RR) documents
60	AfDB (2020), The Integrated Quality Action Plan
61	AfDB (2020), Designing the African Development Bank's PPP Framework
62	AfDB (2020), Evaluation of the Private Sector Strategy
63	AfDB (2021), The African Economic Outlook
64	IDEV (n.d.), Yearly Report on the Management Action Record System – Status of Adoption (Implementation) of IDEV's Recommendations
65	AfDB (2020), Independent recourse mechanism – Annual Reports
66	AfDB (2018), Introduction to AfDB's policies regarding integrity and anti-corruption
67	AfDB (n.d.), Integrity and anti-corruption
68	AfDB (2018), Code of ethics
69	AfDB (2018), Code of conduct for staff
70	AfDB (2007), Code of conduct for executive directors
71	AfDB (2022), Ethics Office Annual Report 2021
72	AfDB (2018 to 2022), Office of integrity and Anti-corruption Annual Report 2021
73	AfDB (2007), Whistle-blowing and Complaints Handling Policy
74	AfDB (2021), Presidential directive 02/2022 establishing rules and procedures for dealing with harassment in the Bank (including sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH)
75	AfDB (2021), Independent recourse mechanism: operating rules and procedures
76	AfDB (2021), Joint Statement on Continuous Advancement of Standards to Prevent SH, Abuse and Exploitation
77	AfDB (2019), Communication Plan on the prevention of SEAH
78	AfDB (2019), NSO Business Manual
79	AfDB (2014), Operations Manual
80	AfDB (2021), Operation Directives and Results Planning and Monitoring
81	AfDB (2012), Disbursement Handbook
82	AfDB (2012), Rules and Procedures for Procurement of Goods and Works
83	AfDB (2015), Procurement Policy for bank group funded operations

No.	Reference
84	AfDB (2020), Annual Report of the Sanctions Appeals Board – 2020
85	IDEV (2018), Comparative Review of Sanctions Practices across Multilateral Development Banks
86	AfDB (2015), Environmental and social assessment procedures
87	AfDB (2013), Integrated safeguards system: policy statement and official safeguards
88	AfDB (2021), Management of complaints – procedure for accountability to beneficiaries
89	AfDB (2021), Total compensation framework 2021-2024
90	AfDB (2017), The AfDB's Human Resource Management Policy and Strategic Directions: A formative Evaluation
91	AfDB (2017), Competency Framework for the African Development Bank
92	AfDB (2017), AFDB's HRIS Strategy and Program – Supporting HR Transformation
93	AfDB (2017), AfDB, Refreshing our performance management framework
94	AfDB (2021), Presidential directive 05/21 concerning Staff Performance Management System
95	AfDB (2021), 2021-2023 Work Programme and Budget Document
96	IDEV (2015), Administrative budget management of the AfDB. An Independent Evaluation
97	AfDB (n.d.), Credit Risk Committee Reviews
98	AfDB (2022), Independent auditor report – in the AfDB Annual Reports / Financial Reports
99	AfDB (2021), Second progress report on the implementation of GCI-VII
100	AfDB (2022), Third progress report on the implementation of GCI-VII
101	AfDB (2018 to 2022), Annual Development Effectiveness Reviews
102	AfDB (2016), The One Bank Results Measurement Framework (2016-2025)
103	AfDB (2016), Midterm review of the Results Measurement Framework
104	AfDB (2020), Annual Portfolio Performance Report
105	IDEV (2018), Evaluation of Quality Assurance across the project cycle of the AfDB (2012–17)
106	AfDB (2018), Quality Retrospective Report
107	IDEV (2022), Synthesis report on the validation of 2020-2021 Project Completion Reports & Expanded Supervision Reports
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109	IDEV (2019), Synthesis Report on the Validation of 2014-2019 Expanded Supervision Reports
110	IDEV (2019), Evaluation of the AfDB's Integrated Safeguards System
111	AfDB (2020), The African Development Bank Group unveils $10 billion Response Facility to curb COVID-19AfDB
112	AfDB (2021), Evaluation of the African Development Group's Transition Support Facility
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116	IDEV (2017), Independent Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Regional Integration Strategy Paper for Eastern Africa
117	AfDB (2021), African Development Bank holds webinar on accountability for Southern African CSOs
118	AfDB (2021), Evaluation of the Partnerships of the AfDB 2008-2019
119	AfDB (2019), Evaluation of the Bank's utilization of the Public Private Partnership Mechanism 2006-2017
120	IDEV (2020), Evaluation of the AfDB's Engagement with civil society 2012-2019
121	IDEV (2019), Lessons on the Effectiveness of Development Partnerships
122	ICAI (2021), The UK Support to the African Development Bank Group
123	AfDB (2022), Partnership Agreements
124	IDEV (2020), Evaluation of the AfDB's self-evaluation systems and processes
125	IDEV (2018), Evaluation of Quality at Supervision and Exit
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127	IDEV (2018), Self-assessment of the implementation of the AfDB Independent Evaluation Strategy 2013-17
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132	Japanese Ministry of Finance (2022), Multilateral development banks' final report on value for money
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134	AfDB (2019), Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance
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141	AfDB, Investing in Gender Equality for Africa's Transformation (2014-2018)
142	AfDB (2022), Evaluation of the African Development Bank Group's support to its Regional Member Countries in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
143	AfDB, Evaluation de la Stratégie décennale de la Banque africaine de développement, 2013-2022

ANNEX C: SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

MOPAN SURVEY'S OBJECTIVES

The MOPAN Survey is a survey of AfDB's stakeholders. It provides one stream of evidence for the MOPAN assessment, besides a document review and interviews with AfDB's staff. The survey is managed by the MOPAN Secretariat. For more information on the process and the survey, please consult the MOPAN methodology 3.1 (pp 35-38).

The MOPAN Survey aims to consult stakeholders that fulfil different roles vis-à-vis AfDB, and to gather data about perception and an understanding of practice from a diverse set of AfDB stakeholders. It provides a broad, balanced sampling of different types of partners in different contexts with an emphasis on people who know the MO well. Selection criteria and a typology of partners were agreed accordingly at inception phase (MOPAN Assessment of AfDB, Inception Report).

The MOPAN survey is designed to generate evidence on the MOPAN 3.1 framework to assess AfDB's organisational effectiveness. Country-level evidence is used for triangulation, but not to generate findings that are 'generalisable' across all AfDB's operations. While the MOPAN Survey will collect a range of perceptions across global policy and country strategy and operations, it does not consult field-based implementation staff or beneficiaries.

MOPAN SURVEY'S APPROACH

Survey Process

- Validation of country sample and of stakeholder typology
- Collection of survey participants contacts for AfDB (Focal Points) and review of the collected list, as well as in parallel customise the survey and translate it
- Implement survey into the online tool and tests
- AfDB senior management send an advanced communication to survey participants to inform them about the imminent launch
- MOPAN Survey is launched. Stakeholders receive personalised URL invite to the survey. Closing of the survey.
- Export and analyse survey results.

AfDB stakeholders identified

The first task of this assessment was to reflect on which stakeholders to include in the survey and finalise the country sample. We have identified 5 categories of stakeholders and two levels of analysis (at Global/Headquarter level; at country level (including a sampled approach):

- **Board of Directors[1]:** Delegated representative (i.e. Alternate Executive Director and/or Advisor) in the Board of Directors for all members countries
- **Government (Borrowing countries):** including the ministry of Finance and/or plan (interlocutors of the AfDB country office management and staff), line ministries and project implementation teams
- Donor governments and bilateral development agencies
- **Peer Development organisations:** including UN organisations, IFI, regional organisations and others
- **Others:** including knowledge partners, private sector, civil society (NGOs), and non-government donors to trust funds.

1. The views of all shareholders will be represented in this category. Specific views from borrower / donor relationships outside of the Board context will be captured in the subsequent categories.

FIGURE 45. **PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF STAKEHOLDERS CATEGORIES FOR AfDB**

	Global/ Headquarter level	**Country level**
Category 1 – Board of Directors	Delegated representative (ie. Alternate Executive Director and/or Advisors) in the Board of Directors for all members countries	
Category 2 – Government (Borrower countries)		(i) interlocutors of the AfDB country office management and staff at the ministry of Finance and/or Plan (ii) interlocutors from Line Ministries (iii) Project Implementation Teams implementing MDB-financed projects.
Category 3 – Donors and bilateral development agencies	(i) Trust fund managers (ii) Other interlocutors of the AfDB management and staff at global / HQ levels in donor governments (iii) Other interlocutors in bilateral development agencies	(i) N/A (ii) Head of Cooperation's or officers from Embassy (iii) Head of Bilateral Development Agency or bilateral coordinators
Category 4 – Peer development organisations	(i) UN Organisations (ii) IFIs (iii) Regional organisations ((African Union, NEPAD, AMU-CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC) (iv) Others (e.g. EU, global funds)	
	Interlocutors from the HQ for example Partnership's Department, Africa Department interacting with AfDB.	Interlocutors at country level for example Representatives, Partnership Officer, Operations Officer, etc.
Category 5 – Others	(i) Knowledge partners (ii) Private sector (iii) Civil society (NGOs) (iv) Non-government donors to trust funds (Global only)	

Source: AfDB, MOPAN's design

Confidentiality: As professional survey researchers we guaranteed confidentiality. This assessment worked in compliance with MOPAN's data privacy policy.

Geographic scope

The survey was sent to AfDB's stakeholders at the **global level**, and partners at the **country level** in the selection of 12 countries agreed at inception stage:

1. Republic of Congo (Central Africa)
2. Egypt (North Africa)
3. Angola (Southern Africa)
4. Kenya (East Africa)
5. Burkina Faso (West Africa)
6. Senegal (West Africa)
7. Morocco (North Africa)
8. Ethiopia (East Africa)
9. Rwanda (East Africa)
10. Mozambique (Southern Africa)
11. Nigeria (West Africa)
12. Cameroon (Central Africa)

Questions of the survey

Q	Questions (HQ/global wording)	Questions (At country level wording)
Q1_1	The strategies of [MO] demonstrate clarity of vision.	The strategies of [MO] in [COUNTRY] demonstrate clarity of vision.
Q1_2	The strategies of [MO] demonstrate good understanding of its comparative advantage.	The strategies of MO in [COUNTRY] demonstrate good understanding of its comparative advantage.
Q1_3	[MO] organises and runs itself in a way that fully supports its vision.	[MO] organises and runs itself in a way that fully supports its vision.
Q1_4	[MO]'s financial framework supports the effective implementation of the mandate and strategy.	N/A
Q1_5	[MO]'s strategic allocation of resources is transparent and coherent with agreed strategic priorities.	N/A
Q1_6	[MO] applies principles of results-based budgeting and reports expenditures according to results.	N/A
Q1_7	[MO] adequately addresses issues and concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (including operational and financial risk management, internal audit, social and environmental safeguards)	[MO] adequately addresses issues and concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (including risk management, audit, social and environmental safeguards) in [COUNTRY]
Q1_8	[MO] manages a range of trust funds and other concessional resources that can be applied flexibly and efficiently to address emergencies, conflict, knowledge work and global public goods in different countries	[MO] manages a range of trust funds that can be applied flexibly and efficiently to address emergencies, conflict, knowledge work and global public goods in [COUNTRY]
Q1_9	[MO] manages trust funds efficiently, including through pooled and umbrella funds.	[MO] manages trust funds efficiently, including through pooled and umbrella funds.
Q1_10	[MO] has a COVID strategy that is clear and reflects its comparative advantage.	[MO] has a COVID strategy that in [country] is clear and reflects its comparative advantage.
Q2_1	[MO] has a sufficient number of staff, either in or accessible to countries where it operates to deliver intended results.	[MO] has a sufficient number of staff, either in or accessible to [COUNTRY] to deliver intended results in [COUNTRY].
Q2_2	[MO]'s staff have the relevant experience and skills to work successfully in their technical/sectoral context.	[MO]'s staff have the relevant experience and skills to work successfully in their technical/sectoral context in [COUNTRY].
Q2_3	N/A	[MO]'s staff are present in country for a long enough time to build the relationships needed in [COUNTRY].
Q2_4	N/A	[MO] makes critical strategic or programming decisions affecting [COUNTRY] in an agile and responsive way.
Q3_1	[MO] promotes gender equality through its operations and strategies.	[MO] promotes gender equality through its operations and strategies.

Q	Questions (HQ/global wording)	Questions (At country level wording)
Q3_2	[MO] promotes environmental sustainability and addresses climate change through its operations and strategies	[MO] promotes environmental sustainability and addresses climate change through its operations and strategies
Q3_3	[MO] considers and addresses risks of fragility, conflict and violence in its interventions and strategies.	[MO] considers and addresses risks of fragility, conflict and violence in its interventions and strategies.
Q3_4	[MO] promotes the protection of vulnerable people in its operations	[MO] promotes the protection of vulnerable people in its operations
Q3_5	[MO] helps develop institutional capacity of borrowing partners and promote good governance through its strategies and interventions	[MO] helps develop institutional capacity of borrowing partners and promote good governance through its strategies and interventions
Q4_1	[MO]'s work responds to the needs of beneficiaries, including the most vulnerable populations.	[MO]'s work responds to the needs of beneficiaries, including the most vulnerable populations.
Q4_2	[MO] adapts its work as necessary when the context changes.	[MO] adapts its work as necessary when the context in [COUNTRY] changes.
Q4_3	[MO]'s work is aligned with the development needs and priorities of the countries in which it works.	[MO]'s work is aligned with the development needs and priorities of [COUNTRY].
Q4_4	[MO]'s strategies and interventions are informed by an analysis of situations and needs, including those in the local context as relevant	[MO]'s strategies and interventions in [COUNTRY] are informed by an analysis of situations and needs, including those in the local context as relevant.
Q4_5	[MO]'s work with partners is based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific sectoral and/or thematic areas	[MO]'s work with partners in [COUNTRY] is based on a clear understanding of why it is best placed to target specific sectoral and/or thematic areas.
Q4_6	[MO]'s work takes into account national / regional capacity, including of government, civil society, private sector and other actors.	[MO]'s work in [COUNTRY] takes into account national / regional capacity, including of government, civil society, private sector and other actors.
Q4_7	N/A	In [COUNTRY], [MO]'s operations target long-term development outcomes and institutional changes in capacity.
Q4_8	N/A	[MO]'s work in [COUNTRY] is selective, targeting sectors where it can contribute to long-term impacts.
Q4_9	N/A	[MO] provides an appropriate mix of technical advice, financing and knowledge to address key development challenges in [COUNTRY].
Q4_10	[MO] designs and implements its projects in such a way that its effects and impact are likely to be sustained over time	[MO] designs and implements its work in [COUNTRY] in such a way that its effects and impact are likely to be sustained over time
Q4_11	N/A	[MO] appropriately manages risk within the context of its work in [COUNTRY].

Q	Questions (HQ/global wording)	Questions (At country level wording)
Q4_12	[MO] has been able to adapt its operating model in response to COVID-19 to ensure operational continuity.	[MO] has been able to adapt its operating model in [COUNTRY] in response to COVID-19 to ensure operational continuity.
Q5_1	[MO] openly communicates the criteria for approving operations and allocating financial resources.	[MO] openly communicates the criteria and processes for approving operations and allocating financial resources in [COUNTRY].
Q5_2	[MO] provides reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen, and the respective amounts.	In [COUNTRY], [MO] provides reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen, and the respective amounts.
Q5_3	[MO] co-ordinates its activities with partners to ensure coherence and avoid fragmentation / duplication at country level.	[MO] co-ordinates its activities in [COUNTRY] with partners to ensure coherence and avoid fragmentation / duplication.
Q5_4	[MO] has been able to adapt its programming and financing to respond to COVID-19 in an agile and responsive way.	[MO] has been able to adapt its programming and financing to respond to COVID-19 in an agile and responsive way.
Q5_5	[MO] actively seeks co-financing with development partners and opportunities to mobilise finance from the private sector	[MO] actively seeks co-financing with development partners and opportunities to mobilise finance from the private sector
Q6_1	[MO]'s knowledge products are useful for my work.	[MO]'s knowledge products are useful for my work.
Q6_2	[MO]'s knowledge products are provided in a format that makes them easy to use.	[MO]'s knowledge products are provided in a format that makes them easy to use.
Q6_4	[MO] provides high-quality inputs to the global (Africa-related) policy dialogue.	[MO] provides high-quality inputs to policy dialogue in [COUNTRY] or at a regional level that affects [COUNTRY].
Q6_5	[MO] allocates sufficient resources to support strategic knowledge work .	[MO] allocates sufficient resources to support strategic knowledge work in [COUNTRY]
Q6_6	[MO] convenes development partners to promote a coherent response to development challenges in Africa.	[MO] convenes development partners to promote a coherent response to development challenges in [COUNTRY].
Q6_7	[MO] shares key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results) with partners in line with IATI requirements	[MO] shares key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results) with partners in line with IATI requirements
Q6_8	[MO] helps develop the capacity of country systems.	[MO] helps develop the capacity of country systems in [COUNTRY].
Q6_9	N/A	In [COUNTRY], [MO] management processes (e.g. hiring, procuring, disbursing) do not cause unnecessary delays for partners in implementing operations
Q6_10	[MO] seizes opportunities to support countries in furthering their development partnerships through South-South cooperation and triangular relationships (e.g. support to regional organisations and initiatives).	[MO] seizes opportunities to support countries in furthering their development partnerships through South-South cooperation and triangular relationships (e.g. support to regional organisations and initiatives).

Q	Questions (HQ/global wording)	Questions (At country level wording)
Q6_11	N/A	[MO] is actively engaged in co-ordination mechanisms for planning, implementation, monitoring with borrowing partners and other development partners in [COUNTRY]
Q6_12	N/A	[MO] jointly monitors progress on shared goals in [COUNTRY] with local and regional partners.
Q6_13	[MO] increases the impact of interventions through the provision of technical guidance and project preparation support	[MO] increases the impact of interventions in [COUNTRY] through the provision of technical guidance and project preparation support
Q6_14	N/A	[MO] identifies and manages the potential environmental and social impacts of its projects in [COUNTRY].
Q6_15	N/A	[MO] engages civil society and project affected peoples in [COUNTRY] and addresses any grievances raised.
Q6_16	[MO] requires its partners to apply clear standards for preventing and responding to sexual misconduct in relation to host populations.	[MO] requires its partners to apply clear standards for preventing and responding to sexual misconduct in relation to host populations.
Q6_17	[MO] has provided relevant knowledge and thought leadership in the context of the COVID-19 response.	[MO] has provided relevant knowledge and thought leadership in the context of the COVID-19 response.
Q7_1	[MO] prioritises a results-based approach – for example when engaging in policy dialogue, or planning and implementing interventions.	In [COUNTRY], [MO] prioritises a results-based approach – for example when engaging in policy dialogue, or planning and implementing interventions.
Q7_2	N/A	[MO] consults with stakeholders on the setting of results targets at a country level.
Q8_1	[MO] supports implementation through regular supervision of projects.	[MO] supports implementation through regular supervision of projects.
Q8_2	[MO] consistently identifies which interventions are under-performing.	[MO] consistently identifies which interventions are under-performing.
Q8_3	[MO] addresses any areas of intervention under-performance, for example, through technical support or changing funding patterns if appropriate.	[MO] addresses any areas of intervention under-performance, for example, through technical support or changing funding patterns if appropriate.
Q8_4	[MO] participates in joint / inter-agency efforts to prevent, investigate and report on any sexual misconduct by personnel in relation to the host population (SEA).	[MO] participates in joint / inter-agency efforts to prevent, investigate and report on any sexual misconduct by personnel in relation to the host population (SEA).
Q8_5	[MO] learns lessons from previous projects and applies them to new interventions	[MO] learns lessons from previous projects and applies them to new interventions
Q9	Thinking about [MO] and the way it operates, what do you consider to be its greatest strength?	Thinking about [MO] and the way it operates in [COUNTRY], what do you consider to be its greatest strength?

Q	Questions (HQ/global wording)	Questions (At country level wording)
Q10	Still thinking about [MO] and the way it operates, what do you consider to be the area where it most needs improvement?	Still thinking about [MO] and the way it operates in [COUNTRY], what do you consider to be the area where it most needs improvement?
Q12	What do you consider to be the key comparative advantage(s) of [MO] in leading development activities in the African continent	What do you consider to be the key comparative advantage(s) of [MO] in leading development activities in the African continent
Q11	Do you have any additional comments about how [MO] has responded to the COVID-19 crisis?	Do you have any additional comments about how [MO] has responded to the COVID-19 crisis in [COUNTRY]?

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Responses received by the survey

The survey received responses from 125 partners. Whilst this response rate is higher than the previous MOPAN assessment of AfDB, which included 39 responses, it represents only 18% of the total number of respondents that received the survey. To support transparency and accurate interpretation of survey data, the assessment reports cite the number of survey respondents for each question and has not presented data where responses were received from a small number of respondents. Within the assessment, survey data is primarily used to triangulate findings from other sources of evidence. In addition, responses to some questions lacked responses from major partners of AfDB.

Distribution by respondents

FIGURE 46. **DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF RESPONDENTS**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=125

FIGURE 47. **DISTRIBUTION BY LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=125

FIGURE 50. **DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF DONOR**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=34

FIGURE 51. **DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF RESPONDENT**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=34

FIGURE 53. **DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF BORROWER**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=39

FIGURE 54. **PEER DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION**



Source: AfDB, MOPAN Survey – N=13